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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores whether Iraq was a consociational democracy both formally as well as in 
practice from 2003 to 2014. Consociational theories suggest that democracies that 
encompass the consociational principles of proportional representation, autonomy, power 
sharing government, and the protection of key community interests by mutual veto provisions 
are more stable. Consequently, consociational principles have frequently been promoted in 
conflict-affected environments, including in Iraq. The thesis examines how and to what extent 
each of these elements is reflected in the constitution, and in government practice in Iraq. 
The analysis is divided chronologically into three parts: the US-led occupation and drafting of 
the constitution (2003 – 2005), the first election and the continued US military presence 
(2005-2010), and the period after the second election and the withdrawal of coalition forces 
(2010-2014).  The thesis examines the consociational character of Iraq’s institutions and the 
degree of its implementation in the period in question through the analysis of key legal texts, 
and process tracing informed by primary documentary and news sources, as well as extensive 
elite interviews. On the basis of this empirical investigation, it finds four things. First, 
consociationalism is only partially reflected in the formal, constitutional provisions for Iraq’s 
governing institutions. Important practices, such as power sharing, have no constitutional 
basis in Iraq, and are at best implicit. Despite this, they are at times a prominent aspect of 
governance practice in Iraq, but at other times (e.g. during the second Maliki government for 
2010 and 2014) are undermined in practice. Second, there is strong path dependence in the 
interpretation and implementation of consociational provisions in Iraq. Thus, the way in which 
consociational provisions were formalised in the constitution and later implemented cannot 
be understood without reference to the consociational practices of the occupation regime, 
for example. Third, the degree to which consociationalism has been implemented depended 
on the political willingness of the political leadership of the country’s major communities, and 
the political leverage of the US. When US forces withdrew, and commitment in particular of 
the Shiite political leadership around Prime Minister Maliki to power sharing and other 
consociational elements declined, the consociational character of the institutions was 
increasingly compromised. Fourth, the partial application of, and weak commitment to, 
consociationalism in Iraq meant that the institutional provisions implemented could not 
effectively work as a conflict resolution tool. While partially reflected in the constitution and 
in some legislation, it could only ever be partially implemented. Thus, it did not lead to peace, 
stability, and sustainability. The gap between communities widened, resulting in the Sunnis’ 
emphasis on the creation of their own region, while the Kurds decided to hold an 
independence referendum in September 2017.  
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1 Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
In the year 2003, the invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies altered the very fabric of Iraq’s 
political system, consequently toppling Saddam Hussein’s long regime. As a result of the 
invasion, Iraq could not return to its original political state. The question of the form that the 
new Iraqi regime would take was front and centre after the invasion: what would Iraq’s new 
political institutions look like? The previous political structure was not widely accepted 
because a particular group of people had dominated the entire system. This situation was 
reported by Stansfield, who noted that “the dominance of Iraq by Sunni Arabs was striking.”1 
In particular, they controlled high-level positions without considering representatives from 
other communities. This meant that a single community “dominated out of all proportion to 
their population size.”2 The regime change became, therefore, a good opportunity for other 
communities to participate in the political institutions in proportion to their populations. Thus, 
the US invasion, and the abandonment of Saddam Hussein’s previous style of governance and 
highly personalised rule led to an opportunity to rebuild political institutions and reshape the 
political system.  
At this point, the Iraqi people were presented with the chance to look for another political 
system, which would retain all communities’ participation. This system was consociationalism. 
Consociational democracy is a system designed to draw disparate communities together to 
share power. Lijphart defines consociational democracy as “government by elite cartel 
designed to turn a democracy from a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.”3 
The creation of this kind of system should be attempted through consociational elements, 
consisting of “grand coalition, proportionality, mutual veto, and cultural autonomy.”4 These 
aspects are important for making power-sharing arrangements in deeply divided societies. 
They aim to reduce ethno-religious conflict and implement stability, with power balanced 
among different communities. Regimes change in a two-part process: first, the old regime is 
removed and second, it is replaced by a new regime.5 Stansfield argued that in the case of 
Iraq the second part “proved to be more problematic and ultimately far more dangerous” 
than the first.6 Power-sharing arrangements were one of the most critical problems facing 
those involved in Iraq’s regime change. The US-led coalition forces were invested in working 
to form political order according to power-sharing arrangements, and recognised that they 
needed to do this by “bring[ing] Iraq’s leaders together to negotiate a power-sharing deal.”7  
Essentially, it was the main responsibility of the US-led coalition forces to rebuild the political 
system and outline new political institutions because the US was recognised as an occupying 
                                                     
1 Stansfield Gareth, Iraq: People, History, Politics, Hot Spots in Global Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 2007). P.47 
2 Ibid. P.47 
3 Lijphart, Arend, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21, no. 02 (January 1969): 207–25. 
4 Lijphart, Arend, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1977). P 36.  
5 Stansfield, Gareth, Iraq. P.159 
6 Ibid. P.159 
7 Khalilzad, Zalmay, The Envoy: From Kabul to the White House, My Journey through a Turbulent World, First 
edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2016). P.233 
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country.8 The US kick-started the process by establishing the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), a 
system founded on broad-based representation.9 This meant that for the first time since 
Saddam’s regime all communities could participate in the political process, and work towards 
achieving power-sharing arrangements.  
Naturally, the question arises as to why a system of consociationalism should have been 
chosen in the first place. There are many reasons for selecting consociationalism in Iraq. First, 
consociational democracy leads to reducing conflict among ethno-religious groups. Since 
1921 Iraq “has been plagued by political instability and violence.”10 Consociationalism is a 
mechanism designed to reduce violent conflict in divided societies, of which Iraq is very much 
an example. Second, in an ideal consociational democracy everybody has a voice and 
contributes to the political process. This can be attained when a society implements 
consociational elements. 11  There are many countries, previously divided, for which 
implementing a consociational system worked effectively in managing conflict resolution.12 It 
is, therefore, a system that would suit Iraq in solving its issues and creating equal opportunity 
for all communities to participate in the political process.  
Creating consociationalism after the regime change was the clear intention of the actors 
involved; however, was it able to be implemented in practice? There were many indications 
describing the operation of the system, and these did not seem to reflect the values of 
consociationalism. While formally the Iraqi system resembled a consociational system, it is 
difficult to describe the way that it has actually operated since 2005 as consociational. So, it 
is crucial to explore the main question: was Iraq a consociational democracy, in its formal 
institutions as well as in practice? This question is composed of multiple avenues of 
investigation. First, we must look at how consociational elements are reflected in the 
permanent constitution. Second, we need to examine the implementation of consociational 
aspects from 2005 up to 2014, the end of Maliki’s government, through the legislative and 
executive power of the parliament and government. This thesis will concentrate on 
connections or divergences between formal or informal examples of consociationalism, and 
the actual practice of these during the period under investigation. This will assist in 
understanding the reality of consociational democracy in Iraq, which is a controversial point 
among proponents and opponents of the consociationalism of Iraq.  
I argue that consociational elements are partially reflected in the permanent constitution, 
which is examined in chapter 4, but that the entire constitution contains provisions 
compatible with consociationalism. This is because there were several constitutional 
provisions that required collaboration among all communities, such as the two-thirds majority 
                                                     
8 “UN Doc. S/REG/ 1483,” May 22, 2003. 
9 Bremer, L. Paul and McConnell, Malcolm, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2006). 
10 Davis, Eric, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005). P.11 
11 Lijphart, Arend, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation,” American Political 
Science Review 90, no. 02 (June 1996): 258–68. P.258 
12 Arend Lijphart, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Al Interpretatio,” American Political 
Science Association 90, no. 2 (June 1996): 258–68. p.259  
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of parliament required for forming federal council, as outlined in Article 65.13 In addition there 
were agreements among political leaders from different factions for achieving a broad-based 
government, like the Erbil agreement. 14  Obviously, there were attempts to implement 
consociational elements through political institutions and the political process. From 2003 to 
2014, the Iraqi people held four parliamentary elections and formed five cabinets. In each 
step there were different processes of implementation of consociational elements. These are 
subject to more discussion in order to investigate the actual practice of the consociational 
elements.  
There were many actors affecting the political process in Iraq, which impacted the 
implementation of power-sharing arrangements. Two groups of actors had a strong role to 
play in the political situation: the US-led coalition (externally) and individual political leaders 
(internally). Internal actors consist of the different groups affected by the political process, on 
account of their participation in rebuilding the Iraqi state. The post-Saddam period brought 
new political leaders from among the Shiite, Sunni and Kurd communities to govern Iraq. 
Compared with the twentieth century, their roles had changed, and each one was allocated 
a different position under new circumstances, where all three groups were supposed to share 
power. At the beginning of the post-2003 period, Iraq’s role was limited to simply following 
the US’s orders through the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). This meant that while Iraqi 
leaders participated in the political institutions, the final decision was always taken by the 
CPA, which was headed by L. Paul Bremer. 15  After the CPA dissolved, the role of Iraqi 
politicians slightly increased, and they ran political institutions by themselves under the US-
led coalition forces. Nevertheless, the US troops stayed until the end of 2010, and impacted 
the political process during that period. The post-2010 period was very different, because the 
political leaders in Iraq could finally act outside the bounds of US pressure.  This, however, 
again changed the situation by increasing the level of threat from the Shiite community, 
particularly with Maliki as Prime Minister.  
As mentioned, a number of external actors affected the political process in Iraq, but the role 
of the US and its overwhelming responsibility was the most dominant.  According to Security 
Council Resolution 1483, the US and UK were recognised as an occupying country: “the 
Security Council recogniz[es] the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under 
applicable international law of these states as occupying powers under a unified command 
(the “Authority”).”16 It gave the US and the UK the power to play a large role in rebuilding the 
Iraqi state and stabilising different ethnic groups. At the start of the process, the CPA formed 
and monopolised this power. The US supported the establishment of a new style of political 
system and the restructuring of political institutions in these new circumstances. Evidently, 
the US-led coalition’s decisions and encouragement influenced the political process of 
adopting consociationalism because without its participation the Iraqi people would not be 
                                                     
13 Iraq, “Permanent Constitution,” 2005. 
14 Bogaards, Matthijs, “Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Three Problems, Four Misconceptions, Some Suggestions,” 
None Published - (2016). P.12 
15 Bremer, L. Paul and McConnell, Malcolm, My Year in Iraq. P.12 
16 “UN Doc. S/REG/ 1483.” 
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ready to rebuild their political system.17 Its impact was also felt after 2010 because when the 
US withdrew their troops, the implementation of consociationalism decreased. The 
government once again became more centralised, and instituted a political system that to all 
intents and purposes resembled one-man rule. This means that if you compare the period 
2003-2010 to 2010-2014 in terms of the US’s impact, you can see that the absence of the US 
resulted in a backtracking in the process of consociational democracy. Consequently, 
according to the above discussion, the role of the US-led coalition should form part of this 
investigation because its efforts affected the direction of the political process, particularly 
with regard to power-sharing arrangements.    
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the implementation of consociational elements in Iraq is 
the main subject of this research, and the role of the US-led coalition plays a large part in this. 
While the internal actors played an important role, the most crucial role was played by the 
US from 2003 to 2014. Another important point is to show the reasons for the US’s desire to 
implement consociationalism, and how the US pushed the Iraqi people to embody power- 
sharing in the political system. These efforts can be seen in the US’s role in negotiations to 
form the cabinet from 2005 to 2014, especially after 2010, when they withdrew their troops. 
There are two main points that will be covered in this research. The first one will pay more 
attention to the reflection and implementation of consociational elements in Iraq in light of 
Lijphart’s theory. From that point, I shall investigate the question of whether Iraq was a 
consociational democracy in its formal institutions as well as in practice. This will be achieved 
through analysing the process of consociationalism step by step from 2003 to 2014. The 
second point is related to the impact of the internal and external actors in the process of 
forming power-sharing arrangements. I will particularly concentrate on the role of the US-led 
coalition as an external actor and how it affected that process. These two points allow this 
thesis to contribute to the area of consociationalism in practice. Moreover, this is the first 
detailed project to undertake a longitudinal analysis of the implementation of 
consociationalism in Iraq from 2003 to 2014, and it will therefore make an important 
contribution to the field of consociational democracy in Iraq. In the following subsection, I 
shall discuss the overarching and sub-questions that this thesis addresses, in order to show 
the value of this thesis in addressing the reality of consociational democracy in Iraq between 
2003 and 2014, and the role of the US in that process 
1.2 Research question 
The research will examine the reflection and implementation of consociationalism in Iraq 
between 2003 and 2014. It does not aim to test the theory of consociationalism itself, nor to 
reconstruct it. Rather, it is a case study, focussing on Iraq. Iraq is an interesting case because 
consociationalism had been planned as a strategy for post-invasion Iraq in terms of regime 
change. It is therefore important to ask how it was reflected formally and implemented, and 
which actors were invested in its implementation, given that violence continued in Iraq. The 
Iraqi people had accepted the permanent constitution in 2005. This constitution was 
compatible with the key elements of consociational democracy. Thus, the research question 
                                                     
17 Shareef, Mohammed, “President George W. Bush’s Policy Towards Iraq: Change or Continuity?” (Durham, 
2010), PhD Thesis, p.150. 
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for investigation in the current dissertation is: was Iraq a consociational democracy in its 
formal institutions as well as in practice from 2003 to 2014? In light of the question the thesis 
contributes to understanding the political developments in Iraq during the period, through 
the lens of consociationalism, and that it contributes to understanding why the Iraqi 
institutions, which were intended by the US to have a broadly consociational character, have 
not looked and worked in that manner in actual practice. I will conduct it on the basis of 
unique empirical work, which is interviews with key Iraqi senior leaders from that period and 
through the analysis of key legal texts, meeting minutes, memoirs and public documents. 
The contribution made by this thesis is threefold. First, it illuminates the actual practice of 
consociationalism in Iraq, as opposed to just examining the institutional design. It is 
interesting because a new political system was chosen and new political institutions formed 
in light of consociationalism. This was the first time that all ethno-religious groups 
participated in rebuilding political order and representing themselves in high-level positions 
in order to share the power. Second, it aids our understanding of the role of the US in that 
process during this time period. In this case, the implementation of consociational elements 
was affected by two different actors, one external and one internal: the US-led coalition which 
was more important and the Iraqi political elites. Third, the thesis makes an original 
contribution through the novel empirical data and insights generated from the elite 
interviews with Iraqi politicians that underpin this analysis. Thus, the question will be 
answered by investigating how actors thought and dealt with new situations and how 
consociational democracy was applied after Saddam Hussein’s regime. 
Another crucial point is the reasons for selecting the time period from 2003 to 2014. By 2003, 
the regime had changed, and a new political process had started, with the formation of 
political institutions by the US-led coalition, and the composition of the permanent 
constitution in 2005. The new political process followed, consisting of two elections and two 
cabinet governments until 2014. In order to clarify what motivated this particular choice of 
political process, the research is divided into three sections. The first part consists of the time 
period between 2003 and 2005. It involves the constitution-making process under formal US 
occupation. The second part covers the time period between 2005 and 2010, the post-
election period, as well as a period that saw a large US presence. This period was also 
characterised by violent conflict among ethno-religious groups. The third period, from 2010 
to 2014, consists of the time after the US withdrew troops, when the US presence had greatly 
lessened and therefore exercised less influence. This meant that Iraqi politicians had more 
autonomy than before. Accordingly, this thesis assesses the influence of external actors.  It 
has the advantage of being able to analyse the fate of consociationalism both while the US 
was present and afterwards, in its absence. It also allows us to examine the evolution of 
different institutions over time, and the political dynamics that underpin this. 
In light of the above, the research question can be divided into several sub-questions in order 
to provide an answer to the main research question. The first sub-question is: to what extent 
has the theory of consociationalism been reflected in the permanent constitution? This 
question is investigated in chapter four, which investigates the main part of the research 
question. This is a good foundation for the other empirical chapters, which deal with the 
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implementation of consociationalism. The second sub-question is: what was the process 
leading up to the permanent constitution in 2005? Chapter five focuses on this question and 
includes a sustained discussion about the political process from 2003 to 2005. It was during 
this crucial period that the constitution was drafted, and it was this document that 
encapsulated the fundamental framework for institution-building. Since the constitution 
offers a formalisation of the consociational model, studying this document, and the political 
processes that led up to it, is of high importance. Clearly, it is vital to discuss how the process 
was conducted, especially when attempts are made to apply the consociational model. The 
third question is: to what extent were consociational elements implemented between 2005 
and 2014? The answers to this sub-question are located in two final chapters, chapters six 
and seven. The structures of both chapters are divided into four subsections: grand coalition, 
proportionality, mutual veto, and segmental autonomy. In both chapters, I examine the 
implementation of consociational elements to rate the success of each principle. This is very 
helpful in obtaining an answer to the main research question, especially that part related to 
the practice of consociational democracy in Iraq.    
A number of smaller questions assist in investigating the main questions. These include: which 
actors were involved at each stage? What were their views on consociationalism?  Did they 
want it?  What did the actors do to pursue their wishes?  What was their role during this 
period? What was the role of the US? How did the various actors interact with each other to 
produce outcomes? What were the processes through which the outcomes were reached? 
What were the outcomes? To what extent and in what ways did they embody 
consociationalism? To what extent were consociational arrangements in fact created?  
Between 2003 and 2014 Iraq, as a country, faced political instability during the 
implementation of a new political system, which was incompatible with the main purpose of 
consociational theory. Empirically, there was no real power-sharing arrangement among all 
groups, although such an arrangement is necessary for maintaining political stability in deeply 
divided countries. The reason was that the political institutions were not inclusive, and an 
imbalance in contribution to the political process had occurred. Specifically, the Sunni 
community had been neglected in the governing process, which resulted in a lack of Sunnis 
participating in the political institutions. Another critical point was that instead of power-
sharing among all communities, the form of the government looked like one individual against 
many. This meant that consociational democracy had not been applied perfectly, and did not 
create the balance and stability among Iraqi people that had been expected. 
This study argues that while all groups formally accepted the consociational elements and 
demanded the implementation of them, this did not make them reflect and implement 
perfectly. The Iraqi case did not depend only on the internal political elite because the US 
played a large role in forming power-sharing arrangements. In addition, the implementation 
of consociational principles in Iraq has shown that the US affected that process. Investigating 
this argument requires looking for a reflection of consociational principles in Iraq’s formal 
political institutions and in the implementation of them. Through this, this research will 
uncover what went wrong during that period and will develop suggestions for a better 
implementation of consociationalism. The implementation of consociational elements could 
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be improved in Iraq because it is one important option for creating a balance among ethno-
religious groups, if all groups really do want to practise true consociationalism. The following 
sections explore the structure of the dissertation, chapter by chapter.   
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation 
The first section of the dissertation provides the theoretical background to consociationalism, 
and a review of the literature. The second section will look at formal institutions, and the 
formal reflection of consociationalism, as represented, for example, in the permanent 
constitution. The third section consists of an empirical analysis, which examines 
consociationalism in practice. It is divided into two periods, 2005-2010 and 2010- 2014, each 
corresponding to one election period. During the first period, Iraq was subject to the presence 
of the US-led coalition, while during the second, the US was no longer a presence in Iraq. Thus, 
through these three sections, the thesis examines the formal (institutions) and informal 
(practices) application of consociationalism in Iraq.  
At the level of chapters, chapter 2, which follows this introduction, provides a literature 
review about consociationalism and its practise in Iraq. It is divided into three subsections: 1) 
the theory of consociationalism; 2) consociationalism in Iraq; and 3) US-led state rebuilding 
in Iraq. It focuses on Lijphart’s theory and those who supported his approach to governing 
deeply divided societies. On the other hand, it puts forwards Horowitz’s approach about 
integration, which is opposed to the theory of consociationalism. In addition, it discusses how 
existing literature contributes to the implementation of consociational democracy in Iraq. 
Thus, it helps to identify the research gap and determine a suitable question to address it. In 
other words, the literature review helps to know what work has already been done, and what 
has not yet been investigated.  
Chapter 3 introduces the research methodology I have used for this research. In particular, it 
focuses on textual analysis and process tracing. When analysing the permanent constitution, 
I used textual analysis. The other method used, process tracing, was implemented wherever 
it was required and feasible. It is often used for single case studies, as it allows a detailed 
understanding of processes like adoption and implementation of practices, in this case of 
consociationalism in Iraq. Several pieces of data have been highlighted, and they form primary 
sources for the research (e.g. interviews with elite politicians, minutes of meetings). 
Secondary sources, written by those with expertise in the field, were also consulted.   
Chapter 4 analyses two main points. First, it explores the consociational elements in the 
permanent constitution, and second, it compares these with similar elements in other 
consociational countries. It aims to understand the nature of the permanent constitution, and 
to what degree the theory of consociationalism is reflected in it. For that reason, the chapter 
is divided among four subsections, which are: grand coalition, proportionality, mutual veto, 
and cultural autonomy. Thus, this chapter compares the Iraqi case with other consociational 
countries, and aims to find out how Iraq’s constitution is formally compatible with 
consociationalism.    
Chapter 5 addresses the origins of the permanent constitution and the political process that 
led up to creating it between 2003 and 2005. There were many significant events that 
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happened during that period, which are analysed within this chapter, from which the 
constitution emerged. Therefore, it is crucial to explain how consociationalism was seen as a 
conflict resolution tool. During that time, significant actors thought that power-sharing 
arrangements would be the way to tackle issues among all communities.  In several 
subsections, this chapter examines each of the new political institutions that were established 
between 2003 and 2005, starting with the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and ending with the 
Constitutional Drafting Commission.  
Chapter 6 illustrates to what extent consociational elements were implemented between 
2005 and 2010. It is structured in light of Lijphart’s theory. Each section tries to examine the 
reality of these elements’ implementation during that period. It includes crucial information 
and evidence supporting the arguments and answering the sub-questions. In addition, it 
provides external perspectives (like that of the US) about the consociational process.  
Chapter 7 has the same structure and aims but covers a different time period, relating to the 
implementation of consociationalism from 2010 to 2014. Many interesting events took place 
during that time, leading to a change in the balance among participants within the political 
institutions.  The significant change is related to the US’s withdrawal of troops because 
directly after that Iraq experienced an increase in conflict. Thus, the implementation of 
consociationalism had created more instability in Iraq.  
Chapter 8 is the conclusion of the thesis. It includes a discussion about the outcome of the 
dissertation and provides an answer to the main research question, posed at the beginning 
of the thesis. It is important to connect this last discussion with the aim of the study. The 
conclusion is based on the foregoing chapters, and the main points concern the success of the 
research and the answer to the research question. This final chapter draws out the overall 
conclusions of the work, generating new solutions and proving that the research gap that was 
determined at the beginning of the dissertation has been filled.    
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2 Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
There is substantial literature available on consociational democracy with respect to Iraq; 
however, it is not specifically about Iraq from 2003 to 2014. This study focuses on those years 
alone. In addition, it takes as its theoretical basis Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism as a 
conflict resolution tool. Finally, it covers the actual implementation of consociationalism in 
Iraq between 2003 and 2014. A number of scholars other than Lijphart have contributed to 
determining the features of consociationalism. Among them, there have been many debates 
between those who supported the idea as a solution for deeply divided societies and those 
who did not. Lijphart and his proponents supported the concept as a way of managing 
conflicts among ethno-religious groups in particular.  
The aim of reviewing the literature is to demonstrate that there is a gap in scholarship. The 
literature currently available focuses more on formal consociationalism, and not much on its 
actual practice. This is the case in the context of Iraq. With that in mind, we should begin at 
the core of the concept, first to define it, and then to determine how far consociationalism 
has been implemented in Iraq. The current chapter, therefore, will discuss the main works on 
the subject and analyse the different arguments put forward. Within it, there are three 
subsections, the first setting out the literature on consociational democracy as a tool for 
conflict resolution, the second addressing consociationalism in Iraq in particular, and the third 
looking at US-led statebuilding in Iraq. 
2.2 Consociational democracy as a tool for conflict resolution 
As we have seen, consociational democracy is mainly based on Lijphart’s theory, which was 
initially developed in 1968, beginning with Typologies of Democratic Systems, 18 
Consociational Democracy,19 and Democracy in Plural Societies.20 In these works, he stated 
that deeply divided societies tend to be more stable if they apply consociationalism. He points 
out that “democracies with subcultural cleavages and with tendencies toward immobilism 
and instability which are deliberately turned into more stable systems by the leaders of the 
major subcultures may be called consociational democracies.”21 This type of democracy is 
“willing to accommodate a variety of groups of divergent ideas in order to achieve a goal of 
unity ...”22 In other words, a consociational democracy should make concessions for groups 
in order to bring all groups together in stable circumstances and “to ensure political stability 
in countries with deeply divided societies.”23 For Lijphart, consociational democracy involves 
“turning democracy from fragmented political culture into a stable democracy through 
                                                     
18 Lijphart, Arend, “Typologies of Democratic Systems,” Comparative Political Studies 1, no. 1 (April 1, 1968): 3–
44. 
19 Lijphart, Arend, “Consociational Democracy.” 
20 Lijphart, Arend, Democracy in Plural Societies. 
21 Lijphart, Arend, “Typologies of Democratic Systems.” 
22 Ibid. pp.20-21  
23 Doorenspleet, Renske and Ammar Maleki, Understanding Patterns of Democracy: Reconsidering Societal 
Divisions and Bringing Societal Culture Back In. In Consociationalism and Power-Sharing in Erope, Jakala, Kuzu, 
and Qvortrup., 1st ed. (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). P.11 
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preparing government by the elite cartel.” 24  O’Leary pointed out that “a cartel is anti-
competitive, and outlawing of competition (and opposition) cannot be part of any 
consociations that is democratic.”25 However, might be historical tradition, memoires, and 
competing nationalist, religion, and ethnicity interpretations of the past affect the process of 
consociational institutions. 26  Lijphart pointed out, consociational government should 
incorporate four main elements: grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality, and segmental 
autonomy; all of them work together, but the main feature is grand coalition, while the others 
are secondary elements.27 Jarrett said, “if conditions are conducive, such as the willingness of 
former adversaries to participate in arrangements and engage with each other, 
consociationalism can prove to be a highly successful method of managing conflict.”28 Thus, 
these four elements are the building blocks for conflict reduction among ethno-religious 
groups in ethnically and religiously divided societies.    
Later on, Lijphart classified these principles into primary and secondary elements. Primary 
elements include 1) grand coalition (all ethno-religious groups share political decision-making, 
mainly within the government), and 2) group autonomy (each group has the right to govern 
their own internal affairs). 29  Secondary elements include 1) proportionality (proportional 
representation, especially at the legislative level, proportional appointment to the civil service, 
and proportional allocation of public funds), and 2) mutual veto (each group has the right to 
exercise a veto, mainly to prevent the hegemony of political institutions by the majority 
group.30 Consequently, both categories of consociational principles can take different forms, 
democratic or authoritarian, formal or informal, and liberal or corporate in different divided 
places.31 Each of these elements performs a large role in reducing conflict among groups 
already divided. In short, these act as drivers for conflict resolution in a divided society, in 
terms of governing, participations, minority rights, and sharing power.  
In 1999, Lijphart explored consensus democracy in his book Patterns of Democracy. It is not 
the same as consociational democracy, but there is little difference between consensus and 
consociational democracy. Lijphart pointed out that the “consensus model [is] characterised 
                                                     
24 Lijphart, Arend, “Consociational Democracy.” 
25 O’Leary Brendan, ed., The Logics of Power-Sharing, Consociation and Pluralist Federations. Settling Self-
Determination Disputes: Complex Power-Sharing in Theory and Practice. M. Weller et Al., Ed (Leiden ; Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008). P. 50 
26 Loizides, Neophytos, Arend Lijphart and Consociationalism in Cyprus. In In Consociationalism and Power-
Sharing in Erope, Jakala, Kuzu, and Qvortrup (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Pp163-164 
27 Lijphart, Arend, Consociationalism After Half a Century. In Consociationalism and Power-Sharing in Erope, 
Jakala, Kuzu, and Qvortrup., 1st ed. (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). P.1 
28 Jarrett, Henry, The Limits of Consociational Power Sharing. In Consociationalism and Power-Sharing in Erope, 
Jakala, Kuzu, and Qvortrup., 1st ed. (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). P.35F 
29 Lijphart, Arend, The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy. The Architecture of Democracy, Andrew Reynolds 
(Oxford University Press, 2002). P.39 
30 Lijphart, Arend, Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice 
(London ; New York: Routledge, 2008). P.8 
31 McEvoy, Joanne and O’Leary, Brendan, eds., Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places, 1st ed, National and 
Ethnic Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 
P.27 
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by inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise.” 32  These characteristics are opposed to 
majority rule, which is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial.33 Doorenspleet and Maleki 
said “while majoritarian democracy are characterized by a high concentration of political 
power, consensus system emphasize the importance of power sharing.” 34  Therefore, 
consensus democracy totally opposes the majoritarian model, and concentrates on points 
which lead to the formation of political institutions based on power sharing arrangements. 
The consensus model is better at ensuring representation, particularly in terms of minority 
groups’ participation in the political process.35 This is in contrast to the majoritarian model, 
which does not allow the opportunity for minority representation, since political positions are 
usually dominated by the majority.  
While Lijphart used consensus and consociational for power sharing in his works, there are 
some differences between both.36 Bogaards pointed out that the “consociational democracy 
is explicitly defined in terms of both sociopolitical and political characteristics, consensus 
democracy is distinguished by political characteristics only.”37 Although the differences are 
slight, each system has its own boundaries and functions. The ten characteristics that shape 
consensus democracy are: executive power-sharing, executive-legislative balance of power, 
a multi-party system, proportional representation, interest group corporatism, federal and 
decentralised government, strong bicameralism, constitutional rigidity, judicial review, and 
central bank independence.38 The issue with consensus democracy, as Lijphart worked out, 
is that it is more applicable to a society that is not broadly divided, and therefore functions 
more like an alternative to the majoritarian model. 39  This is why Lijphart strongly 
recommended consociational, rather than consensus, democracy for societies that are deeply 
divided by ethno-religious groups.40  Thus, the preferable type of democracy for conflict 
reduction in the society strongly divided consists of consociational, rather than consensus, 
elements. 
Moreover, Lijphart points out that “consociational theory challenges the two paradigmatic 
notions that democracy should be equated with majority rule, and that democracy is not a 
viable form of government in a deeply divided state.”41 In other words, in deeply divided 
societies, majority and minority rule cannot work as a tool for conflict resolution, because of 
                                                     
32 Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). P.2 
33 Ibid. P.2 
34 Doorenspleet, Renske and Ammar Maleki, Understanding Patterns of Democracy: Reconsidering Societal 
Divisions and Bringing Societal Culture Back In. In Consociationalism and Power-Sharing in Erope, Jakala, Kuzu, 
and Qvortrup. 
35 Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy. P.275 
36 Lijphart, Arend, Thinking about Democracy. P.6 
37 Bogaards, Matthijs, “The Uneasy Relationship between Empirical and Normative Types in Consociational 
Theory,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 12, no. 4 (October 2000): 395–423. P.410 
38 Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy. P.34-41  
39 Ibid. P.33 
40 Lijphart, Arend, Thinking about Democracy. P.8 
41 Lijphart, Arend, “Majority Rule versus Democracy in Deeply Divided Societies,” Politikon 4, no. 2 (December 
1977): 113–26. 
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the divisions between ethno-religious groups. In contrast, as O’Leary pointed out, “power 
sharing is intended to enhance effective and peaceful political participation, especially by 
minorities.”42 This is because if the majority dominate posts and ignore the minority, conflict 
violence is exacerbated. Thus, consociational democracy requires participation from both the 
majority and the minority in order to avoid a clash between both. Consociational elements 
function as ways to escape instability in countries facing ethno-religious conflict.    
As discussed earlier, a compromise between majority and minority groups should be 
fundamental in deeply divided societies, because practising majoritarian democracy cannot 
lead to conflict resolution across ethno-religious groups.  That was Lijphart’s core reason for 
identifying the four main consociational characteristics for tackling this issue in deeply divided 
societies.43  
In order to support the theory, Lijphart draws on many cases, including the Netherlands, 
Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Lebanon, Malaysia, and Cyprus. By making reference to these 
cases, Lijphart points out that consociational democracy is an empirical and normative model, 
and that it is applicable to deeply divided societies.44 He views consociational democracy as 
a compromise, which accommodates both the majority and minority, calling it “kinder and 
gentler”.45    
In light of the above, the main purpose of consociationalism is to ensure stability and peace 
through reducing conflict and violence. O’Leary emphasises that “power-sharing, rightly, is a 
standard prescription for protracted national, ethnic and communal conflicts in deeply 
divided territories.”46 For this reason, power-sharing is the main tool for conflict resolution, 
and attempts to both shape political institutions and promote collaboration among different 
groups. McGarry, however, believes that “peace and political stability need more than the 
creation of power-sharing or autonomous institutions, they also need a viable peace 
process.”47 According to O’Leary, the scope of consociationalism has hitherto been restricted 
to political institutions. As McGarry says, “consociationalists have focused narrowly on the 
design of political institutions, including executives, legislatures, and election systems.”48 
O’Leary also argues that a narrow objective of consociationalism is “the arrangement of 
political institutions to prevent the monopoly, permanent or temporary, of executive, 
legislative, judicial, bureaucratic, military, or culture power.”49 Political institutions can, then, 
act as an important arena for conducting conflict management. It is through the distribution 
of posts among these institutions that divided countries can avoid the domination of posts by 
                                                     
42 McEvoy, Joanne and O’Leary, Brendan, Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places. P.16 
43 Lijphart, Arend, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004): 96–109. 
44 Lijphart, Arend, Democracy in Plural Societies. P. 1 
45 Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy. P.275 
46 O’Leary Brendan, Settling Self-Determination Disputes. P.47 
47 McGarry, John, Power-Sharing Theory: Lessons from Complex Power-Sharing Project. Settling Self-
Determination Disputes: Complex Power-Sharing in Theory and Practice. M. Weller et Al., Ed, First (Leiden ; 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008). P.703 
48 Ibid. P.700 
49 McEvoy, Joanne and O’Leary, Brendan, Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places. P.4 
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a single group. Thus, resolving or reducing conflict violent among different groups in societies 
that are already divided is driven by consociational elements.  
Another important point is the involvement of elite political leaders for achieving the aim of 
consociationalism. McGarry believes that “the central idea in consociational theory is that if 
ethnically, religiously, or linguistically-divided polities are to enjoy political stability, 
segmental leaders must share power.”50  Power sharing by political leaders is necessary, 
because if the elites do not cooperate, consociationalism does not work. More importantly, 
if leaders do not cooperate, conflict ensues. Consociationalism requires elites to coordinate 
and agree on the distribution of public resources. Supporters of consociationalism emphasise 
that this support of the elite can lead to a ‘trickle-down’ effect, as “they think that segmental 
leaders can engage in the politics of compromise, and persuade their followers to follow 
suit.” 51  This is why Lijphart says “consociational democracy means government by elite 
cartel.”52  
It is absolutely essential for a divided society to have a power sharing system in order to 
ensure that decisions are made collaboratively, rather than by a majority at the top, and that 
is why some consociational countries such as Belgium, Lebanon, etc., have operated in this 
way for a long time. If there is cooperation at the highest levels of government, then this will 
be reflected positively among the people. There are three main factors encouraging elites to 
build power sharing arrangements in deeply divided societies. These consist of external 
threats, multiple balance of power among the subcultures, and relatively low total load on 
the decision-making apparatus.53 Those factors motivate elites to cooperate to build a stable 
and peaceful country for different religious groups. When the leaders cooperate, the entire 
process moves towards reducing conflict violence between ethno-religious groups. Hence, 
the participation of those at the elite level is a fundamental part of consociationalism as a 
conflict resolution tool.  
The electoral system has the important role of facilitating power sharing through the political 
leaders it selects. It contributes to the formation of political institutions, and shapes the 
relationship between parliament and government. Lijphart believes that the list forms of 
proportional representation (PR) are the best electoral system for building power-sharing 
arrangements in deeply divided societies, and recommends their use in the consociational 
system. 54   Because the PR system produces proportionality, it is preferable to single 
transferable votes. Within the PR system, the list may be open or closed. 55  Therefore, 
Grofman and Lijphart state that the “list PR is more attractive to established political parties 
                                                     
50 McGarry, John, Power-Sharing Theory: Lessons from Complex Power-Sharing Project. Settling Self-
Determination Disputes: Complex Power-Sharing in Theory and Practice. M. Weller et Al., Ed. 
51 Ibid. P.691 
52 Lijphart, Arend, “Consociational Democracy.” P.31 
53 Ibid. P. 217-218 
54 Lijphart, Arend, The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy. The Architecture of Democracy, Andrew Reynolds. 
P.41 
55 Ibid. P.53 
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and hence much more widely used.”56 Divided societies require a system which includes 
representatives of all groups, and gives each group the opportunity to participate in political 
institutions. Political parties from each ethno-religious group try to obtain their due 
proportion through the electoral law, which is based on list PR. List PR, especially the closed 
list system, often gives political parties a good opportunity to form an “elite cartel”. 
Lijphart argues that “PR exists in many forms, all of which share the principle that political 
parties win roughly the same percentage of seats as the percentage of votes they receive.”57 
This means that all ethno-religious groups will share power and contribute to the decision-
making process according to the percentage of votes each entity receives in the election 
process.  Supporters of power sharing emphasise that using a proportional representation 
system in the election process probably motivates consociational democracy.58  Therefore, in 
ethno-religious divisions, the voting rule leads to the correct representation of voter 
preferences.59 Thus, PR is a mechanism that makes cooperation among different entities 
highly likely, and produces proportionality for ethno-religious groups. PR makes it impossible 
for a single group to form political institutions, so that all groups will cooperate in structuring 
the House of Representatives and the government.   
On the other hand, Donald Horowitz has a different vision about conflict reduction in deeply 
divided societies. His work concentrates on the integration of different groups, rather than 
managing conflict through consociationalism. In his book Ethnic Groups in Conflict, he 
suggests five main elements for reducing conflict in ethnically, religiously or linguistically 
divided societies. Those mechanisms consist of “1) dispersion of power, by proliferating the 
point of power, 2) devolution of power and arrangements that emphasize intraethnic 
competition, 3) incentives for interethnic cooperation, 4) strategies to encourage alternative 
alignments, and 5) reducing disparities between groups.”60 These elements are obviously 
different from the consociational elements which Lijphart proposed, as mentioned earlier in 
this section. Consociationalism is, then, not the only option to reduce conflict resolution in 
divided societies. As Brian Barry points out, generalizing consociationalism as a prescription 
for deeply divided societies is “much more doubtful than is commonly supposed.”61  The 
reason is that the cases Lijphart discusses from Switzerland, Austrian, Belgium and the 
Netherlands are not successful enough as evidence to support the consociationalists’ claim.62 
This led to criticism that consociationalism was misrepresenting the evidence in order to 
support the outcome that it presumed. As an alternative to consociationalism, integrationists 
                                                     
56 Lijphart Arend and Grofman Bernard, eds., Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives, American 
Political Parties and Elections (New York: Praeger, 1984). 
57 Lijphart, Arend, “The Alternative Vote: A Realistic Alternative for South Africa?,” Politikon 18, no. 2 (June 
1991): 91–101. P.91 
58 McEvoy, Joanne and O’Leary, Brendan, Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places. P.387 
59 Grofman, Bernard, Electoral Rules and Ethnic Representation and Accommodation: Combining Social Choice 
and Electoral System Perspectives. The Architecture of Democracy, Andrew Reynolds (Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
60 Horowitz, Donald L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). P.598-599 
61 Barry, Brian, “Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy,” British Journal of 
Political Science 5, no. 04 (October 1975): 477. P.481 
62 Ibid. 
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proposed reinforcing the central government instead of reinforcing minorities and self-
governance. There are some controversial points between proponents and opponents of 
consociationalism in terms of managing conflict reduction.  
Horowitz criticises Lijphart because, as he points out, many of the places that Lijphart 
mentioned (including Lebanon, Malaysia, Surinam, and Netherlands Antilles) did not have 
grand coalition government.63 Horowitz points out that “each had an inter‐ethnic coalition of 
some political parties, opposed by other parties representing the same groups.”64 This kind 
of coalition is not grand coalition, and does not lead to conflict reduction because it does not 
accommodate all main groups. Centripetalists like Horowitz proposed an alternative 
instrument in order to build coalition among groups: preelection agreement. The main reason 
for this was that centripetalists doubted that elites could really collaborate in a deeply divided 
society. Thus, they preferred cooperation by voters rather than elites. In light of Horowitz’s 
approach, Reilly states that centripetalists “advocate institutions which encourage inter-
communal moderation by promoting multi-ethnic political parties, crosscutting electoral 
incentives and intergroup accommodation.”65 Thus, integrationists demand the formation of 
institutions designed to induce ethno-religious groups to move towards a centre. The way in 
which political institutions are formed can play an important role in implementing 
“cooperation, accommodation and integration across ethnic divides.”66   
According to centripetalism, integration replaces accommodation through encouraging the 
election of moderate representatives. 67  Horowitz argues that the electoral system or 
electoral incentives have a huge impact on achieving coalition by political parties and voters 
across ethno-religious groups.68 In discussing the position of the integrationists relative to 
that of the consociationalists, Stefan Wolff points out that integrationists emphasise that 
consociational democracy is “morally unacceptable and practically prone to collapse”69. As an 
alternative, the integrationists’ proposed solution consists of “mainly electoral mechanisms 
to induce moderation and conflict reduction, primarily the use of the Alternative Vote, a 
majoritarian preferential electoral system.”70 It seems that the alternative approach mainly 
relies on the electoral system, especially the alternative vote (AV).  
While Lijphart preferred list PR for producing proportional representation, Horowitz states 
that “list PR is likely to produce a great deal of party fragmentation.” 71  He prefers the 
                                                     
63 Horowitz, Donald, Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes. Andrew Reynolds, The Architecture of 
Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2002). P.22 
64 Ibid. 
65 Reilly, Benjamin, “Institutional Designs for Diverse Democracies: Consociationalism, Centripetalism and 
Communalism Compared,” European Political Science 11, no. 2 (June 2012): 259–70. P.260 
66 Ibid. P.265 
67 Horowitz, Donald, “Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 4 (2003): 
115–27. 
68 Horowitz, Donald L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict. P.507 
69 Wolff, Stefan, “Conflict Resolution between Power Sharing and Power Dividing, or Beyond?,” Political 
Studies Review 5, no. 3 (September 2007): 377–93. P.377 
70 Ibid. 
71 Horowitz, Donald, “Electoral Systems.” P.122 
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alternative vote (AV) because it brings moderate representation results through a process of 
preferences. 72  Reilly pointed out that “the apparent benefits of preferential voting in 
comparison to first-past-the-post for divided societies are persuasive.”73 For this reason, the 
centripetalists recommended the AV as a suitable mechanism for “encouraging 
accommodation between competing groups, by rewarding moderation in policy positions and 
by providing a more representative legislature.”74 This kind of outcome relies on the electoral 
system. Under the AV, coalitions form among ethno-religious groups prior to instead of after 
the election, because this leads to increasing their share of the vote.75 On the other hand, list 
PR encourages postelectoral coalitions that rely heavily on the performance of the elite 
political leaders involved. While Lijphart proposes single transferable vote (STV) in some cases, 
he prefers list PR to the STV, and closed list or almost closed to open list PR.76 Arguing against 
Lijphart, Horowitz states that “STV provides weaker incentives to compromise than 
preferential systems with majority thresholds do.”77 It is for this reason that he thought the 
electoral system should produce “incentives for interethnic cooperation and for preelection 
coalitions based on vote pooling.”78 
In accordance with Horowitz’s approach, the AV should effectively encourage the 
establishment of a multi-ethnic coalition, such as that which won the election according to 
the 1997 Fijian constitution.79 These types of election are very complicated, and require a 
long process. In some cases, such as the Austrian election in 1990, the candidate won the seat 
only in the seventh round of preferences by AV.80 Centripetalists assert that AV leads to 
collaboration among voters in a broad based political party system, because the they will 
recognise that a preferred candidate needs a majority of votes.  But if centripetalism really 
did encourage voter collaboration, then the Austrian election would have been resolved long 
before it reached the seventh round of votes. Horowitz’s evidence was criticised by Lijphart, 
who pointed out that Horowitz’s evidence of AV was based on Sri Lanka's 1982 and 1988 
presidential elections, which did not require second preferences, since both were won in the 
first round.81 Surely if one political party or one ethno-religious group already maintained an 
absolute majority in a deeply divided society, then the election would be finished in the first 
round, without requiring second or third preferences. In that case, political institutions would 
be dominated by the majority group, increasing, rather than reducing, conflict violence. 
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Furthermore, integrationists believe that the mechanism that leads to reducing conflict 
violence among ethno-religious groups is the AV, which produces preelectoral coalitions.  As 
Wolff pointed out, “it is clear that conflict reduction is to be achieved through inducing 
interethnic cooperation before and at the polls rather than after elections.”82 In addition, 
Horowitz asserts that “preelectoral coalitions across group lines required compromise on 
ethnic issues.”83 Thus, this type of electoral system tries to “break down the political salience 
of social divisions rather than foster their representation.”84  Sisk argues that “minorities 
should have more than representation, they should have influence.” 85  In this way, 
integrationists concentrate on how minorities can become stronger in the political institution, 
rather than just how they can be represented. This is very much against the approach of 
consociationalism, which works to reinforce ethno-religious group representation through list 
PR. However, Reilly pointed out that the list PR offers some motivation for avoiding political 
fragmentation in deeply divided societies such as Iraq.86 In the case of Iraq, it seems unlikely 
that the AV could bring stability and peace. The situation in Iraq requires power sharing rather 
than integration.  
Another controversial point between centripetalists and consociationalists is the political 
party system. In fact, the political party system has an impact on shaping political institutions, 
especially in deeply divided societies, in order to manage conflict. Political parties in a 
consociational approach are formed along ethnic, religious and linguistic lines. According to 
Lijphart, a multi-dimensional party system “is very likely to occur in plural societies with three 
or more segments and proportional representation.”87 In addition, consociationalists prefer 
“parties which represent social cleavages explicitly.”88 This kind of party system is based on 
small vote thresholds, which commonly yield to an inclusive multiparty parliament, which 
encourages political leaders to cooperate in order to be a part of the coalition government.89 
On the other hand, Horowitz argues that the ethnic party system that consociationalists 
recommended actually fosters ethnic conflict. Because each party is ethnically-based, it will 
focus on its own interests.90 Alternatively, integrationists recommended an aggregative party 
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system that bridges ethnic groups.91 As we have seen, there are major differences between 
both approaches for dealing with the party system, because “majoritarian electoral systems 
are thought to encourage ‘bridging’ cross-identity appeals.”92 However, consociationalism 
supports a bonding strategy through advocating “the presence of ethnically based parties and 
party system.”93 A party system based on bridging conflict between ethnic groups produces 
institutions based on cooperation and integration among voters (across identities), rather 
than political leaders. Such a system leads to weak collaboration among political leaders in 
the parliament. In short, according to centripetalists the best instrument for conflict reduction 
in a plural society is the establishment of party bridging.   
The creation of federal regions as one consociational element for reducing conflict violence 
in deeply divided societies is another debatable point. As mentioned above, consociationalists 
propose autonomy and federation, but centripetalists suggest centralisation. Lijphart pointed 
out that “in order to be able to make the federal dividing lines coincide as much as possible 
with the ethnic boundaries, consociational theory recommends federalism.”94 It is a good 
opportunity for each group to determine its territory with geographical boundaries, which 
leads to reducing issues among ethno-religious groups. On the other hand, Horowitz is more 
sceptical. He states that in a country ethnically or religiously divided, federalism and 
autonomy reinforce minority groups’ conflict and that “the most potent way to assure that 
federalism or regional autonomy will not become just a step to secession is to reinforce those 
specific interests that groups have in the undivided state”.95  
According to Horowitz, consociational theory does not succeed in taking into account cultural 
and political autonomy. This is particularly because in conflict reduction there are issues 
regarding equality, and minority groups having to make concessions to the majority group, so 
it is not a simple issue.96 Cultural and political autonomy reinforce sectarian identities, rather 
than tackling the issues relating to the division. In addition, implementing federalism means 
that the country would be divided into two or more parts, prompting harsher competition for 
narrow interests, and therefore increasing conflict among them. On this basis, Horowitz 
argues that the best method to guarantee that autonomy will not develop as a stage to 
separation is “to reinforce those specific interests that groups have in the undivided state.”97 
The most suitable strategy is for all groups to take responsibility for the whole country, not 
just concentrating on their own interests, giving each group “a strong stake in the center, 
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[since] devolution can help avert separatism.”98 So in that context, autonomy “is the product 
of the reduction of inter-ethnic conflict, not an ingredient of a conflict-regulating prescription 
at the threshold.” 99  Autonomy can lead to different outcomes. For instance, within a 
homogeneous society, intra-group competition will be raised, but in a heterogeneous society, 
the competition stirs inter-group rivalries.100 In short, the solution from integrationists for 
conflict reduction is a unitary system, and they believe that segmental autonomy may lead to 
secession.  
Both approaches have been discussed above, along with the evidence for their arguments. 
There is no resolution for this kind of debate, especially where different countries will always 
have different (and very nuanced) features, but there are key arguments that 
consociationalists propose, which consist of particular elements of consociationalism. The 
consociational advocates argue that Iraq is a strong case for applying this approach because 
it has clear sectarian division, a common legacy domination by a single group, and domination 
by other groups. For example, the Kurdish population has always been very separate and very 
difficult to integrate. The Iraqi political system as it now stands formed in accordance with 
the aims of a power sharing arrangement: to share power among ethno-religious groups, and 
to stabilise Iraq. I will discuss consociationalism in Iraq in the next section.   
2.3 Consociationalism in Iraq 
After the collapse, the USA and its allies, alongside UN advisers, formed the Iraqi Governing 
Council (IGC) and cabinets, and prepared an election process. The crucial step towards 
practising consociationalism was the structure of IGC, because it included all the main ethno-
religious groups, and considered their aims to manage conflict. At that time, all of them 
accepted being a part of the resulting coalition of elites, a coalition based on PR, because it 
was “a logic of institutional design that Iraq was moving to embrace.”101 This logic enabled 
the establishment of a political system that reinforced each group’s impact, since “each group 
should expect to have a share of power roughly proportional to its weight in society.”102 It 
was clear in the wake of the invasion that Iraqi society would require an alternative system, 
based on PR and decentralising power, which would accommodate all groups. The regime 
change provided the opportunity to apply this type of solution. Larry Diamond argues that 
ethno-religious groups should make an agreement among themselves to decide how power 
should be shared, which political concessions should be made, and how conflict violence can 
be avoided.103 Diamond states that in the case of Iraq, three conditions are essential: “the 
political arena must be made more inclusive; there must be a balance of power among Iraqi 
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groups, and Iraq’s major politicians and parties must evince the elite’s pragmatism and 
flexibility.”104  
Wimmer, however, advocates the AV vote instead of PR. He frames “as an alternative to 
power sharing, an electoral system that fosters moderation and compromise across the 
ethnic divides[…]”.105 Wimmer argues that the AV “provides a good incentive for moderation 
across the dividing lines of ethnicity and religion.”106 It is clear that Wimmer supports the 
centripetalists’ approach to governing Iraq and rebuilding sustainable political institutions. 
Ali Gokpinar argues that both approaches, consociationalism and centripetalism, should be 
used in analysing the case for power sharing in Iraq.107 It is impossible to discuss how both 
models would function in Iraq with regard to power sharing arrangements, because each has 
its own boundaries and specific structural characteristics that would lead to different 
outcomes.  
Some scholars (such as Horowitz, Barry, and Wimmer) encouraged a political system for Iraq 
that was the same as in integrated countries, that is, a centralising political system. However, 
others supported consociational democracy as the best style for the new Iraqi state. For 
example, Lijphart, McGarry, and O’Leary strongly recommended consociationalism for Iraq. 
Despite the fact that particular scholars advocated implementing an integrative approach, 
there was no chance for it to become part of the political system. This is partly due to the fact 
that centripetalism cannot be compatible with Iraq’s current conditions and the history of its 
political development. If Horowitz’s approach was applied to Iraqi institutions, political 
institutions would mostly involve followers of the Shi’ite majority, which, as Lijphart pointed 
out, is hard to imagine.108 Since they were aware of this possible outcome, the Kurd and Shiite 
communities were against the centripetalists’ approach, and advocated power sharing 
arrangements.109 McGarry and O’Leary also came to the conclusion that consociationalism 
would be better for Iraq, as it is a deeply divided place, and this concept is clearly reflected in 
the permanent constitution.110 The majoritarian principle has consistently been ignored in 
Iraq because of the challenges the country would face if a Shiite majority governed Iraq: this 
political system would lead to authoritarianism.111 Byman points out that the democratic 
process in Iraq was not based on majoritarian rule because there was no opportunity to 
implement it in a country that contains such diverse religious and ethnic groups.112 To sum 
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up, consociationalism is the only approach that can suitably explain the case of Iraq, because 
it was formally enshrined in the constitution and contributed to the structuring of formal 
political institutions.  
Political leaders tried to place some consociational elements in the permanent constitution 
formally, especially elements relating to the structure of political institutions. This could 
happen because the permanent constitution was drafted mainly by Shiites and Kurds, while 
the rights of the Sunnis, who boycotted the process, were neglected. Therefore, the 
permanent constitution gained acceptance by the majority of Shiites and Kurds but only some 
Sunnis, because the majority of Sunnis boycotted the constitution referendum. This meant 
that the Shiite and Kurdish agendas succeeded. Dodge noted that this was the result of an 
exclusive elite bargain pact, and one of the core features of the political system in 2005, then 
becoming a cause of civil war in Iraq.113 That is one of the reasons that Horowitz states that 
“the future of an inclusive government will therefore turn on Sunni success in achieving 
fundamental change in these constitutional arrangements.”114 The permanent constitution 
needs to include the Sunnis’ proposals in order to avoid conflict violence.  
Another important point is that Iraq’s constitution is based on a liberal consociation, which 
permits each group to self-determine its administration and representation.115 McGarry and 
O’Leary pointed out that this kind of liberal approach “focused on democratic preferences 
rather than on predetermined ethnic or communal categories.”116  Furthermore, it is an 
example of formal consociational government, because consociational elements are 
stipulated by the constitution of 2005.117 These are the subject of chapter four, where I 
discuss each element, and where it can be found in the permanent constitution, separately.  
There is no doubt that the permanent constitution was developed by consensus among the 
key communities. However, there are surprisingly few consociational elements in the 
constitution.118 Although the permanent constitution contains some consociational elements, 
there are no stipulations for grand coalition in it. The inclusion of consociational elements was 
a real issue that the Iraqi people faced during the formation of the cabinet. Younis worked 
out that the Iraqi constitution was based on Lijphart’s recommendations for applying 
consociational features, but that it did not bring peace, and in fact undermines political 
stability.119 She argues that the permanent constitution was clearly unsuccessful in identifying 
the vital “role that it could play in post-conflict reconciliation, and has instead instituted 
clauses that have directly retarded the reconciliation process.”120 She openly criticises the 
theory of consociationalism, and prefers an alternative approach for managing conflict 
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violence. The reason she gives is that consociationalism did not create stability and 
sustainability in Iraq from 2005 to 2010. Concurring with this, Bogaards pointed out “the sad 
fact, though, is that post-Saddam Iraq has never been a democracy and never been at 
peace.” 121  He emphasises how the issue is related to the constitution, because “the 
constitutional process lacked the spirit of accommodation.” 122  This led to a lack of 
consociational characteristics, which hindered the process.123 Thus, while some elements of 
consociationalism can be found in the constitution, the document has been criticised in terms 
of its allowances for power sharing. Both centripetalists and consociationalists criticised the 
formal reflection of consociational elements in the constitution.  
As discussed above, a power-sharing arrangement is applicable to Iraq, as recommended by 
consociationalists. The fact that power sharing is embodied in the permanent constitution 
should mean that, as consociational theory advocates, conflict resolution is one of its primary 
goals. So, conflict reduction is the main incentive to implement the principles of 
consociational democracy in Iraq. However, Horowitz emphasises that the permanent 
constitution does not encourage conflict reduction. As he stated, “it is difficult to identify in 
that document any institutions designed to reduce ethnic or sectarian conflict.” 124 
Furthermore, Bogaards noted that “Iraq’s constitution fails to prescribe executive power 
sharing.” 125  This means that grand coalition government is nowhere prescribed in the 
constitution. Despite the fact that it does not appear formally, political leaders designed 
cabinets and distributed high-level posts by agreement among the three main groups: Shiite, 
Sunni, and Kurd. Thus, informal political agreements contributed to the formation of political 
institutions between 2003 and 2014. Bogaards worked out that the power sharing process 
has three main weaknesses: “an imbalance between self-rule and shared rule, a lack of 
consociational features, and an open-ended process of regionalization and federalization.”126 
These points are controversial because they can take different forms in different divided 
societies.  
Although some consociational elements were placed in the permanent constitution, the 
document was criticised in terms of its approach to power sharing arrangements. 
Centripetalists who have written about power sharing in Iraq claim that the permanent 
constitution needs to change, because consociationalism does not lead to conflict resolution 
and has failed Iraq.127 Younis argued that consociational democracy is not suitable for divided 
societies, especially Iraq. The alternative approach is an integration model, and the 
amendment of the permanent constitution and electoral law.128 Bogaards likewise demands 
constitution reform in terms of the three crucial points mentioned above. He is doubtful 
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about whether Iraq remains a united country or not, because if it continues as a united 
country, then all groups should share power in the centre.129 Thus, Bogaards highlighted 
some flaws in the representation of consociational elements in Iraq’s permanent constitution 
and in practice. 
Abu Ltaif agrees that the current constitution does not include all consociational 
characteristics. It suffers from not mentioning grand coalition and mutual veto, and from its 
limitations in terms of power sharing arrangements.130  Dixon pointed out that Iraq had 
challenged the absence of consociational features, but that the country could not manage 
conflict and bring peace because “consociationalism has become increasingly vague, 
ambiguous and even contradictory.”131 As discussed earlier in this section, grand coalition was 
organised only by informal agreement among politicians, and mutual veto has also existed in 
different forms. For example, Article 138 section four is obvious evidence for the mutual veto, 
because it states that “the presidency council shall issue its decisions unanimously,” 132 
meaning that if any one of them disagrees the decision will be rejected. The Presidency 
Council contained Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd members. The provision was, however, only in place 
for the first term of the presidency, from 2005 to 2010. After 2010 there was only an informal 
veto between the president and two vice presidents. Thus, Abu Ltaif suggested some ways to 
improve the implementation of consociationalism, including changing the electoral law for 
predetermining seats for each group, instituting more parliamentary consultation to 
nominate the Prime Minister, and giving all groups the opportunity to create real 
proportionality in the military sector. These changes would mean that consociationalism still 
has a chance to be an instrument for conflict reduction.  
The criticisms of consociationalism that we have examined focus mostly on the operation of 
formal institutions, like how to achieve a grand coalition government, how to balance power 
among institutions, and how electoral law can be modified so that a vote translates to a 
parliamentary seat. For this reason, many have demanded the reform of some of the 
consociational characteristics already present in the Iraqi constitution in order to improve 
power sharing arrangements. Others advocate centripetalism as an alternative approach to 
replacing consociationalism in the constitution. In particular, integrationists demand that the 
permanent constitution should be amended in order to shift the political system directly from 
consociationalism to centripetalism. As we have seen, however, all efforts concentrate on 
formal institutions, rather than actual practices. This, therefore, is the gap that I want to 
address in this dissertation, and it forms my main contribution to the actual implementation 
of consociationalism in Iraq.    
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2.4 US-led state rebuilding in Iraq 
Discussing the role of the US in Iraq is important, because the US contributed directly to state 
rebuilding after the invasion, and its impact on Iraq fluctuated from 2003 to 2014. Over this 
decade, political development involved working out a new political system based on 
consociationalism. The US played different roles in Iraq, from occupying country to influential 
external actor. Questions arise regarding who actually chose the new approach for Iraq? Was 
it the decision of the US or Iraq to establish consociational institutions? It is clear that the US-
led coalition for state rebuilding was in control at the beginning of the invasion, from 2003 to 
2005. Then, during the transition period, from 2005 to 2010, with the US troops present in 
Iraq, the US did not authorise the Iraqi people to take absolute responsibility, especially 
regarding security. Thus, internal actors in Iraq were not even presented with the opportunity 
to control the power. After the withdrawal of the US troops, the Iraqi people regained full 
responsibility from 2010 to 2014. The US took a step back, and decreased its influence. Thus, 
the role of the US changed over time, and this is one of the areas the research will discuss in 
detail in terms of the practice of consociational elements.    
When George W. Bush appointed Bremer to lead the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 
Bremer told him that he was “fully committed to bringing representative government to the 
Iraqi people.”133 He asserted that “all Iraqis must have a voice in the new government, and 
all citizens must have their rights protected.”134 The Bush administration aimed to ensure 
that all communities shared the power, without neglecting any ethno-religious group, but 
Bremer did not recommend any particular method for translating this idea from theory into 
practice. Byman believed that working towards the establishment of a new political system 
that gathered together all communities would require consensus among political leaders.135 
A consensus among the political elite was one way of gathering all communities together in 
the new state structure. As Zalmay Khalilzad said, “our policy of regime change would seek a 
broad-based representative government in Iraq.”136 This was one reason why the US did not 
accept Jay Garner’s approach for forming an interim Iraqi government by forming a coalition 
between the Shiites and Kurds, because the Bush administration wanted a more inclusive 
government in Iraq.137 Thus, the literature suggests that the US was intent on gathering all 
groups together to share the power, without excluding any group. 
Along these lines, Toby Dodge worked out that “building a new political order will ultimately 
mean guiding Iraq towards a government that is in broad agreement with US foreign-policy 
aims.”138 The US-led coalition force’s purpose was to build a political system compatible with 
US policy and interests. Their plan included reducing the role of previous participants in 
Saddam’s regime, but marginalising other political parties that were opposed to the US’s 
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occupation and aims.139 This meant that the US drafted the new political system in Iraq in 
light of its own policy in Iraq, rather than with an awareness of each community’s right to be 
represented in the new government. Co-operation among groups was an issue that 
confronted the US-led coalition forces, because there was no collaboration among significant 
communities, especially with Sunni groups. The Shiites and Kurds were, however, able to 
create a kind of partnership for facing challenges.   
By contrast, there were voices that demanded a majority government, rather than 
consociational institutions. The Shiites enjoyed a majority in Iraq, and their role had been 
neglected for long periods. As Peter W. Galbraith stated, “many of the Shiites believe their 
majority status entitles them to run all of Iraq.”140 Their demand for a majoritarian approach 
was strongly rejected, especially by the Kurds, because they also wanted to participate in the 
political institutions. For this reason, senior Kurdish leaders informed Bremer that they would 
not agree with a “tyranny of the majority.”141 This was due to “the Kurds’ unwillingness to 
accept a strong Arab-controlled center.”142 On the other hand, the Sunnis raised the issue 
because they were against the CPA and wanted to take back some authority again. Regarding 
this, Khalilzad said that the “Sunni Arabs took a hostile position against their rivals, the Shia 
and the Kurds.”143 That was why the US demanded that the government should be based on 
broad representation, and should include the Sunni community in particular. To tackle that 
issue, Khalilzad “worked with Iraqi leaders of all factions to ensure that the December 2005 
election, under the new constitution, would involve all groups and produce a fully 
representative government.”144 This shows that the US really wanted all communities to 
participate in the political process and have a stake in rebuilding the political order. According 
to the above, the US’s policy aimed at restructuring political institutions to ensure broad 
representation from all communities in Iraq.  
In practice, the US started rebuilding political institutions in Iraq, beginning with the Iraqi 
Governing Council (IGC), which was based on representatives from all communities: 13 Shiites, 
5 Sunnis, 5 Kurds, 1 Assyrian, and 1 Turkoman.145 It was the first consociational institution 
formed by the US, through negotiation with the UN and seven senior Iraqi political leaders. 
Nevertheless, Bremer controlled membership of the IGC. 146  Thus, while apparently 
consociational, in fact the CPA controlled the authority in Iraq, and the IGC “had no autonomy 
to make decisions without the approval of Bremer.” 147  This meant that rebuilding and 
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structuring the new Iraqi state actually fell to the US-led coalition forces, which created a 
political system that was compatible with its post-war agenda.   
While Iraq “lost its administrative and coercive capacity,”148 the US tried to rebuild political 
institutions and establish a state with a high level of administration, which would represent 
all significant communities, an aim that was reflected partly in the IGC. Reidar Visser criticised 
the IGC, because he believed that through its creation Bremer attempted “to enshrine ethno-
sectarian identities in the governing structure of the Iraqi state […]”.149He pointed out that 
the US strongly encouraged “ethno-sectarian power-sharing arrangements.” 150  Visser 
obviously did not believe that power sharing arrangements would tackle conflict among the 
different identities, and blamed the US for persisting with such an approach.  
The role of domestic elites in Iraq in the formation of the political institutions is also a point 
of contention. They were not able to fulfil a real role because the US and its allies controlled 
the power at the first stage of occupation. In theory, under a consociationalist’s government, 
elite cartels should play a large and beneficial role in implementing the system’s four main 
elements, especially grand coalition. This means that politicians should work in a positive way 
towards supporting consociational institutions. But this did not work in the case of Iraq, 
because politicians were not ready to take responsibility. During the transition period (2010-
2014), mistakes were made by the US, which led to weakness in political development.151 
Dodge notes that after that, when the Iraqi people took more active positions in the 
government, they worked against the democratisation process. In particular, the role of 
Maliki was problematic, and his behaviour during his second turn “posed the main threat to 
Iraqi democracy.”152 This occurred after the withdrawal of US troops in 2011. On the last day 
of the US occupation, Maliki attacked three key Sunni leaders, al-Hashemi, al-Issawi, and 
Mutlaq. That was strong evidence that compromise among internal actors, especially the 
Shiites and Sunnis, did not exist. While present in Iraq, the US-led coalition forces maintained 
a kind of equilibrium among political leaders, preventing one-man rule. Thus, the presence of 
the US and its allies was crucial for maintaining conflict reduction between different 
communities.   
According to the above discussion, it is obvious that the process of choosing a new approach 
to rebuild the political system in Iraq was highly controversial. The US-led coalition wanted to 
form a government that represented all significant communities, but it is not clear whether 
its plan was based on power sharing arrangements or not. Was it the case that the US-led 
coalition pressured the Iraqi people to accept that kind of system? Or did other factors 
motivate the process, such as Iraq’s division into ethno-religious groups and the history of its 
political development since Iraq was first established as a state? Whether consociational 
theory was actually a part of the US’s policy in Iraq after the regime change remains uncertain. 
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While the Shiites wanted a majority political system, the Sunnis and Kurds did not accept an 
approach which would lead to a dominant majority, and each community demanded its rights 
within the new political institutions. The US-led coalition strongly encouraged the Iraqi people 
to adopt a system of broad representation. But was it the decision of the US-led coalition or 
the Iraqi people to establish consociational institutions? My research pursues the role of the 
US, from occupying country to external actor. Iraq offers a new case for studying 
consociationalism because of the pivotal role of the occupying country. In other cases, such 
as Northern Ireland, it was external actors who affected the process of consociational 
democracy. 
2.5 Conclusion 
As noted in the previous sections, the gap I specifically want to fill concerns the practice of 
consociationalism by focusing on one key question: was Iraq a consociational democracy in 
its formal institutions as well as in its practice during the period 2003 to 2014? Answering this 
question requires concentrating on the actual implementation of consociationalism in Iraq 
and how worked as a conflict resolution tool, this is my main contribution. Another important 
gap in the scholarship is a lack of work on the US-led coalition’s role in state rebuilding, in 
terms of its role for implementation of consociationalism, from 2003 to 2014, transitioning 
from occupying country to external actor. In this research, I examine how the US affected the 
political process, from selecting the new political system to creating consociational 
institutions to acting externally. It is evident that the US played a crucial role in Iraq from 2003 
to 2011. After that, with the withdrawal of US troops, the situation in Iraq became more 
authoritarian. The absence of the US-led coalition had a negative impact on the Iraqi situation. 
Thus, issues regarding the implementation of consociational democracy and external factors 
(such as the role of the occupying country) are linked in Iraq. These points will be addressed 
throughout my work. 
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3 Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, this thesis identified the research gap and the research questions for 
this study. The current chapter introduces the research methodology I have used for this 
project, which relies on process tracing and qualitative analyses of documents and elite 
interviews. The investigation will trace events related to consociationalism from 2003 to 2014, 
dividing the whole period into three main periods: from 2003 to 2005, 2005 to 2010, and 2010 
to 2014. Using constitutional textual analysis, it aims to explain how consociational elements 
are reflected in the permanent constitution. After that, it examines the implementation of 
those consociational elements in Iraq’s political institutions during the chosen period, in order 
to get answers to this question ‘to what extent were consociational arrangements in fact 
created and how did they operate?’ The discussion of the research design and research 
methods is divided into four sections: research design, methodology, data collection, and 
methodological challenges.   
3.2 Research design 
The research design for the current PhD dissertation was conceived to investigate the 
development and implementation of consociational elements in Iraq. In other words, it does 
not aim at testing the theory of consociationalism itself. Owing to the constraints of the thesis, 
one period of time during which consociationalism was implemented was selected as a case 
study.  Thus, the case study of this thesis is Iraq during the period 2003 to 2014. Before 
proceeding further, it is worthwhile to explain two things: first, why was Iraq chosen as a case 
study for analysing consociationalism? Second, why was this particular time period selected?  
Iraq is an interesting case because consociationalism has been promoted as a conflict 
resolution tool, and it was partly with this in mind that it was proposed for post-invasion Iraq. 
Moreover, international and local policy makers consciously decided to use power sharing as 
a conflict resolution tool in Iraq – it is therefore important to ask how it was implemented, 
and what factors shaped its implementation, given that violence continued in Iraq. To 
elucidate this, Iraq adopted a permanent constitution entailing the major elements of 
consociationalism in 2005. Similarly, Iraqi authorities implemented at least two elements of 
consociationalism, for instance, crucial political institutions such as parliament and the 
cabinet were rebuilt in light of consociational democracy. All this, however, could not produce 
substantial peace and stability inside the state.  
The second important point is related to the selection of the time period. Following the 2003 
invasion, the government in Iraq had collapsed and a new political process had begun. The 
new political system was involved in two elections and the constitution of two cabinet 
governments until 2014. This period of 2003 to 2014 in Iraq, therefore, represents a period 
of time when consociationalism was applied.  It is hoped that an examination of the events 
and developments that took place at that time, including the ways in which power sharing 
was practised, may be beneficial to an understanding of current political developments in Iraq, 
as well as in the field of conflict management. In order to clarify what has driven this particular 
choice of political process the research is divided into three sections (chapters 5, 6 and 7). The 
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first part consists of the time period between 2003 and 2005. It involves the constitution-
making process under formal US occupation. The second part covers 2005 to 2010, which is 
the post-election period as well as a period that saw a large US presence. This period is also 
characterised by violent conflict among ethno-religious groups. The third period from 2010 to 
2014 consists of the time after the US withdrew troops and when the US presence greatly 
lessened and had less influence as well. This meant that Iraqi politicians had more autonomy 
than before.  All three parts illustrate aspects of the implementation of consociationalism and 
warrant separate, in-depth studies in order to examine consociationalism at each stage.  This 
will then enable a clearer understanding of the path dependency of consociational elements, 
and will reflect how consociationalism was utilised as a conflict resolution tool during this 
time. Accordingly, this research design allows the thesis to assess the influence of external 
actors, as it can examine the fate of consociationalism while the US was present and 
afterwards. Also, it allows the thesis to examine the evolution of different institutions over 
time, and examine the political dynamics that underpin this. In order to create a better 
understanding, the following sections explore each time period individually.  
The constitution itself and the constitution-making process are the subject of the first period 
under investigation. This will be dealt with through two main chapters, one focusing on the 
reflection of consociationalism in the permanent constitution (chapter 4), and the second 
concentrating on the activities leading to the drafting of the permanent constitution (chapter 
5). This will help to ascertain to what extent the theory of consociationalism has been 
reflected in the permanent constitution. The answer to this should be obtained through 
performing textual analysis, which is the appropriate method for this type of data. These two 
chapters cover knowledge about the elements in the constitution and how consociational 
elements have emerged in the constitution. This analysis will be complemented by an 
exploration of the thinking and objectives of those involved in the drafting of the constitution 
process.  
Two main factors contributed to the formation of the constitution during this period. First, 
this period included external and internal actors’ efforts. The US-led coalition strongly 
affected the decision-making process but Iraq’s role has been marginalised. Secondly, through 
this time there were different views about rebuilding political institutions and the way of 
operating consociational elements. As this thesis explores the implementation of 
consociationalism later on it is crucial to know the root of this theory and how it developed.  
From that point, if the US and its allies did not assert power-sharing arrangements, 
consociational elements were not reflected in the constitution. 
After this, the elections are taken as the start and end points of the periods under examination 
(2005-10, and 2010-14). During the first period (2005-10), one can see the implementation of 
consociational elements found in the constitution in practice. In this case, there was a grand 
coalition government, proportionality in the parliament and government, practising mutual 
veto through the Presidency Council, and attempting to create another federation region in 
the south of Iraq. Therefore, forming political institutions in light of the constitution helped 
to evaluate between formal and practical elements of consociationalism.  Moreover, during 
the transition period orchestrated by the US and its allies, the US had a huge impact on the 
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political process because of the considerable US troops in the country. This means Iraqi 
politicians could not act independently because the situation was controlled by the US.  
Moreover, Iraqi politicians took part of the political process in order to govern Iraq by 
themselves. It is important to examine how internal actors dealt with the new political system 
especially as Shiites, as the majority population, took the most important high positions. 
Another crucial point is that the US presence altered slightly. In the previous period, it 
governed Iraq, but during this period, it in part transferred authority to the new Iraqi 
institutions.  However, the US still contributed to the direction of the political process and the 
military actions because Iraq’s ability to take full responsibility was extremely weak.  
The third period included the second round of elections from 2010 to 2014, which was the 
second attempt to implement consociationalism. It continued the previous period but with a 
different implementation of consociational aspects because Maliki was in charge for the 
second time. At the beginning of this period, the US withdrew its troops and Iraqi politicians 
became independent, acting without the US’s pressure as they had done before. This means 
Iraqi politician had more independence than before with full responsibility for governing Iraq. 
It was an interesting point because after the presence of the US there was a huge change in 
politicians’ attitudes towards the political dominance of a single individual, especially in terms 
of Maliki’s erratic behaviour. The important point from this period is comparing last two 
periods (2005-10 and 2010-14) in terms of external impact on the political process, especially 
in terms of the US presence. Therefore, during this period there were challenges that changed 
the direction of the political process from working on adopting consociationalism toward 
ignoring its development, and its replacement by authoritarianism.  
According to the research question, there is another important point that should take place 
in that investigation, which is the relationship between what was reflected in the constitution 
and how it was implemented. While the design of institutions is very important, institutions 
do not reflect ideas (e.g. consociationalism in the Iraqi constitution) fully or quickly. 153 
Horowitz in his important work “Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes” discussed 
“the gap between constitutional design and the constitutions that actually emerge from 
process of constitutional innovation.”154 It is important to address that kind of link because, 
when constitutional designers are accepting political system, it is essential to follow how it 
will be practised. Furthermore, Horowitz pointed out that “there is no guarantees of success 
for any prescription or mix of prescriptions.”155 This means that, while approving particular 
features for a specific approach to the constitution are important, there are no assurances for 
succession even if implemented. However, the main assumption during the drafting 
constitution should be based on the higher possibility of practising what the designers 
mapped in the constitutions. Issues arise when incompatibility occur in practice.  
There is a literature highlighted there is occasionally mismatch between institutions’ design 
and their functionality. Pierson pointed out “Institutions may not be functional because 
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designers make mistakes.”156 It is one of the reasons that he highlighted which may affect the 
adoption of institutions based on what designers calculate because “actors expect that 
particular features will produce specific consequences,” 157  which is not accurate. This 
suggests reflecting features of particular designs does not matter, what matters is the way 
that political leaders shape it, and sometimes there is a mismatch between what is in the 
constitution and the implementation of it. The Canadian case is one of the examples of that 
perspective because “The designers of the Canadian federation sought a highly centralized 
form of federalism—in part as a reaction to the ways in which decentralization contributed 
to the horrors of the Civil War. Yet the Canadian federation is now far less centralized than 
the American one.”158 There are many reasons for that kind of mismatch - historical tradition, 
memories - and competing nationalist, religious, and ethnic interpretations of the past affect 
the process of consociational institutions.159 Therefore, that kind of perspective is one of the 
main points in this particular research to address the reality of adoption and implementation 
of consociational elements in Iraq. In the Iraqi case there is a mismatch between what is 
reflected in the constitution (consociational elements) and its implementation. This requires 
further discussion which takes into account the way that consociationalism has been 
operated.  
Consequently, the organisation of this dissertation will, in turn, help to grasp the dynamics of 
consociational developments in Iraq. Three different periods are shaping the thesis, which 
allows readers to understand how consociational elements really occurred in Iraq. This is a 
clarity for using each period from 2003 to 2014, which contributed to designing the project in 
order to investigate the implementation of consociational aspects in the particular case of 
Iraq. Moreover, this type of design is comfortable with the process tracing method because, 
as Collier says, “process tracing focuses on the unfolding of events or situations over time.”160 
Thus, in the following pages process tracing will be the main method used.  
3.3 Methodology  
This study is a case study looking at political development in Iraq from 2003 up to 2014 in 
terms of consociationalism. This research will be the realisation of the qualitative analytical 
approach which concerns the mere presence and absence of the particular characteristics. In 
order to achieve the aim of the study, the best method is process tracing wherever it is 
required and feasible. This method allows a detailed understanding of the adoption and 
implementation of consociationalism in Iraq, and what explains it. Also, it examines different 
dynamics and explores how they led to particular outcomes. Therefore, the thesis is tracing 
out details of the decision-making process in the adoption of consociationalism, and the 
implementation (or not) of it, which are elements to explain the outcome. This fits with 
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process tracing because it focuses on decision-making, investigating discussions, and 
understanding development of that decision making. 161  Therefore, the process tracing 
method has been selected as an ideal methodology for conducting this study. 
Furthermore, I used textual analyses as a method for analysing the first part of the empirical 
chapter which is about formal consociationalism in the constitution. Textual analysis has been 
used to map out the actual consociational elements in the constitution. Thus, there are two 
methods that have been used in this dissertation, which investigates the two main points 
involved in a formal consociational democracy and its practice. Therefore, conducting this 
thesis depends upon four main parts and in light of them, I applied two different methods. 
The first should be about the best method for analysing this particular subject, textual analysis 
and the second empirical part about the adoption of consociationalism.    
There are two ways for conducting textual analyses in this research. Firstly, through reading 
the constitution the thesis examines the term grand coalition, proportionality, mutual veto, 
and segmental autonomy in the constitution. It is difficult to find the exact terms because the 
wording of the constitution differs from theoretical writings about consociationalism. For 
instance, if I look at the term ‘mutual veto’ it does not exist with the same wording but it is 
implicitly included. Secondly, I will investigate the meaning of consociationalism through 
articles, which indicate the terms of consociational elements. In this way, I will determine the 
reflection of those characteristics upon the meaning of consociationalism. This is does not 
make any difference because there are many ways for making sense depending on what texts 
are analysed.162 This form is called ‘realist’ perspective because the researcher investigates 
for the particular text which they consider embodies reality most accurately, and judge all 
other texts against that one.163  
Moreover, to complement the constitutional analysis through a textual method requires 
looking at the thinking of those involved in the drafting and preparing of the permanent 
constitution. The main point of doing that is to explore their attention to consociationalism 
aspects whilst drafting the constitution and then to see whether they paid much attention to, 
or wanted, consociationalism. This process should be undertaken through process tracing 
during the particular period from 2003 to 2005 and the political activities at that time which 
led to the last draft of the permanent constitution. This research traces that event to 
investigate the thinking behind making the decision to embody consociationalism in the 
constitution. Hence, process tracing comes up in the second part of the empirical chapters to 
complement the first step of constitutional analysis.  
It is important to know which type of process tracing I have used because there are three 
different types of process tracing, which are theory-testing, theory-building and explaining-
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outcome.164  This research used the explanation-outcome process tracing method, which 
“attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific 
historical case.”165  In line with this, the current research is aimed at tracing a sufficient 
explanation about a puzzling outcome: was Iraq a consociational democracy in its formal 
institutions as well as in practice from 2003-2014? Because it is not clear whether 
consociationalism was truly practiced, fully implemented, or partially applied during the 
period despite the constitutional provisions, and why it did not lead to the expected outcome. 
As the theory of consociationalism is well tested elsewhere, the current research focuses on 
the implementation side of the theory to produce a sufficient answer to the research question.  
Process tracing fits with this dissertation because one of its types focuses on a single case 
study, which is here political development in Iraq through the particular period between 2003 
and 2014. Another important point is that this type of process tracing is more common in 
practice than others.166 Therefore, this study does not test the theory, or construct a theory, 
because both these approaches aim to develop a particular theory, which is not the object of 
the underlying research question. Instead, this study concentrates on the evaluation of 
certain elements crucial for the proper functioning of consociationalism in producing the 
expected outcome of peace and stability.   
In light of the above exploration, this study required empirical evidence, which it was possible 
to collect from different sources, especially elite interviews, in order to identify each part of 
the thesis. It aims to explore the adoption and the implementation of consociationalism, and 
examines the process leading to that particular outcome. This means my contribution focuses 
on the practising of consociationalism within political development in Iraq.  
3.4 Data collection  
There are three types of data that contributed to this study, which involved texts, elite 
interviews, and secondary literature on developments in Iraq after 2003. Those are 
appropriate methods for collecting data in process tracing and textual analysis. Through 
process tracing the analyst “examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, 
and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a 
case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.”167 
In the following subsections, I will discuss each of the three kinds of data which have been 
used in this research and then address their methodological challenges.  
3.4.1 Primary sources   
This type of data includes the permanent constitution in Iraq and primary sources such as 
meeting minutes, memoirs, and public documents. This research got benefits from each of 
them during the investigation and whilst researching the thesis. Therefore, those texts played 
a big role in the research structure and the investigation of the reflection of consociational 
                                                     
164 Beach, Derek and Pedersen, Rasmus Brun, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013). P.3 
165 Ibid. P.3  
166 Ibid. P.11 
167 George, Alexander and Bennett, Andrew, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005). P.6 
Chapter 3 Methodology 
34 
 
elements in the constitution. Primary sources form the core of the study, which relies on 
information and evidence available in those sources from different backgrounds. That is the 
aim of using the texts because some “documents tell us something about what goes on in 
that organisation and will help us to uncover such things as its culture or ethos.”168 This means 
texts from different types of sources are needed to build up a frame for the project and the 
researcher has to use them to answer the research question.  In the following paragraphs, I 
will try to answer the questions of, what kind of texts I have used, how I used them and how 
they contributed to the project. 
The permanent constitution is an essential source for conducting this study because it is 
crucial to know where and how consociational elements were placed. There are many 
constitutional articles located in different sections within the Iraqi constitution that are 
related to the consociationalism. Those articles are subject to analysis in order to identify the 
degree to which consociationalism is reflected in formal institutions. Moreover, the 
permanent constitution has been approved by majority groups and it got acceptance through 
a referendum. This means it is accepted by all groups. Therefore, investigating 
implementation of consociationalism requires looking at the style of consociationalism and 
which type of consociationalism is present. Is it adopted by agreement? Or by constitution? 
Or mixed between both?  
Another important point is that the permanent constitution is the source of law and is a 
powerful document: people should follow it and it is not easy to amend its articles. 
Consequently, these type of texts contributed strongly to frame the starting point of this study 
in order to get a better understanding of consociationalism in formal political institutions. 
In analysing the constitution’s articles, there are two points raised as an indication of the 
degree to which consociationalism is reflected in the constitution. The crucial one is that 
consociational elements are also located in different places than the constitution. Moreover, 
the grand coalition does not exist in the constitution; instead I found it within the informal 
agreement between political leaders. Hence, the new political system in Iraq after 2003 is 
based on consociationalism with three elements are reflected formally and just one element 
organised by agreement, which is called the informal element.  
There is one type of meeting minutes that has used in this thesis, which is the meeting 
minutes of the Committee to Prepare the Constitution. Analysing the permanent constitution 
using meeting minutes is essential because it enables a knowledge of politicians’ discussions 
about each part of consociational aspects. Moreover, it included plenty of data about how 
they decided on consociationalism and how other factors affected that process. Then it 
provides the different positions of ethno-religious groups about each part of the permanent 
constitution. When I visited Baghdad, I got a copy of meeting minutes of the Committee to 
Prepare the Constitution but they were not complete because all of the meetings’ data has 
not transcribed to hard copy and they are still working on it. I asked the first deputy speaker 
of the Council of Representatives for access to more data in relation to meeting minutes but 
he said that I had the only thing he can provide. It includes 33 meetings from 24/5/2005 to 
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8/8/2005 and is around 275 pages.169 This helped me to analyse a fundamental part of this 
study especially in chapters four and five. I read all of the document and highlighted the 
relevant information and then translated this from Arabic into English; this was then analysed 
during the whole process. At some points I also used it to verify attitudes of the politicians 
who participated in this committee and if they were one of the participants in the interviews.  
As noted, there are many types of texts, which contributed to this study. There are some 
memoirs have been used, which have written by people who had a role in Iraq after 2003. 
Ayad Allawi, for example, is one of the Iraqi leaders who wrote a book about his contributions 
during that period. It includes important information about his positions and participation in 
the political process after 2003. It is helpful in understanding how his political party dealt with 
consociationalism and how he contributed to the political process. In addition, he was a 
former member of the IGC and Prime Minister after the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
in 2004.170 Lewis Paul Bremer and Zalmay Khalilzad have also each written a book about how 
they acted in Iraq after 2003. Both were used in this research and included useful data, which 
has been utilised in different chapters. In particular, they both represented the US authority 
in Iraq and they had an impact on the political process.  In addition, there is another memoir 
that has been written by Peter W. Galbraith called The End of Iraq.171  Galbraith was an 
advisory member of the Kurdish committee that participated in preparing the constitution. It 
includes important data about the role of the US and how the Iraqi people negotiated after 
2003 in order to make the new constitution. This mechanism paid attention to finding out the 
most accurate information and evidence in order to verify what the interviewees provided 
and to improve the answer to the research question. Consequently, memoirs have been used 
throughout the chapters and they contributed to the structure and theme of the study. 
Another important source for getting more evidence and information was official websites, 
which are often a useful source for of official documents. In this research I used many official 
websites including the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the Council of Representatives 
(CoR), the Council of Ministers (CoM) and the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) 
as well as, to a lesser degree, the Security Council (SC). My study required me to get 
information from those websites from across the period of 2003 to 2014. After 2003, the US 
and its allies rebuilt political institutions by the CPA according to SC Resolution 1483 and 
following others resolutions.172 Moreover, the CPA itself made many decisions during its 
period of operation to reorganise the Iraqi state. On that point, I looked at their websites to 
find out how they decided to choose consociationalism, which should be dependent on their 
regulations and the decisions they made. In addition, through websites I found their position 
on consociationalism and why they chose it to govern Iraq. That helped in chapter five to build 
up the structure and to develop the themes of the subsections.  
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Another important website was The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) as 
chapters six and seven required information on the elections from 2005 to 2014. I accessed 
all of this through the official IHEC websites. Analysing that information was very useful for 
building the last two chapters and for pulling out how ethno-religious groups were 
represented on the Council of Representatives (CoR). I then used the CoR’s website to find 
out how they formed the parliament and how they contributed to issuing laws.  
That was the method I have used to conduct the information from official websites for 
different time periods. Thus, websites played an important part in this research and 
contributed to the structure and themes of the study. 
Newspapers were another source used for getting more information and evidence in this 
research because they are one of the “potential sources for social scientific analysis.”173 In 
addition, Beach and Pedersen state “newspaper and other journalistic sources can, in certain 
circumstances, provide accurate observations of what we intend to measure.” 174  This 
research, in some points, was based on analysing information and evidence found in a number 
of newspapers, which were issued in Arabic and Kurdish. Therefore, I translated what was 
essential and required from them whilst writing the chapters. In fact, during the period of this 
study there were large numbers of newspapers being published, which contain many data 
about the political process.  
When I was in Baghdad and Erbil in October 2015, I got a large number of issues of three 
newspapers – Azzaman, Alsabaah, and Xebat – which covered the period 2004-2014. I used 
two ways to search these: firstly, I read through relevant issues to identify pertinent articles 
and reports. Secondly, I used search engines for those available online to find suitable data. 
This is sufficient information to help this research to develop its structure and get more 
evidence. There was missing information that no one recorded, but I found useful data in the 
newspapers. For example, when I was looking for a group’s position on consociationalism 
after 2003 and how they acted during that period, newspapers helped me to find out what it 
was. Moreover, analysing data from interviews sometimes required me to go back to what 
the participants said about a particular aspect, which could be found in the newspapers. This 
meant that verifying information and developing the analysis to the research was an outcome 
of using the newspapers.  
3.4.2 Elite interviews  
Elite Interviews are a crucial method for collecting data in social science research, particularly 
in qualitative research. Alan Bryman states that “the interview is probably the most widely 
employed method in qualitative research.”175 Tansey argues that “interviews can facilitate 
the collection of data that is highly relevant and specific to the research objectives being 
pursued.”176 This research is a case study in political science, and analyses the political process 
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in terms of consociational elements. This is a core element of the process tracing method 
because “it frequently involves the analysis of political developments at the highest level of 
government, and elite actors will often be critical sources of information about the political 
processes of interest.” 177  It is clear that elite interviews should help to determine the 
direction of the analyses and an important part for applying process tracing method. In fact, 
the data come out with elite interviews has contributed every single step and identify the 
causal mechanism.  
I chose this method to collect as much data as possible from key leaders and decision-makers. 
I am interviewing a sample of politicians who have been or are currently MPs in the Iraqi 
Parliament, Kurdistan Parliament or Ministers of government from each group, including 
some who have been directly involved in the constitution-making process and some who have 
not. There are two main types of interviews: unstructured interviews and semi-structured 
interview, however, “semi-structured interview techniques would be appropriate for process 
tracing related interviews.”178 I have used the second type, which is more suitable to the 
analysis in this research. Elite interviews will find out unknown information and the reality of 
what had happened in terms of consociationalism in Iraq. Furthermore, finding relations 
between implementation of consociationalism and key actors is vital during that period.  In 
order to build up this research, connections between the research question and the list of 
interview questions are necessary. That requires determining a list of questions to ask the 
interviewee although, during a face-to-face interview, you can also ask more questions that 
come up from their responses.  
I conducted the interviews in two main stages. The first stage ran from 10th July 2014 to 12th 
September 2014 in Kurdistan and included 21 interviews. The second stage was between 2nd 
October 2015 and 17th October 2015 in Baghdad for 16 interviews. I did all interviews (37) 
face to face except two of them: one was done by email and the other one by Facebook. While 
they are divided among different ethnic religious groups, the majority of respondents are 
Kurdish politicians (Kurd (21), Sunni (8), Shiite (7), and Assyrian (1)). The reason for this was a 
security issue, because Kurdistan is a secure place you can contact with politicians easily, 
however, it is very difficult to move from place to place in Baghdad, especially within Green 
Zone so it was difficult to get more interviews with Shiite and Sunni politicians. While getting 
acceptance from politicians to do the interviews was hard, I had the chance to do it with key 
politicians including former the Prime Minister, Speaker, former Speaker, and a member of 
the Council of Representatives (CoR).  
Another important point is I made a plan for dividing all interviewees by time period. For 
instance, I chose members of the IGC in 2003, then a Minster in the first government along 
with members of the committee for making the permanent constitution. After that I chose 
Nuri Al-Maliki, former Prime Minister from 2006 to 2104 and some Ministers during that 
period. I also included members of the CoR at different times from 2003 to 2014. Thus, the 
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structure of the interview covered the whole period as well as ethnic religious backgrounds 
and positions.  
In light of the semi-structured interview, I wrote some questions connected with the research 
questions. I started with a general question and then smoothly I focused on the 
implementation of consociationalism. This included several questions divided into three main 
groups in one list to get the views of the politicians, which was crucial to understanding the 
issue of governance in Iraq from 2003 to 2014. To come up with each group of interview 
questions I connected them with sub-questions because it helped to get an evidential basis 
for the research. Also, some questions could be useful for the first period, and others might 
be relevant to the previous or the current period. The first group of interview questions 
involved many questions such as: which principles for rebuilding political institutions were 
used? Was consociationalism one of those principles? What was the first step toward applying 
this concept? Why did politicians decide to choose consociationalism as a fundamental 
principle? Is consociationalism reflected in The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for 
the Transitional Period (TAL)? How? Is consociationalism reflected in this new permanent 
constitution? How was the permanent constitution made? What was the principle of 
establishing the Iraqi Interim Government? Generally, those questions connected with how 
consociationalism is reflected in the permanent constitution are addressed in chapter four.  
These then help to gather evidence for tracing the process leading up to the permanent 
constitution in chapter five. In addition, when I found a proper time for asking another 
question outside written questions I did it with the aim of getting more important data. This 
means, sometimes I asked questions that did not exist in the question list because participants 
provided information I did not expect.    
The second sort of interview question included some questions connected with other sub-
questions. In order to get more evidence and data I asked the interviewee why, in the first 
election on 31st January 2005, did the Sunni group not participate? How did all groups 
participate to make constitution during Committee of Making Constitution? Which groups 
supported consociationalism as a main solution? How? Why? Which groups were against this 
idea? How? Why? How did the US deal with that situation? What do you think about the three 
state solution? Do you think any groups have changed how they think about 
consociationalism during the last decade? How? How can the federation of Iraq be explained 
according to the permanent constitution? Through those questions, I got useful data about 
the implementation of consociationalism and how the US affected that process, especially 
during the two terms of Maliki’s government.  
The data is used in chapters six and seven because both these have the same structure in light 
of the four main elements of consociationalism.  Also, both chapters tried to investigate three 
questions, the first being, to what extent did ethno religious groups actually pursue 
consociational arrangements?  The second is, to what extent did they implement four main 
elements? The third is, to what extent were consociational arrangements in fact created? 
Therefore, it is vital to know who was involved in the political process and how much power 
they had in different periods. Thus, the interview data contributed widely to the core of the 
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study and makes the thesis stronger. Moreover, discussing those questions with various 
participants was useful for analysing the implementation of consociationalism.  
I recorded and transcribed the interviews, and translated all of them into English myself. I 
conducted the interviews in Kurdish and Arabic, and then I translated into English for use in 
this thesis. Generally, not all the interviews are used throughout the thesis because in some 
interviews, there was irrelevant information and repetition. I used the thematic technique to 
minimise the data and focusing on particular subjects which are relevant to the topic. For that 
reason, I translated what was relevant to the topics into different chapters and subsections. 
For example, when I conducted interviews with former IGC members some points about 
rebuilding and structuring political institutions were the same. I transcribed the interviews, 
and I printed out all of them because I thought it was easier to highlight what was useful to 
my topic.  
I think it is normal that some politicians provide information when you ask them questions, 
but sometimes it is not easy to get what you want. That happened to me because one of the 
participants had an impact in the political process after 2003, but he answered the questions 
generally. When I turn off my recorder, he said did you turn it off, I said absolutely yes, and 
then he provided useful information. Moreover, the majority of interviewees agreed to let 
me use their name in the thesis but two of them declined the request for personal reasons. 
In sum, I got useful information from the interviews which were not available in the literature 
and helped me for building up the research and generating a new study. This means the 
research relies on the primary data from who have been directly involved in the political 
process. 
3.4.3 Secondary literature on developments in Iraq after 2003 
There are secondary sources that have been used in this research and played a part in the 
analysis, such as journal articles and books. In fact, a large number of journal articles have 
been written about consociationalism. This research used some of those articles especially 
those written by scholars and politicians. This includes, for instance, the scholars Lijphart, 
O’Leary and John McGarry, who have written many articles about consociationalism and 
political development in Iraq. There are also many politicians who have written articles about 
political progress in Iraq such as Zalmay Khalilzad, who has written, for example, “Lesson from 
Afghanistan and Iraq.”179 The contribution of the secondary literature factors into all aspects 
and themes in the different chapters. Many books have contributed to the constitutional 
analysis, such as Constitution Making Under Occupation180, Negotiating in Civil Conflict181 and 
Faleh A. Jabar who wrote about paradoxes in the permanent constitution ( تاداضتم روتسدلا مئادلا ) 
in a book about the constitution in Arabic.182 In addition, there are other books related to 
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political development such as Iraq, People, History, Politics183 and many books by Toby Dodge, 
which have been mentioned in the previous chapter about literature. Therefore, journal 
articles and books as secondary sources have contributed to building up the research 
structure and have supported the thesis toward achieving its main goal.  
3.5 Methodological challenges 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the research was based on data collection through 
documentary and elite interviews. While there are strengths of using different sources, this 
study faced some challenges in collecting and using them too. Firstly, I will try to summarise 
some of the issues faced in this research in terms of documents. Secondly, I will illustrate 
challenges have faced in using elite interviews as well.    
There is a plenty of information located in different documents and each of them provides a 
little information about the events that happened from 2003 to 2014. Looking at all 
documents to find appropriate information and supporting evidence is a challenge and the 
main methodological challenge is evaluating competing claims about the same event. This 
thesis balanced different types of sources and then selected important sections in different 
sources to contribute to the explanation of a particular subject. When I needed more 
information about, for example, the elections in 2005, I went back to documents that 
mentioned specific aspects relating to that election. Thus, the triangulating technique was the 
best way for tackling the issue of different claims, and for assessing their plausibility in light 
of the evidence that has been provided.  
In terms of elite interviews challenges, there are three main points faced in this research 
during collecting and analysing appropriate data.  The first issue with interviews was that it 
was difficult for some participants to remember accurate information and provide evidence. 
That is a real issue faced by my research because building a historical narrative requires 
participants to talk about past events and what happened but is difficult for some of them to 
remember what happened twelve years ago. Moreover, they may not be able to tell me what 
they thought but instead they tell me what they are thinking now. For that reason, it is 
important to trace events in order to pull out useful information very carefully. For instance, 
one of the interviewees could not remember accurately which Sunni was asked for more 
rights during the writing of the permanent constitution because he had an illness and forgot 
some information. I tried to remind him of events which had happened during that time and 
when I used this information, I went back to documents to fill this gap, especially meeting 
minutes and newspapers.  
Another issue was confusion between two things related together by participants. In other 
words, a participant was confused between the Transitional Administration Law (TAL) and the 
constitution. He talked about an article which is in the TAL but he said it was from the 
constitution. I understood he was confused, but I did not interrupt because I knew what he 
meant and how to use it in the thesis. Thus, I tried to tackle this issues through data 
triangulation from another interviews independently with text copy documents in order to 
increase the validity of evidence. This is the triangulation approach, which leads to 
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“increas[ing] the credibility of findings that are supported across multiple sources, and can 
reveal the weakness of some sources that might otherwise have been viewed as reliable.”184 
The second challenge was the danger of bias: my identity caused issues whilst conducting 
some elite interviews, especially from Shiites and Sunnis. In a divided society, identity 
sometimes raises an issue for the researcher because politicians are divided among different 
ethnic groups, and they are part of the issue. From that point, when I eventually conducted 
an interview with politicians from Shiite and Sunni backgrounds they assumed I was a Kurd 
when they answered the question. Even so, I tried to ignore that point and closely stay on the 
topic, not identity politics.  
In addition, the letter from the University of Reading helped me to tell them formally at the 
beginning that I am from a university far removed from politics, and that they had the right 
not to answer any questions that they were unhappy with. In that situation, I avoided being 
biased by dealing equally with all the data I obtained from different participants.  
I also adhered to the data very consciously by doing analyses objectively, ignoring any effect 
that came from identity. It was not easy for me to do that because in some cases I already 
had information about what was going on. To avoid being biased, I tried to find some 
information in the literature or from other sources to support what I analysed. This means 
the triangulation of data has been applied through going back to original sources that could 
help prevent being biased. Moreover, it is important to see the events in different ways than 
other people have seen it. In order to do that, I consciously tried to consult different sources 
from a variety of perspectives and paid more attention to those sources which verified the 
information I had. Hence the consideration of many perspectives could be the best way avoid 
that problem and to ascertain the reality of what happened.  
Another difficulty relating to bias was that it was unbalanced among participants because the 
majority of them were Kurdish people. I had planned to ensure a balance among interviewees 
from different ethno-religious groups but security issues did not allow me to do that. In 
addition, it was hard to find appropriate participants for each period because some of them 
live outside of Iraq, several did not response when I contacted them, and the Islamic State (IS) 
war negatively affected people’s participation. However, the question is how can I ensure a 
balance? In order to get a comprehensive picture, I used the triangulation strategy through 
different kinds of sources especially newspapers, books, and personal websites. For instance, 
I used three different kinds of newspapers from different backgrounds: two of them are 
Arabic and issued in Baghdad Azzaman Arabic Daily Newspaper 185  and Alsabaah 
newspaper.186 The third one is Kurdish from Kurdistan called Xebat.187  I got the majority of 
their issues since 2003 and I used them as required for getting a comprehensive picture about 
political developments in Iraq. Whilst this is not the only way I used for an inclusive image 
about political progress in Iraq, I used books and other sources to increase the reliability of 
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data, which has been used in this thesis to ensure a level of balance for conducting 
appropriate analyses.  
Finally, security issues were another problem faced by this research whilst conducting face-
to-face interviews in Baghdad. The nature of the study requires doing interviews with 
politicians from three main groups – Shiite, Sunni and Kurd – from different periods.  Those 
leaders were divided among different places, which are not easy to access. Some of them 
were available in the Kurdistan region and the Green Zone in Baghdad, which are the most 
secure parts of Iraq. However, other parts are not secure and are not easy to travel to, 
particularly the one third of Iraq that is under the control of Islamic State (IS). In light of this 
circumstance, the best way to tackle this problem was to focus on people who were available 
in the Green Zone and in the Kurdistan region, and then I conducted interviews with two 
participants by email and Facebook. In Kurdistan, I did not face any difficulty in conducting 
interviews with people who were available, but in Baghdad it was more difficult because I 
needed permission for every step, including arriving there with a secure car and special 
bodyguard. I have friends in Baghdad (a Minster and a member of the CoR) who helped me; 
without them, I could not have conducted the interviews. This means there was a limitation 
on my movements when finding participants and conducting face to face interviews. Despite 
this, I have collected crucial data from senior politicians such as Nuri Al-Maliki, Humam 
Hamoudi (the chairman of the committee to prepare the constitution) and the Speaker of 
Parliament. In doing so I tried hard to minimise the challenges by conducting the interviews 
systematically in order to achieve the aim of the interview.     
3.6 Conclusion  
In general, different methods have been used within this research. The process tracing and 
textual analysis are a big part of this and have had a huge impact on the whole thesis. The 
time period from 2003 to 2014 has been divided among different subjects and chapters with 
regards to the election period, especially from 2005 to 2014 in order to consider to what 
extent the theory of consociationalism has been implemented in Iraq since 2003. It was 
important to analyse that topic using a process tracing approach because it helped to trace 
the events and to focus on the four main elements of consociationalism between 2003 and 
2014.  
Also, textual analysis contributed to this study and helped the investigation. The first 
empirical chapter (Chapter 4) depends on constitution analysis, especially of those 
constitution articles relevant to consociational democracy. Chapter four discusses how 
consociationalism is reflected in the permanent constitution, what is in the constitution and 
what is not in the constitution. This type of method works well with those questions, and I 
will investigate the four consociational elements and to what extent the Iraqi case matches 
other cases of consociationalism. Therefore, integrating two different analyses is a significant 
process in building up the research structure and getting an answer for the research question. 
This means integrating different methods is important for better understanding and analysing 
particular cases.   
Furthermore, elite interviews and documents played a big role in this study. It was not easy 
to find out truthful but uncovered information without using face to face interviews and 
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searching through different documents. Both contributed to this research and helped the 
researcher to get an answer to the research questions. While I used both in this study, elite 
interviews played a bigger part in the research and brought more benefits than the 
documents. That fact is related to the topic because Iraqi political development is connected 
with elite behaviour from 2003 to 2014.  
It also helped a lot when I looked at the US’s role in Iraq and how it affected the political 
process after 2003. There were unreported events and positions taken and the best way for 
discover them is through interviews with politicians. The research questions required elite 
interviews without ignoring the documents. However, both have strengths and weakness, 
some of which were faced whilst the researcher was conducting investigation. As noted, I 
tried to minimise the difficulties and develop the strengths in order to get a better 
understanding of political development in terms of the implementation of consociationalism. 
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4 Chapter 4 how is consociationalism reflected in the permanent 
constitution in Iraq? 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will seek to find out how consociational elements are reflected in Iraq’s 
permanent constitution of 2005. This particular investigation contributes to answering the 
main question: was Iraq a consociational democracy, in its formal institutions as well as in 
practice, from 2003 to 2014? Analysing the Iraqi constitution is vital. Understanding the actual 
reflection of consociationalism in the document is necessary for investigating whether or not 
this corresponds to actual practice. Traditional consociationalism is based on four main 
elements, identified by Lijphart. These consist of proportionality, grand coalition, mutual veto, 
and autonomy.188 
This aim of this chapter is to determine how these four elements of consociationalism are 
reflected in the permanent constitution. What is in the constitution? What is not in the 
constitution? How do these elements emerge in the constitution? Why does it matter? To 
answer the overarching question, I will approach these sub-questions first. Before conducting 
this process, it is important to know that there is no a single, precisely-defined structure of 
consociationalism. However, many countries have been listed as consociational cases. Many 
countries have been identified as consociational democracies, for example Canada from 1840 
to 1867, Austria from 1945 to 1966, Lebanon from 1943 to 1975, Cyprus from 1960 to 1963, 
Malaysia since 1955 with a temporary breakdown from 1969 to 1971, South Africa from 1994, 
Bosnia from December 1995, and Northern Ireland from 1999.189 These cases could be helpful 
in understanding that the nature of each case is different, and that each country may shape 
its consociational institutions differently. Consociationalism has two main forms: formal, 
according to the constitution or law, and informal, through an agreement. Both have the 
potential to offer advantages and disadvantages.    
In this chapter I will describe the characteristics of each recognised element of 
consociationalism, beginning with proportionality, and examine the extent to which each is 
reflected in the constitution.  From this, we may establish whether consociationalism in Iraq 
operates, at least in principle, according to one of the two forms, formal or informal, or may 
be in between.   
4.2 Proportionality  
Proportional representation is one of the most essential elements of consociational 
democracy. According to Lijphart, proportionality has three main functions. The first crucial 
role of proportionality is making political appointments, that is, “to delegate the most difficult 
and fateful decisions to the top leaders of the segments.”190 The second one is the creation 
of “a method of allocating civil service appointments.”191 The third one is a method of “scarce 
financial resources in the form of government subsidies among the different segments.”192 
Giving some power, in the form of civil service and political appointments, to different 
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communities, bestows on each one greater potential to shape the political system and 
decision-making process. The aim is for each single community to be represented within the 
wider political institutions of the country, to have right, and to share in the power. In 
conducting these three procedures, electoral law plays a crucial role. It can determine each 
community’s size and standing within the society, and can thus function as their basis for 
demanding rights. Thus, proportionality shapes the political system through the distribution 
of political posts, especially high-level positions, allowing each community a voice in the 
political institutions. Moreover, proportionality is an instrument for conflict reduction among 
diverse groups. It would be through making political institutions each community represent 
its own group. Therefore, while it is important to concentrate on offering members of diverse 
community’s high-level positions, there is also a need for “promoting proportionality 
throughout the public sector, not just in the executive and legislature but also in the 
bureaucracy, including the army and the police.” 193  This could be reflected in formal 
documents or by informal agreement among political leaders.  Taking this into consideration, 
it is important to highlight how proportionality is reflected in the Iraqi constitution, 
concentrating on points that are linked to it.  
In the Iraqi constitution, there are many articles designed to promote proportionality in 
various respects. The reality of proportionality in Iraq is that it relies on ethnic religious groups, 
which includes Shiites, Sunnis (as a sectarian group), and Kurds (as an ethnic group). There 
are also other minority groups, such as Turkomen and Christian. Each single group has a right 
to obtain its due proportion in the political system. However, the political process depends 
on the three main groups (Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd) for achieving proportionality in the political 
system. Ideally, this would lead to plurality within political institutions without any 
discrimination or the neglect of any particular community. This is obvious in Article 9, section 
one, which asserts that the “Iraqi armed forces and security services will be composed of the 
components of the Iraqi people with due consideration given to their balance and 
representation without discrimination or exclusion.” 194  In reality, the constitution makes 
provision for the army, allowing for different representation, but it does not mention 
proportionality. It seems to decree that proportionality should take place in the organisation 
of one of Iraq’s most important institutions, the armed forces. It offers a positive way of 
preventing monopoly in the armed forces by one or two communities, because it prescribes 
the building of that institution by all Iraqi people. Its members would, it suggests, be loyal to 
Iraq, rather than to a specific community. Also, it is designed to alleviate concerns that the 
army will be used in support of one side in sectarian conflict.  
The Council of Representatives is an important political institution for gathering all 
communities to represent all the Iraqi people. Constitutionally, it should include 
proportionality based on the electoral system, which leads to the proportional appointment 
of representatives. This is enshrined in Article 49, section one, which says “the Council of 
Representatives shall consist of a number of members, at a ratio of one seat per 100,000 
persons representing the entire Iraqi people, they shall be elected through a direct secret 
general ballot, the representation of all components of the people shall be upheld in it.”195 
This clearly states that the principle of proportional representation should be reflected in the 
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parliament. This conforms to the aim of proportionality in Iraq, wherein each particular group 
wants to have a voice in the parliament based on its population. This could bring a kind of 
plurality, composed as it is of individuals from various places who represent the whole 
country. Consequently, while a limited number of constitutional articles indicate 
proportionality, proportionality in the constitution is not actually explicit for most institutions, 
and it is left to other pieces of legislation, such as electoral law and informal practices, to 
enshrine proportionality. 
In addition, the electoral system ensures that no single community could monopolise the 
parliament, allowing proportionality to take place. According to the electoral law, 
parliamentary seats should be distributed among governorates through pre-election 
methods.196 Each governorate has a number of seats according to its population in order to 
achieve proportionality in the parliament.197 Therefore, each community has a supermajority 
in a number of governorates. For example, the Shiite community has a supermajority in at 
least seven of eighteen and always attains all the seats of parliament from these places, the 
Sunni community in three, and the Kurd community in three. Others are mixed among at least 
two of them, such as Kirkuk, which has 12 members of parliament. Kurd and Sunni each 
obtained 6 in 2010. Thus, the outcome of the process is proportionality in the parliament in 
light of electoral system not the constitution. However, the voice of each ethno-religious 
community is directly transferred to a seat in the parliament.  
On the other hand, there were informal agreements among political leaders for distributing 
high-level positions among key Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd communities. There is no constitutional 
article enshrining the division of posts among these communities. However, political leaders 
emphasise that high-level positions and ministry posts should be managed by an agreement. 
In fact, constitutional articles encourage them to make such agreements, because there is no 
chance for a single community to form the cabinet without getting support from other 
communities. There were two main ‘Erbil’ agreements, one in 2006 before the parliament 
approved the cabinet, and the other in 2010 to appoint Maliki for a second turn. According to 
both agreements, primary posts were distributed under particular formulae based on seats 
in parliament and on key components, especially Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd communities. This 
brought all communities into power, especially the Shiite community, because they had a 
majority in Iraq and won more parliamentary seats than others. In this way, proportionality 
was arranged informally by agreement, rather than by constitutional articles. This kind of 
informal proportionality has worked in some cases, such as Lebanon, Malaysia, and India, but 
not in Cyprus, where formal proportionality was more effective.  
Therefore, proportional representation can take on different forms, depending on the 
structure of the political system and the nature of the political environment. As shown above, 
the Iraqi constitution consists of many articles that emphasise representation, but not 
proportional representation, and provides for proportionality of key ethnic and religious 
groups through other legislations and informal additional agreements. Therefore, 
consociationalism is compatible with the constitution but not explicitly prescribed by it. 
Rather, it is present in other legislations and informal agreements.  An example of formal 
representation is the case of Cyprus. Proportionality was enshrined in certain articles in its 
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1960 constitution (Articles 46, 47, 48-50, 67, 72, 77-78).198 These gave different groups the 
right to represent their interests through the allocation of civil service appointments and 
scarce financial resources.  Similarly, in the Iraqi constitution, proportionality is reflected in 
Articles 9, 49, and 112. This means that proportionality is formally reflected in a few 
constitutional articles, and furthermore that electoral law has been drawn under those 
articles. Informally, proportionality in Iraq can be seen in the appointment of people to high-
level positions based on informal agreements, like in Lebanon and Malaysia. Since 
proportionality in Iraq is managed by both the constitution and informal agreements, it is in 
fact a combination of both methods, formal and informal, allowing it more flexibility.    
4.3 Grand coalition 
According to Lijphart’s theory, grand coalition is one of the most important principles for 
producing power-sharing arrangements. It achieves this by forming political institutions that 
encompass key groups in a divided society.199 The government should contain “all sizable 
communities in executive institutions provided they wish to participate.” 200  Forming the 
government from significant groups is important for achieving the main aim of 
consociationalism because “broad agreement among all citizens seems more democratic than 
simple majority rule.”201 Moreover, as with proportionality, there are different forms of grand 
coalition, formal and informal. Formal grand coalition is enforced by the constitution or 
written law, while informal grand coalition is not.202 Cyprus is a good example of formal 
consociation because a grand coalition government was introduced in its 1960 
constitution.203 The formula for finalising Cyprus’ grand coalition was placed in its constitution. 
It “had to consist of seven Greek ministers designated by the president and three Turkish 
ministers designated by the vice president.”204 Therefore, both communities attained posts 
and participated in the political institution.   
On the other hand, Lebanon from 1943 to 1975 is an exemplary case of informal grand 
coalition government. Lijphart stated, “the informal and unwritten “national pact” concluded 
at the time of independence prescribed government by a kind of grand coalition of top 
officeholders.” 205  Senior political leaders decided to distribute all high positions among 
communities, following a particular formula. The available positions included “a Maronite 
president, a Sunni prime minister, a Shiite chairman of legislature, and a Greek Orthodox 
deputy chairman and deputy prime minister.”206 Thus, grand coalition government worked 
for more than three decades but eventually ended in 1973 when the civil war occurred in 
spite of neglecting the grand coalition. As can be seen from both cases, grand coalition 
government does not have a particular form, but rather depends on individual countries and 
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their situations. In some countries, grand coalition operates in the constitution, while in 
others it is implemented by an agreement.   
In the case of Iraq, there is no explicit article in the permanent constitution supporting grand 
coalition government and division of high-level positions. By contrast, there is an article that 
gives the largest bloc the right to form the government.  This is explicitly stated in Article 76, 
section 1: “the President of the Republic shall charge the nominee of the largest Council of 
Representatives bloc with the formation of the Council of Ministers.”207 This seems to be the 
majoritarian model, but there are many articles that instead show that the cabinet formation 
requires consensus among key communities: Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd. The reason for this is 
that the constitution does not allow a single community to govern, even if they get an 
absolute majority. However, if one of the communities forms the largest bloc, it needs an 
absolute majority for its confidence from parliament, as is stated in Article 76, section 4.208 
Practically, getting an absolute majority is hard to imagine because none of the key 
communities has an absolute majority in the parliament. In addition, the current reality of 
electoral politics in Iraq is that the party system largely runs along ethno-religious lines. Each 
group cast the vote for its group, it is therefore highly unlikely that a single ethnic group could 
successfully govern without some form of grand coalition.  This means that it is hard for any 
community to form the government by itself. One group cannot govern Iraq without support 
from the others, and there is no guarantee of getting an absolute majority for approving the 
cabinet in the parliament. Moreover, passing laws and practising several constitutional 
articles requires a two-thirds majority. 
This ‘stalemate’ situation therefore encourages all communities to form a grand coalition 
government rather than a majority government. There are many other decisions within the 
permanent constitution that require two-thirds of parliamentary members to be in 
agreement. These include Federation Council Article 65, constitutional amendment Article 
126, section 2, and Article 138, section 2, for electing a President Council, which emphasises 
that “the Council of Representatives shall elect the President of the State and two Vice 
President who shall form a Council called the “President Council,” which shall be elected by 
one list and with a two-thirds majority.”209  The President Council consisted of three members 
from three main communities. Obviously, electing a president and two vice-presidents 
through one list looks like a kind of grand coalition conducted for the purpose of distributing 
three posts among the three main communities. However, this kind of coalition was formally 
enacted only for the presidency council during the transitional period from 2005 to 2010.210 
It ended after the first term of the Council of Representatives.211 In other words, it was a 
limited article, linked to the first period of parliament and limited to presidency posts. Visser 
pointed out that “the degree of formal power-sharing at the level of the central government 
is in fact quite limited.” 212  This means there is no grand coalition in the permanent 
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constitution, but he does not indicate there are many constitutional articles encouraging all 
communities to from the grand coalition government. 
In Iraq, therefore, grand coalition takes different forms. On the one hand, it was formal for a 
specific period under Article 138. On the other hand, there was an informal grand coalition 
based on an agreement among the three main communities to govern Iraq together, 
inclusively.213 Since 2005, all governments have formed under the informal agreements of 
2006 and 2010, which were signed by senior political leaders. Furthermore, many existing 
constitutional articles implicitly require collaboration among communities for taking 
important action and making decisions. Formally there is no chance for a single community 
to govern Iraq without getting support from other significant communities. Thus, grand 
coalition in Iraq is mostly managed informally by an agreement. It was only during the 
transitional period from 2005 to 2010 that a formal grand coalition formed part of the 
presidency.  
4.4 Mutual veto 
Another crucial element of consociationalism is mutual veto, which gives minority 
communities a great opportunity to protect their rights and resist the dominant majority. 
Lijphart states that “only such a veto can give each segment a complete guarantee of political 
protection.”214  Moreover, he pointed out that “the mutual veto can be an informal and 
unwritten understanding or a rule that is formally agreed on and possibly anchored in the 
constitution.”215 Therefore, any mutual veto existing either formally or informally with other 
consociational elements in a country should count as a consociational case.   
In Iraq, the permanent constitution includes several articles based on mutual veto for each 
significant community. Each community could use mutual veto for protecting its interests and 
obtaining and exercising its rights, while regarding the rights of others. Two types of veto 
occur in the case of Iraq.  The first is the presidency veto located in Article 138, sections 1 and 
4, which states that “the Presidency Council shall issue its decisions unanimously.”216It gives 
each community the authority to use the veto, because each has a representative in the 
Presidency Council. This provides the Council with the chance to reach a consensus about 
passing laws and making decisions. Formally, this type of veto was only intended for the first 
election period between 2006 and 2010. According to Article 138, section one, the Presidency 
Council will take the place of the president and “the provisions related to the President of the 
Republic shall be reactivated one successive term after this Constitution comes into force.”217 
After that, constitutionally, the president does not have a formal veto because there is no 
provision enshrining the presidency veto after 2010.   
In addition to the formal presidency veto, as mentioned earlier in this section, there is a 
provision for two-thirds majorities, which has an effect that is very similar to a veto.  Actually, 
there is another type of formal veto that is present in the permanent constitution.  This is the 
regional veto on accepting amendments to the constitution. Article 126, section 4 states that 
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“articles of the Constitution may not be amended if such amendment takes away from the 
powers of the regions…, except by the approval of the legislative authority of the concerned 
region and the approval of the majority of its citizens in a general referendum.”218 It is obvious 
that the constitution gives individual regions the power to accept or reject the amendment 
of articles that may affect the region. This is a way of protecting the region’s rights, because 
if the central government wants to harm a particular region by amending the constitution, 
the region will be able to use its veto. Moreover, Article 142, section 4 emphasises, “the 
referendum on the amended articles shall be successful if approved by the majority of the 
voters, and if not rejected by two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates.”219 This 
means that the amendment of constitution articles could face a veto from two-thirds of the 
voters in three governorates. With this two-thirds majority veto applicable for the three main 
communities, it is not easy for anyone to amend the permanent constitution. It is, therefore, 
a way of balancing power between the majority and the minority.  
Furthermore, informal mutual vetoes can occur in particular cases, based on certain 
constitution articles. As mentioned above, there are several articles that require a two-thirds 
and absolute majority to pass a law in parliament or take a decision in the government. In 
practice, this means that if any of the key communities does not accept a particular case or if 
it withdraws its members during the voting process, then the decision-making process cannot 
succeed. Therefore, mutual veto is present informally, and may affect the political process for 
achieving power-sharing among different communities.  
To summarise the above, the Iraqi constitution contains mutual veto for key communities in 
order to protect their rights when they see that they are being neglected. The Iraqi people 
instituted the same mutual veto as Cyprus did in its 1960 constitution. The permanent 
constitution covers mutual veto in two main areas, the Presidency Council, and the potential 
for amending the permanent constitution. In addition, 12 areas require two-thirds majority 
of seats in the CoR and two-thirds of voters in three or four provinces, and any of the key 
communities can use this right to stop the particular process by rejecting it or by withdrawing 
its members from the CoR. This means that each key community can use a veto to block any 
decision or any project that may infringe one of its rights. Thus, the Iraqi permanent 
constitution has a mutual veto in order to avoid the majority rule that Cyprus and Belgium 
possess formally, and Malaysia and Lebanon possess informally.   
4.5 Autonomy  
Autonomy is one of the primary principles of consociationalism. It has three main forms 
cultural, economic, and political autonomy. Cultural autonomy has three formulas; the first is 
“the right of religious and linguistic minorities to establish.” The second one is the right to 
“administer their own autonomous schools.” The third one is a “separate "personal laws".”220 
In other words, it affords each community the right to govern its own activities, particularly 
education and culture.221 Lijphart mainly discussed cultural autonomy, but also referred to 
political and economic autonomy as being a part of consociational theory, which is also 
associated with federalism. Political autonomy is crucial for those countries that have a 
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territorial basis. Lijphart says “consociational theory recommends a federalism with relatively 
many and relatively small constituent units.”222 According to the principles of federalism, 
political authority is given to the sub-national unit. This could be in the form of the power to 
regulate taxation, the power to make political decisions on provisions for public services, and 
even a degree of formal representation. Ideally, through federalism, each community could 
implement its right to form a region for its own activities. Additionally, federalism of course 
suggests having a territorial basis to practise economic autonomy, which gives the right to a 
particular group to administrate its own economic activities. Therefore, in consociational 
countries, federalism and autonomy should be instituted in the constitution. This would allow 
all communities the ability to shape the political system autonomously, according to their 
own needs.  
Generally, autonomy has been applied in consociational countries.  Lijphart asserts that 
“Indian democracy has had all these three forms, the last two from the very beginning and 
linguistic federalism since the 1950s.”223   Those types of cultural autonomy were explicitly 
reflected in Indian’s constitution to demonstrate that power was shared among the different 
communities. Because of this constitutional backing, the Indian government proposed 
linguistic federalism for the minorities and tried to establish power-sharing among all of them. 
Other consociational cases have similar reflections of culture autonomy in their constitutions 
in different forms, as is the case with Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Belgium Cyprus, and 
Lebanon.224  
The Iraqi constitution covers political autonomy in several articles. The first is Article 116, 
which says that “the federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a decentralized 
capital, regions, and governorates, as well as local administrations.” 225  This means the 
political system is a federation arrangement that individual administrations are able to govern 
each region and keep their own interests in hand. For example, Kurdistan is recognised as a 
federal region In Iraq with the boundaries that it had before its collapse in 2003.226 This 
recognition need not just be for Kurdistan, but for all communities in Iraq that are able to 
designate themselves as a region through the procedure outlined in the constitution. Article 
117, section 2 emphasises this point, noting that “this Constitution shall affirm new regions 
established in accordance with its provisions.”227 In addition to giving governorates the right 
to make a region, the permanent constitution also “leaves the decision about what the 
number of regions and their boundaries should be to the governorates.”228 Article 119 states 
that “one or more governorates shall have the right to organize a region based on a request 
to be voted on in a referendum.”229 To implement this article, the constitution emphasises in 
Article 118 that the law should be enacted to identify the government’s stake in and ability 
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to arrange a region.230  The Council of Representatives enacted this law in 2008. It includes 
details of the procedure for establishing a new autonomous region in Iraq. 
Another critical point addressed in the permanent constitution is economic autonomy, 
dealing specifically with the allocation of scarce financial resources among the Iraqi people. 
More precisely, Article 112, section 1, emphasises that “the federal government, with the 
producing governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil 
and gas extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner 
in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country.” 231  It is, then, 
determined to undertake one of the core activities of proportionality and autonomy by 
distributing resources among the Iraqi people and giving regional governments and 
governorates to right to be part of administrating that process. This article is clearly linked to 
the idea of proportionality and autonomy among diverse groups. This is in order to ground 
the system in autonomy and proportion, with all parties sharing the benefits of oil and gas. 
Moreover, it is related to autonomy as well as proportionality, because according to this 
article, the constitution provisions indicate the formal decentralisation of management of oil, 
gas, and natural resources.232 As Bogaards summarises, “the implicit understanding is that 
new fields will be controlled and managed by the regions and governorates where oil is 
discovered.” 233  Therefore, this creates a kind of balance in power-sharing among 
communities, where all of them obtain advantages from rare resources.  
According to constitution Article 121, the region has the power to “exercise executive, 
legislative, and judicial powers in accordance with this Constitution, except for those 
authorities stipulated in the exclusive authorities of the federal government.”234 It is clear that 
the constitution gives the right to people to run their own internal policy, since power has 
been decentralised. More than this, the federal region has the right to modify national 
legislation if it clashes with regional interests. This means that the permanent constitution 
“leaves open the extent of self-rule.”235 This is located in Article 121, which states that “In 
case of a contradiction between regional and national legislation in respect to a matter 
outside the exclusive authorities of the federal government, the regional power shall have 
the right to amend the application of the national legislation within that region.” 236 This 
means that the regional authority is free to adapt federal legislation in its area.237 Therefore, 
the federal region has the real power to exercise its own rights through its political institutions. 
Thus, federalism is the main characteristic of consociationalism, and is formally reflected in 
the permanent constitution. 
Another type of autonomy is cultural autonomy, the basis of which is establishing 
autonomous schools for minority groups. The permanent constitution maintains the right for 
each ethno-religious group to exercise its right in terms of religious identity, education, and 
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schools. Article 2, section 2 states that “this Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of 
the majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights of all individuals to 
freedom of religious belief and practice, such as Christians, Yazedis, and Mandi Sabeans.”238 
This means that while Islam is the religion for the majority of the people, other religions have 
the right to practise what they believe. Furthermore, Article 2, section 1 strikes a balance 
between the provisions of Islam and the principles of democracy, because no law may be 
enacted that opposes any one of them.239 The constitution accounts for two main languages, 
Arabic and Kurdish. Article 4, section 1 decrees that “the Arabic language and the Kurdish 
language are the two official languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in 
their mother tongue, such as Turkmen, Assyrian, and Armenian shall be guaranteed in 
government educational institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any 
other language in private educational institutions.”240 This means that each ethno-religious 
group has the right to teach children in its own language, and that the government should 
take responsibility for providing the resources to do so. But Arabic and Kurdish are not only 
official languages in Iraq. According to Article 4, section 4, the Turkomen and Syriac languages 
are “two other official languages in the administrative units in which they constitute density 
of population.” 241  Thus, this type of culture autonomy formally exists in the permanent 
constitution for all ethno-religious groups.  It is the government’s responsibility to maintain 
it.  
The final type of culture autonomy is the stipulation for separate personal laws according to 
ethno-religious groups. Article 41 states that “Iraqis are free in their commitment to their 
personal status according to their religions, sects, beliefs, or choices, and this shall be 
regulated by law.” 242  That involves many aspects related to personal life for people in each 
particular community, such as marriage, divorce, succession, and adoption of children. 
Formally, the Kurdistan region had its own personal law, which in some cases differed from 
central personal law. It is clear that the Iraqi constitution determines freedom in personal 
laws, allowing all separate groups the right to practise their own personal law in Iraq.  
Autonomy is, then, strongly reflected in the permanent constitution of Iraq. It is similar to 
other consociational countries that practise power-sharing among ethno-religious groups. 
This means that the majority of consociational countries have the same situation. Formally, 
all of them emphasise consociational principles in their constitutions in order to provide equal 
rights without neglecting any community. Therefore, federalism is the core of autonomy, and 
plays a significant role in the process of consociationalism in deeply divided places.  However, 
it is not compulsory that all consociational countries should be at the same level in regard to 
the representation of autonomy in their constitution.  
4.6 Conclusion 
In light of this examination, we may conclude that certain characteristics of consociationalism 
are reflected in the Iraqi constitution, but not all of them are explicit. Autonomy is strongly 
reflected in the permanent constitution. There are some veto provisions, but these are 
actually not very strong, especially after 2010, when the formal presidency veto was 
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abandoned. There are limited provisions for formal proportionality, mainly in the army, but 
provisions for proportionality occur across a wider range of legislations and agreements. 
There are, however, no provisions for grand coalition government. In light of this, the 
constitution is only partially consociational. (Table 1 shows it more clearly). However, one can 
see consociationalism represented in various legislations (e.g. electoral law) and Erbil 
Agreements. Consequently, Iraq should be counted as one of the consociational countries. It 
is crucial to highlight the nature of the constitution and how consociationalism is reflected in 
it, because without this it is hard to investigate and assess the actual practice of consociational 
elements in Iraq. We must, then, turn to the constitution drafting process, which is the subject 
of chapter five. 
Rating the reflection of consociational elements in the permanent constitution 2005 
 Consociational 
elements  
Fully 
reflected  
Partially 
reflected 
None 
reflection  
Notes  
1 Grand coalition  
  
√ There is no provision for grand coalition government in the 
permanent constitution, however, it is reflected by the 
agreement among key communities such as the Erbil 
agreement. 
2 Proportional 
Representation  
 
√   There are few provisions of proportionality in the 
constitution but it is reflected broadly in the legislations, 
such as electoral law. 
3 Mutual Veto  
 
√ 
 
Veto provisions are not very strong, especially after 2010, 
when the formal presidency veto was unruly. 
4 Autonomy  √ 
  
Autonomy is strongly reflected because there are many 
provisions for segmental autonomy and creating new 
regions. 
Table 1: Rating the reflection of consociational elements in the constitution 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 Origin of the Constitution  
5 Chapter 5 Origins of the Constitution  
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed how consociationalism is reflected formally and informally 
in the constitution. That chapter demonstrated that Iraq is a consociational country and that 
consociational aspects are partially reflected in the constitution. Therefore, in the following 
chapter we will examine to what degree consociationalism was deliberately pursued in the 
drafting of the constitution. I will seek to investigate the process leading up to the permanent 
constitution from 2003 to 2005 in order to identify why there are so few consociational 
provisions in the constitution. It is important to know how consociational elements became 
embedded in the constitution, the writing of which required discussions about bargaining 
power between diverse groups in Iraq. This chapter adopts a path dependence construction 
that emphasises the significance of key actors’ choices, and the structuring of the political 
institutions in terms of consociational elements. It was a critical moment that affected the 
political development afterwards because during that time there were different options for 
forming the new political institutions and the actors selected one of them which was 
consociationalism. After that the critical moment “led to the formation of institutions that 
tend toward persistence and that cannot be easily transformed.”243 In the Iraqi case, political 
institutions formed according to consociational elements starting with IGC in 2003 that 
triggered others in following years.  
Establishing political institutions in its new form which was based on consociationalism led to 
the reflection of consociational elements in the permanent constitution in 2005. Mahoney 
said, “a path-dependent approach emphasizes how actor choices create institutions at critical 
moments, how these institutions in turn shape subsequent actor behaviours, how these 
actors’ response in turn culminate in the development of the new institutional pattern.”244 In 
light of that method, the chapter focuses on the political process that led to the constitution 
and how the new political institutions outline the main communities’ performances during 
critical moments. Pierson investigated the concept of a path dependence, stating “preceding 
steps in a particular direction induce further movement in the same direction.” 245  Thus, 
tracing the political process, in particular forming the new political institutions from 2003 to 
2005 and the impact of actors, will be examined in this chapter. The reason is when a path 
dependence approach is practiced “adequate explanation will require identifying key 
historical process that set cases on particular trajectories of development, even if these 
processes rest in the distant past.”246 In light of that, I am arguing that the period of 2003-
2005 was a critical stage that led to the selection of the political institutions based on 
consociational elements. So, it is difficult to understand mapping consociational elements in 
the constitution without looking the political development from 2003 to the permanent 
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constitution in 2005. This entails not just looking at the outcome of the constitution: it is 
crucial to look at the processes of the constitution design process. This explains my path 
dependence argument.  
Accordingly, I shall examine how each political group negotiated and imposed its own 
interests in the constitution in order to ensure that power was shared. I shall explore various 
leaders’ expectations at that stage about how they would interact with each other to produce 
positive outcomes. What was each actor’s role during this period? What were the processes 
through which outcomes were reached? What were the outcomes? I shall address these 
questions in eight subsections, moving from the motivation for re-establishing new political 
outcomes to the effects of the establishment of several political, administrative, and legal 
bodies related to the process of writing the constitution. Finally, I shall conclude the chapter 
with a summary of the findings.  
5.2 The Creation of New Political institutions after the 2003 Invasion  
In this section, I shall discuss the political process immediately following the invasion. 
Obviously, when the USA and its allies invaded Iraq, the entire government was dissolved. 
After that, the decision had to be made about whether the political system should be re-built 
by the US-led coalition or by internal players. Among the internal actors were the main ethno-
religious groups (Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd).  Among the external actors were the US-led 
coalition, and the UN. It is crucial to explain who had real authority influence on the plans for 
rebuilding the political system, and how those with authority and influence acted during that 
period.    
The fundamental resolution from the Security Council about Iraq after the invasion was 
Resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003, which contained key points regarding Iraqi involvement in 
organising their own situation. It started with “the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine 
their own political future and control their own natural resources.”247Moreover, the UN 
strongly supported Iraqi people’s desire to govern their own country.  The same resolution 
“express[es] resolve that the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly.”248 In 
addition, it pointed out “that the United Nations should play a vital role in humanitarian relief, 
the reconstruction of Iraq, and the restoration and establishment of national and local 
institutions for representative governance.” 249  The regulation gave the UN the right to 
participate in humanitarian and political fields, and identified the role of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) as well, stating that “the Security Council recogniz[es] the specific 
authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states 
as occupying powers under a unified command (the “Authority”).” 250  So, the resolution 
recognised the US and UK as occupying powers, and with that came certain rights and 
responsibilities. But the occupying powers began to create a number of political institutions, 
an act that was not compatible with occupation law. David J. Scheffer argues that in the early 
stages, the occupying powers ignored occupation law because their action was not 
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compatible with it.251 On the ground, the CPA and the UN collaborated in the institution-
building process of the occupying powers, which required discussing rebuilding political 
institutions together. Furthermore, this attempt aimed at “encouraging efforts by the people 
of Iraq to form a representative government based on the rule of law that affords equal rights 
and justice to all Iraqi citizens without regard to ethnicity, religion, or gender.”252 Hence, the 
participation of the Iraqi people in these efforts were crucial, because without inside support, 
external actors would be unable to make the political institution work effectively.  
Following the invasion in March 2003, the US-led coalition established an administration to 
govern Iraq under the name of the CPA. In other words, the US-led coalition took 
responsibility, as the occupying power, and Iraq was recognised by the UN as an occupied 
country. Following this, the US-led coalition built up its authority under Security Council 
regulations. The aim of this was to create a powerful authority to take responsibility for 
rebuilding the Iraqi state, since there was no existing authority in Iraq that had such powers. 
The CPA was responsible for rebuilding all political institutions and preparing the government 
for upcoming transitions. It received recognition from the Security Council regulation 
mentioned earlier, and its functions were outlined in Section 1: “the CPA shall exercise powers 
of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during 
the period of transitional administration, to restore conditions of security and stability.”253 
The aim of that process was to support attempts to rebuild the political system, emphasising 
that the “Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future, including by advancing 
efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance 
and facilitating economic recovery and sustainable reconstruction and development.”254 That 
process was the first step that the US and its allies made towards authorising a new 
government, legalised by the UN. In light of this, the CPA took responsibility for controlling 
the entire country under its own administration. The final decision was taken by the chair of 
the CPA, Lewis Paul "Jerry" Bremer, who was appointed by President Bush on May 9, 2003.255 
Consequently, there were two main actors with political power at the beginning of the 
process, the UN mission led by De Mello and the CPA led by Bremer. This meant that internal 
actors did not have any impact on the US-led coalition’s functions, because Iraq was 
considered an occupied country.   
The question is: how was this new political system perceived by both the external actors who 
created it, and the internal actors, who were not consulted? According to Resolution 1483, 
the UN supported the Iraqi people in moving towards governing their own country after the 
occupation. However, the leading role depended on the US-led coalition, which went through 
the CPA. When President Bush appointed Bremer, he told him “I am fully committed to 
bringing representative government to the Iraqi people.” 256  It was clear that the US-led 
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coalition wanted a broad-based government, which would include all ethno-religious groups, 
because it was part of the US policy of regime change in Iraq not to exclude any group.257 
Despite their intentions, they did not in fact have any formula to ensure that the three main 
groups (Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd) would each have a say. Barham Ahmed Salih, former Prime 
Minister of Kurdistan said “the US looked at Iraq situation from their perspective on the basis 
of the state of citizenship [i.e. regardless of ethno-religious affiliation, all communities were 
comprised of citizens of Iraq] and they did not agree on formal division at the beginning of 
the process.”258 In addition, Barham Salih pointed out that if a single majority [e.g. Shiite] 
governed Iraq, it would be harmful for minority rights, because the majority people would 
neglect the rights of minorities. That situation encouraged Kurds to demand consensus 
among communities as a fundamental principle for rebuilding Iraq.259 Moreover, Mahmoud 
Othman, a Kurdish leader, pointed out that the US and UK did not like that division, but when 
they saw the reality, and what the Iraqi people wanted, they accepted it as necessary in 
dealing with the new situation. 260  They therefore accepted an arrangement that had 
previously been made among opposition parties in Iraq before the collapse of Saddam’s 
regime.  Each group would be represented according to the following formula: Shiite 60%, 
Sunni 20%, and Kurd 20%. 261  Therefore, division in Iraq according to three main ethno-
religious groups helped to ensure a system that was compatible system with previously-
acknowledged power-sharing arrangements.  The main point at that stage was that Shiites 
and Kurds wanted to be in a real partnership with other sects through a power-sharing 
arrangement.  
Consequently, at that stage all sects started negotiations with the CPA to find out how the 
political system could be arranged.  The Shiite majority stood with the Kurds to apply power- 
sharing in the political system in order to ensure their own participation in governing Iraq. 
According to the above discussion, the US-led coalition accepted the deal to operate with the 
three clearly-delineated communities: Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd. This meant that power had to 
be shared among all three groups. The already-existing partnership between the Shiites and 
Kurds meant that power-sharing would have a greater chance of success. According to the 
US-led coalition policy, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was formed, appointed by the CPA.  
It was the first establishment to include representatives from all three groups.  I shall discuss 
this in the following section.  
5.3 Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)  
Before the US-led coalition occupied Iraq, there was a group of seven leaders who had been 
chosen by the Iraqi opposition leaders at their London Conference in 14-16 December 2002.  
They are referred to as the G-7.262 After the collapse, Bremer wanted to expand the G-7 
because he considered this body not to be a truly representative group, and he wanted to 
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make a broad-based government with representation from all communities.263 There was no 
significant opposition from internal actors to expand the group; however, the Shiite majority 
feared that the expansion of the G-7 would affect them, because the ratio of Shiite members 
would be reduced. Bremer assured them that they would not be affected.264 The Kurds did 
not object to the expansion. 265  From that point, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was 
established on 13 July 2003 by the CPA as a first step towards rebuilding formal political 
institutions.266 It consisted of 25 members from all Iraqi communities: 13 Shiites, 5 Sunnis, 5 
Kurds, and two seats for Christian and Turkmen minorities.267 Table 2: Rating Members of the 
Iraqi Governing Council  provides more details of these members, all appointed by Bremer. In 
addition, a new, significant role was “a presidency that rotated among nine of the council 
members. It had no autonomy to take decisions without the approval of Bremer, who 
retained veto power over all IGC decisions.”268 Hence, the formula that shaped the IGC was 
crucial, because it was the first time that the posts were divided among the three main 
communities.  This became a grounding principle for participation in the political process from 
2003 onwards. This was a fundamental step towards power-sharing based on ethno-religious 
groups, based on appointment rather than election. 
Internally, the formula used to ensure cross-community participation in both the IGC and the 
cabinet was accepted by all communities. The formula reflected the reality of the country and 
gave each ethno-religious group the opportunity to be represented in it. In accord with this, 
Qubad J. Talabani, Kurdish deputy Prime Minister in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
said, “the structure of the IGC means a new political system in Iraq will be thought three main 
communities Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd.”269 Therefore, it was a starting point for all communities 
to work together and make decisions in consensus, a new method for sharing responsibility 
in the political institutions of Iraq.270 The Shiites as a majority community accepted the new 
political process, and participated in it eagerly, because it was the first time that they had 
shared the responsibility of high-level positions in Iraq. However, also at that time, the Shiites 
had been warned by Bremer “not [to] commit the mistake they had made in 1920”, when 
they rose against the British, who occupied Iraq.271 The absolute majority of posts granted to 
Shiites meant that they dominated both the IGC and the cabinet. That was one of the biggest 
reasons that the Shiites agreed with that formula, and were in a rush to start rebuilding 
political institutions.272 On the other hand, while the IGC and the cabinet included Sunni 
people, many of them opposed the political process, and demanded ending the authority of 
the Americans occupying Iraq.273 This led to controversy, as the Sunni community divided into 
two groups, one – the stronger of the two – wanting to resist the occupation, and the other 
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– less powerful – wanting to collaborate with it.  The opposition group called all groups to 
boycott any political process that included the IGC, which was under the occupation’s 
authority.274 However, there were some Sunni leaders in the IGC who represented the views 
of the Sunni community that was willing to work with occupation. Consequently, Shiites, 
Kurds and part of the Sunni community participated in the political process, and obtained 
posts that allowed them to share the (limited) power in the political system.  
While the IGC consisted of 25 Iraqi members, the US-led coalition monopolised the political 
process, and the final decision came through the CPA, always requiring approval from Bremer. 
This meant that the US-led coalition had real power, while other actors simply gave advice 
and followed its decisions. Despite this, Bremer claimed that “the Council will have real power 
and the Coalition stands ready to help in any way possible.” 275  This, however, was the 
opposite of reality.  Members of the IGC emphasised that the CPA and Bremer in particular 
had real power, not the IGC. Ayad Allawi, Shiite secular former Prime Minister, pointed out 
that the IGC had no real power, but was considered to be an advisory council, because it was 
Bremer alone who had real authority at that time.276 Thus, the role of the IGC was only 
consultative and gave legitimacy to the process.  
However, the role of the IGC and the cabinet was marginalised by the CPA, particularly by 
Bremer. Obviously, the CPA was one of the main actors to have a significant impact during 
this period, but this does not mean disregarding other actors who played a positive role. 
Security Council Resolution 1483 specifically allowed the US and UK to possess the power of 
an occupying country, and it was under that logic that the CPA and Bremer appointed the 
members of the IGC. This was clear in the CPA’s regulations, which stated: “the Governing 
Council met and announced its formation as the principal body of the Iraqi interim 
administration referred to in paragraph 9 of Resolution 1483.”277 This meant that the IGC was 
granted ostensible authority to govern Iraq during that period, but in reality, the power was 
held by the CPA, especially Bremer, who “decided to give no authority to the IGC independent 
of the CPA.”278 It was based on the thought that the Iraqi people “was not ready to govern 
Iraq, or even to share substantially in such responsibilities.”279 It was in this way that the CPA 
became a main actor, and exerted more influence on rebuilding formal political institutions, 
starting with the institution of the IGC. The IGC continued as the first political institution in 
post-occupation Iraq until 1 June 2004, and ended through the agreement of all members. 
This was enshrined in CPA Regulation number 9 on the 9th of June, which reported “the 
actions by the Governing Council to dissolve itself on June 1, 2004 as part of the ongoing 
evolution in the structures of the interim Iraqi administration, as contemplated by Resolutions 
1483 and 1511.”280    
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 Rating Members of the Iraqi Governing Council from 13 July 2003 to 1 Jun 2004.281 
 Name  Position  Ethnicity Bloc and Political Party 
1 Ahmed Chalabi Member and President Shiite Iraqi National Congress 
2 Ibrahim Jaafari Member and President Shiite  Daawa Islamic Party  
3 Mohammed Bahr al-Ulloum,  Member and President Shiite Cleric from Najaf  
4 Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim,  Member and President Shiite Supreme Council for the 
Islamic Revolution  
5 Ahmed al-Barak,  Member   Shiite Human rights activist  
6 Raja Habib al-Khuzaai Member   Shiite Southern tribal leader 
7 Aqila al-Hashimi,  Member   Shiite Foreign affairs expert 
8 Hamid Majid Mousa Member   Shiite Communist Party 
9 Ezzedine Salim Member and President Shiite Daawa Islamic Party  
10 Iyad Allawi Member and President Shiite Iraqi National Accord  
11 Wael Abdul Latif Member  Shiite 
 
12 Mouwafak al-Rabii Member  Shiite 
 
13 Abdel-Karim Mahoud al-
Mohammedawi 
Member  Shiite Hezbollah from Amara 
14 Samir Shakir Mahmoud Member  Sunni 
 
15 Naseer al-Chaderchi Member Sunni National Democratic Party 
16 Adnan Pachachi Member and President Sunni  
17 Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer Member and President Sunni Tribal figure 
18 Mohsen Abdel Hamid Member and President Sunni  Iraqi Islamic Party 
19 Massoud Barzani Member and President  Kurd Kurdistan Democratic Party 
20 Jalal Talabani Member and President Kurd Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
21 Salaheddine Bahaaeddin  Member Kurd Kurdistan Islamic Union 
22 Mahmoud Othman Member Kurd Independent  
23 Dara Noor Al-din  Member Kurd Judge 
24 Younadem Kana,  Member Assyrian (Christian) 
25 Sondul Chapouk Member Turkomen 
 
 Note: Under the principle of rotation, 11 out of 25 members got presidency of IGC for one month. 
 
Table 2: Rating Members of the Iraqi Governing Council  
Running parallel to the IGC was the cabinet government.  Bremer worked hard to form the 
cabinet government based on the same formula for participation used for forming the IGC. 
Directly after the declaration of the IGC, Bremer said, “the Governing Council is the first step 
on a journey we will travel together toward our mutual goal of a democratic and 
representative Iraqi government.”282 Obviously, the UN regulation called for this, and Bremer 
tried to put it in place as soon as possible. That was why after the establishment of the IGC, 
he set out to do the same for the cabinet government.283 Formation of the first cabinet did 
not take long, because it was based on the IGC’s formula, with each community receiving the 
same percentage of posts. Abdulrahman S. Kareem, a Kurdish former minster in Bremer’s 
cabinet, said, “the government I have been minster in formed in the similar ratio of the IGC 
and all the decision should get his approval and issued by him.” 284  The only difference 
between the IGC and the cabinet members was that the ministers were suggested by the IGC 
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to Bremer, who appointed them. The government formation commenced in September 2003, 
and contained 25 minsters, divided in the same way as the IGC. For more details, see Table 3.  
 
Rating Ministers in the first Cabinet, 1st September 2003 to June 2004. 285  
 Name  Position  Ethnicity Bloc and Political Party 
1 Rotated among 11 members   Prime Minister  Diversity  Different political parties  
Powerful Ministers (Sovereign Ministers) 
2 Nori al-Badran Interior Minister  Shiite Iraqi National Accord 
3 Ibrahim Mohamed Bahr al-
Uloum 
Oil Minister  Shiite Independent, the Future Iraq 
Grouping. 
4 Mahdi al-Hafidh Planning Minister Shiite Iraqi Independent Democrats 
5 Kamil Mubdir al-Gailani Finance Minister Sunni  
6 Dissolved by Bremer  Defence Minister    
7 Hoshyar Zebari Foreign Affairs Minister Kurd  KDP 
Low Powerful Minister (Service Ministries) 
8 Khudayer Abbas Health Minister Shiite Daawa 
9 Mohammed Jassem Khudair Immigration and Refugees Shiite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council 
10 Ali Allawi Trade Minister Shiite   
11 Sami Azara al-Majun Labour and Social Affairs 
Minister 
Shiite Iraqi National Congress 
12 Abdul-Ameer Abboud Rahima Agriculture Minister Shiite  National Democratic Party 
13 Alaudin Abdul-Saheb al-Alwan Education Minister Shiite   
14 Haidar al-Abbadi Communications Minister Shiite Daawa 
15 Mufid Mohammad Jawad al-
Jazairi  
Culture Minister Shiite  Iraqi Communist Party 
16 Ali Faek al-Ghadban Youth and sports Minister Shiite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council 
17 Bayan Baqer Sulagh Reconstruction and Housing Shiite/ 
Turkmen 
 
18 Abdel Basset Turki Human Rights Minister Sunni   
19 Hisham Abderrahman al-
Shibli 
Justice Minister Sunni  Iraqi National List 
20 Ayham al-Samaraie Electricity Minister Sunni  Iraqiya 
21 Ziad Abderrazzak Mohammad 
Aswad 
Higher Education Minister Sunni  Iraqi branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood 
22 Latif Rashid Water resources Minister Kurd  PUK 
23 Nisrin Mustafa al-Barwari Public Works Kurd  KDP 
24 Mohammad Tufik Rahim Industry and Mines Minister Kurd PUK 
25 Abderrahman Sadik Karim  Environment Minister Kurd   KIU 
26 Rashad Mandan Omar Technology Minister Turkomen   
27 Bahnam Zaya Bulos Transport  Christian  
Table 3: Rating Ministers in the First Cabinet 
The question is: how was the new system of forming government received? The US-led 
coalition strongly supported the new government, considering it a truly representative, 
broad-based government that did not neglect any ethno-religious group. Bremer, who 
believed that majority rule would not work, was in favour of this system.286 This meant that 
all significant communities had a share of the power in the new political institutions, as 
represented by the IGC and the cabinet. Bremer knew that the Shiites were a majority in Iraq, 
and would have liked to be given more power, but he preferred to set up the IGC and the 
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cabinet from all communities.287 Thus, the US-led coalition sought to make a broad-based 
government because it was the most acceptable strategy to secure the country and to bring 
all communities together to share power in the new Iraq. Moreover, the UN supported the 
formation of the IGC, and the cabinet was recognized formally by Resolution 1500, which 
stated that the Security Council “welcomes the establishment of the broadly representative 
Governing Council of Iraq on 13 July 2003, as an important step towards the formation of the 
people of Iraq of an internationally recognized, representative government that will exercise 
the sovereignty of Iraq.”288 Thus, as we have seen, both external actors endorsed the ideas of 
power sharing between the different communities and encouraged Iraqi participation in 
political institutions that contained representatives of the main communities. 
Consequently, the formulation of the IGC and the cabinet look like grand coalition and 
proportional representation, because all significant communities participate and are 
represented in both. This means that in practice two of the consociational characteristics 
were applied at the first step of the new political process. The US-led coalition pushed the 
Iraqi people to implement this kind of system to ensure that all communities had a share of 
power, without neglecting any of them, in order to create stability and sustainability. This 
meant that the external actor thought the implementation of consociational elements was 
crucial in Iraq to work as a tool for conflict resolution among communities. Although the US-
led coalition was the main actor, and had a significant impact on the political process, its 
efforts were strongly supported by many Shiites and Kurds. Clearly, the structure of the IGC 
was a fundamental step towards setting up consociational elements in subsequent actions.   
5.4 The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) 
On 8 March 2004, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which functioned as the 
temporary constitution, was signed by all IGC’s members.  It had been prepared mostly by the 
CPA and a few, selected IGC members.289 Before drafting the TAL, Bremer suggested the idea 
of it to Condoleezza Rice, and she agreed to it.290 The proposal of TAL was originally designed 
by the CPA to implement discussion among political leaders in order to finalise the interim 
constitution.291 It took three months of long and hard discussion among Shiite, Sunni and Kurd 
leaders under CPA supervision to finalise the draft of the TAL. It was the first document to be 
recognised as an interim constitution after Saddam. The TAL “provided the road map to 
election and the adoption of a permanent constitution and specif[ied] how Iraq would be 
governed in the interim.”292 During the negotiation, there were several controversial points 
among ethno-religious groups, such as the shape of the state, its political system, federalism, 
veto, and dividing the power. I will investigate how the actors negotiated these points, 
especially those related to the power-sharing arrangements.   
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Federalism was one of the main controversial points among actors. Kurdistan had already had 
a type of autonomy since 1991. After the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime, Kurdistan 
wanted to be recognised as a federal region with significant authority and autonomy. Bremer 
pointed out that the Kurdish political leaders agreed with making the interim constitution; 
however, Talabani, former President of Iraq told him “we Kurds will also want the document 
addressing our concerns, especially our demand for a federal system-you know, to protect 
our autonomy”293 and Kurds were reluctant to agree to less than autonomy for Kurdistan and 
federalism for Iraq.294 More than that, Talabani told Bremer “you are asking us to join an Iraq 
in which we’ll have less freedom than we had while Saddam was in power.”295 This meant the 
Kurds looked forward to setting up a system compatible with its demands; they did not want 
to go back to dealing with a strong central government. David Wippman pointed out that the 
Kurds “would not accept an integrationist alternative. Their own proposal for Iraq was to 
create a bi-modal federation in which there would be equal Arab, and Kurdish federated 
states.”296 Thus, Kurdistan declared that the political system should be based on federalism, 
and placed it in the TAL, which was main goal for them at that time.   
The Shiites, as the majority in Iraq, were initially in a rush to take power, and petitioned for a 
quick transition. The main reason why they wanted to end CPA authority and disband the 
occupation forces in Iraq was to become sovereign as soon as possible.297 Furthermore, when 
the Kurds sought a significant degree of self-government, the Shiites “began to ask, if the 
Kurds can have it, why can’t we?”298 This meant that the Shiites did not reject federalism for 
Iraq at that time. They wanted a provision that any three provinces outside the Kurdistan area 
could form a region, excluding Baghdad and Kirkuk.299 Therefore, Article 53 Section C stated, 
“any group of no more than three governorates outside the Kurdistan region, with the 
exception of Baghdad and Kirkuk, shall have the right to form the regions from amongst 
themselves.” 300  Thus, the Shiite model was compatible with the Kurds’ in some points, 
especially federalism as a principle for the political system. The Sunnis’ position was different 
from the other communities’, and they “wanted the centralised Iraq that they had once 
run.”301 It was part of their nostalgia to re-govern Iraq, as they had in a previous period, which 
was their demand after Saddam’s regime. The US-led coalition supported the Kurds’ and part 
of the Shiites’ claim for federalism, but “only in the context of a unified Iraq, with a central 
government exercising authority over key national issues such as Defense, foreign policy, and 
Iraq’s natural resources.”302 After discussion among all of them, federalism was placed in 
Article 4 of TAL, which stated: “the system of government in Iraq shall be Republican, 
federal, democratic, and pluralistic, and powers shall be shared between the federal 
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government and the regional governments, governorates, municipalities, and local 
administrations.” 303  This shows that the system was envisaged as federal and regional 
governments sharing the power, which was an important point for preventing a majority 
tyranny. Galbraith pointed out that “the Kurds see power-sharing as a way to protect a self-
governing Kurdistan and as a way to ensure a benign Iraqi administration.”304 Consequently, 
there was no strong disagreement about placing federalism in the TAL at that time, and it was 
one of the fundamental issues that the US-led coalition supported.       
Cultural autonomy was another issue at stake, because Kurds demanded that the Kurdish 
language should be a formal language, in the same way as Arabic. After discussion, it was 
accepted as an official language.  This was placed in Article 9, which stated: “the Arabic 
language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq.  The right of Iraqis 
has to educate their children in their mother tongue.”305  It was the first time that the Kurdish 
language was recognised as a formal language in Iraq, and it had an influence on the way that 
Kurdish people felt that they had autonomy in Iraq. Bremer worked out that this was the 
outcome of an agreement between Shiites and Kurds “on the establishment of two official 
languages.”306 It seems that the US-led coalition did not reject that right, and it supported the 
agreement.  
Another controversial point was the power of veto, which was mainly demanded by the Kurds. 
Bremer said, “the Kurds wanted assurances that they could veto a draft constitution if its 
provisions on federalism were insufficiently generous.”307 During the negotiation, it was one 
of the point that the Kurds asserted should be part of the TAL. However, it faced strong 
opposition by the Shiites and the US-led coalition, especially from Bremer. He stated, “Kurds 
proposed that ratification of the constitution would fail if a two-thirds majority in any three 
provinces, this gave them a veto. I told them I’d have to check with Washington on this 
issue.”308 It was not easy to get the veto because negotiators knew it would lead to giving 
more power to the Kurds while they remained a minority. Barham Salih said, “we demanded 
the veto but at the beginning the US-led coalition and Shiite did not accept it. After hard 
discussion with them till last night of the finalising the draft of the TAL and Talabani discussed 
it with Rice, after that she accepted our demand to be a part of the TAL.”309 Bremer said “I 
called Condi Rice and brought her up to date. She agreed we could accept the Kurdish 
proposal on ratification.” 310  This meant that while the Iraqi people participated in the 
negotiation of drafting the TAL, the US-led coalition had the final decision about strategic 
points.  
By contrast, the Shiites rejected the Kurdish veto, especially Ayatollah Sistani, who was not 
pleased with it, because he thought it was not democratic that a two-thirds majority in any 
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three provinces could veto the permanent constitution.311 The issue was that the Kurds and 
Sunnis were worried that the Shiites could use their majority against them. It was for that 
reason that the Kurds asserted that they should have a veto and place it in the TAL to protect 
their rights. The veto was placed in the TAL, Article 61 section C, which stated “the general 
referendum will be successful and the draft constitution ratified if a majority of the voters in 
Iraq approve and if two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates do not reject it.”312 
There was widespread concern for the future when the Iraqi people were writing the 
permanent constitution, but it was seen as absolutely certain that Kurds’ rights would be in 
safe hands. However, four days before signing the TAL, the Shiites worked hard to excise this 
article, but they did not succeed for two main reasons. First, the US-led coalition had already 
accepted it. Second, the Kurds strongly defended it. When there was a hard discussion 
between Kurds and Shiites about the veto, a number of Sunni leaders who had participated 
in the IGC asked Bremer to sign the TAL without regarding the Shiites, but Bremer did not 
accept it.313 This meant that the Sunnis members in the IGC did not care about the veto.  In 
fact, they may have liked it because they were also a minority, and were worried about Shiite 
domination in the coming years. However, the Association of Muslim Scholars, as represented 
by Sunni leader Harith al-Dhari, was against the TAL, because they thought it did not reflect 
their interests and neglected Sunni groups. 314  This type of statement affected the 
participation of the Sunnis in the political process, because the Sunni people had been 
affected by Fatwa (advisory opinions) to boycott the political process.315 There was a belief 
that the Sunnis’ members in the IGC did not represent the Sunni community, because while 
they were themselves Sunni they did not have popular support among the Sunni community. 
Thus, the veto was nevertheless established in the TAL with the full support of the US-led 
coalition and the Kurdish community, even though the Shiites were unhappy with it.  
Moreover, there was another veto in the TAL Article 36 section B5, which stated “the 
Presidency Council shall take its decisions unanimously.”316 This meant that if one of the 
Presidency Council’s members did not agree with any decision, it would be rejected. The 
Presidency Council consisted of three members from the three main communities: Shiite, 
Sunni, and Kurd. They were elected altogether in one list and by a two-thirds majority of the 
National Assembly’s members.317 In addition, according to Article 38, the Presidency Council 
had a right to select the Prime Minister and the cabinet ministers unanimously.318 Thus, the 
veto was very clear, but it was obvious that it was only intended for the transitional period 
because the TAL would end when the permanent constitution was ratified by the general 
referendum. The crucial point was that it led to consensus among communities to form the 
government, and ensured that each group, especially minority groups, would have a voice in 
the cabinet. Akram al-hakim, Shiite leader and former minister in the Maliki government, said, 
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“the agreement among communities for forming the cabinet and the veto among the 
Presidency Council, which consisted of three communities, were one of the greatest 
guarantees of power sharing.”319 But it was clear there was an article in the TAL, Article 38, 
which emphasized that the cabinet should gain acceptance from all communities’ 
representatives in the presidency council, which meant making a grand coalition cabinet. 
Another important article was Article 30 Section C, which highlighted proportional 
representation, and said “The electoral law shall aim to achieve the goal of having women 
constitute no less than one-quarter of the members of the National Assembly and of having 
fair representation for all communities in Iraq, including the Turcomans, Chaldo Assyrians, 
and others.”320  It is obvious that “fair representation” means that the Iraqi Transitional 
National Assembly should be inclusive, and that each community should get the right 
proportion of seats. Therefore, articles about proportionality were not a big issue among 
negotiators, because all of them knew very well that there was no chance for one particular 
group to lead the country. That was why they all agreed to form the government and 
participate in the political process together.       
The question is: did the US-led coalition monopolise the negotiation for drafting the TAL? At 
that time, the US-led coalition in Iraq controlled the entire political process and took 
responsibility for rebuilding the Iraqi state. It was unclear who had actually written the TAL. 
Abdulrahman S. Kareem emphasises, “TAL has been completely written by the US but the CPA 
asked Adnan Pachachi, the Sunnis’ leader, to write its introduction to show that the Iraqi 
people had written the TAL.”321 If that was the case, why was it that a certain number of 
articles were asserted by particular communities, becoming a part of TAL?  An example is the 
veto by the Kurds. This means that the CPA’s proposal was not completely compatible with 
all communities’ demands. That was why it involved hard discussion to ensure that it was 
compatible with Iraqis’ demands. Galbraith pointed out that “the TAL was largely written by 
U.S. government lawyers and negotiated in secret by U.S. officials among a handful of 
Iraqis.”322 It looks like the US-led coalition gave a small opportunity for changing a number of 
articles, not all of them subject to negotiation. Therefore, the CPA mostly achieved what it 
sought in the TAL, but not everything, because it faced huge challenges from the Shiite and 
Kurd communities.323 Therefore, the process of drafting the TAL lacked transparency, because 
there were so many different agendas, especially the US-led coalition’s agenda, which meant 
that in the end, the TAL mostly reflected the CPA’s goals.324 That is why Brahimi says, “it 
reflected the will of the occupying power.”325 Therefore, the US-led coalition forces drew the 
map of the political process, and others had to go through it to rebuild the political system 
and form the political institutions during that time. Hanan Al Fatlawi, a Shiite Member of 
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Parliament, pointed out that the political system was not chosen by the people of Iraq after 
2003, because there was no chance to accept or reject that method. It was masterminded by 
the US-led coalition and political leaders in the IGC, most of whom had come back from exile 
outside Iraq.326  
Consequently, federalism, grand coalition, proportionality, and minority veto were formally 
reflected in the TAL for the transitional period. The hard discussion and long negotiations 
were about federalism and minority veto, which related to other elements, like grand 
coalition and proportionality. In addition, proportionality had existed in the electoral law 
issued by CPA Regulation number 96 in 2004, while grand coalition was arranged in detail by 
informal agreement among political leaders. Thus, as it was the US-led coalition and internal 
actors (and the UN) who viewed consociationalism as a conflict resolution mechanism, and 
this influenced their preference for it.  
5.5 Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) 
When the TAL had been signed, the Iraqi situation reached another stage, and required the 
appointment of the Interim Government. It was an important stage to know how the actors 
were pursuing their interests in the wake of the adoption of the TAL. Obviously, the TAL 
constructed the framework for implementing power-sharing in political institutions. Article 2, 
section B1 of the TAL decreed that the Iraqi Interim Government should be established. It 
remained in place from 30 June 2004 to 31 January 2005, and was “constituted in accordance 
with a process of extensive deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi 
people conducted by the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority and 
possibly in consultation with the United Nations.”327 This meant that those wishing to form 
the cabinet had to first obtain the advice of the Iraqi leaders, the CPA and the UN. At that 
time, “high-level positions were divided among the three main communities and they took 
responsibility for several posts.”328 The CPA had the power to determine the direction of the 
political process, but the UN’s role was not at the same level.  It was an advisory body, rather 
than having the power to appoint ministers. 
Forming the Iraqi Interim Government with those actors was not easy because they all had 
different points of view about how it would be, and who would take the posts.  In particular, 
differences arose between the CPA and UN. There were hard discussions about how those 
posts would be distributed among different communities and how a balance could be struck, 
especially regarding who would take the more powerful positions. Both actors had already 
played a significant role in paving the way to stability and sustainability, and so each was 
invested in the outcome. The Special Envoy of the UN Lakhdar Brahimi had a role in forming 
the IIG through “a long consultative process by him, who met with hundreds of Iraqis from 
around the country before making his choices.” 329  Brahimi’s approach was based on 
establishing a technocratic government, but he faced challenges because of the reality on the 
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ground, and the need to include powerbrokers from the different parties. Abdulrahman S. 
Kareem said, “Brahimi tried to make a technocratic government from key communities but 
he could not make it perfectly because Bremer did not agree with that kind of government 
and the communities as well”330 The issue was that Bremer wanted ‘career’ politicians, while 
Brahimi wanted technocrats. This created a clash between two methods.331 There were now 
two possible options for making the IIG, one from the US-led occupation (Bremer’s), the 
second from the UN (Brahimi’s). It made the negotiation harder for appointing who would 
take ministerial positions.  
According to Abdulrahman S. Kareem’s statements, Bremer and Brahimi shared the task of 
appointing the members of the cabinet. Some ministers were appointed by Bremer and 
others by Brahimi, which disappointed Brahimi.332 The CPA’s “main interest was the top seven 
positions: prime minister, and the ministers of defence, interior, finance, foreign affairs, oil 
and trade.”333 This meant that Brahimi’s approach did not succeed because the aim of the 
CPA was incompatible with his ideas. Bremer pointed out that the “Coalition’s main objective 
was to use the appointment of the new government to broaden its base, especially by 
including more Sunnis and more people from the provinces.”334 Bremer thought that it would 
not be easy to find the technocrat people for achieving Brahimi’s aim. This was because it was 
rare for Sunni people to participate in the political process, and it might be the case that there 
would be none who qualified according to Brahimi’s conditions. After negotiation between 
the CPA and the UN, they “plugged away on building the new government with the UN, one 
name at a time.” 335  Therefore, all the names of candidates for the positions had been 
discussed by the CPA under Bremer’s guidance before they obtained the post in the IIG.  
Meanwhile, choosing people for positions was one of the main functions for the CPA and UN, 
with recommendations coming from communities. 336   Bremer pointed out that he and 
Brahimi discussed choosing Adnan Pachachi as the president of Iraq, but at the end of the 
negotiations, the Sunni leader Ajil al-Yawar had been chosen because the Shiites and Kurds 
never embraced Pachachi. 337  The US-led occupation wanted it brought to the Sunnis’ 
attention that they were not being neglected, but in reality it was a less powerful position 
than the Prime Minster. At the same time, Kurdistan strongly supported that position for Ajil 
Yawar because he had a good relationship with the Kurdish people. That was why Barzani 
emphasised during negotiations with Bremer that al-Yawar should be president.338 After the 
president, the selection of the Prime Minister was another controversial issue. The Shiites as 
the majority claimed that the position should fall to a Shiite, but this was not discussed. 
However, there were two main Shiite candidates, Hussein Shahristani and Ayad Allawi. After 
negotiations between Bremer and Brahimi on one side and Kurds and Shiites on the other 
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side, Ayad Allawi was chosen. Allawi pointed out that “meanwhile the US and its allies 
suggested Shahristani become the Prime Minister and I become Minister of Defence but I 
refused because I said, “let’s go back to the IGC to choose the Prime Minister and then 
unanimously they voted for me.””339 This means Allawi was accepted by all communities. The 
next step was choosing the members of the cabinet. The formation of the cabinet ended after 
Brahimi accepted Bremer’s recommendation that several ministers from the current 
government should be carried over to the post-occupation IIG.340 It consisted of 36 posts 
distributed among all communities: 16 Shiites, 10 Sunnis, 8 Kurds, one Assyrian and one 
Turkomen. If we compare it to the previous formula, it seems that the ratio of each 
community’s representation has changed slightly. The Shiites got 44%, the Sunnis 27%, and 
Kurds 22%. Table 4 makes this clear.  
Rating Ministers and posts in the interim government 1st of Jun 2004.341 
 Name  Position  Ethnicity Bloc and 
Political 
Party 
 Presidency 
1 Ghazi Ajil Al-Yawar President of Iraq Sunni  
2 Ibrahim Jaafari Vice President  Shiite Daawa 
3 Rowsch Shaways Vice President  Kurd KDP  
The government 
1 Ayad Allawi Prime Minister  Shiite/ 
Secular 
Iraqi 
National 
Accord 
2 Barham Salih Deputy Prime Minister  Kurd PUK 
Powerful Ministers (Sovereign Ministers) 
3 Hazem Sha’alan Defence Minister  Sunni  
4 Falah al-Nakib Interior Minister  Sunni 
 
5 Thamir Abbas Ghadhban Oil Minister  Sunni  
 
6 Mehdi Al-Hafidh Planning Minister Shiite Iraqi 
Independe
nt 
Democrats 
7 Adel Abdul Mahdi Finance Minister Shiite Supreme 
Islamic 
Iraqi 
Council 
8 Hoshyar Zebari Foreign Affairs Minister Kurd  KDP 
Low Powerful Minister (Service Ministries) 
9 Ala’adin Alwan Health Minister Shiite Daawa 
10 Sawsan Ali Magid Al-Sharifi Agriculture Minister Shiite 
 
11 Sami Al-Mudhaffar Education Minister Shiite  
12 Mohammad Ali Al-Hakim Communications Minister Shiite 
 
13 Mufeed Mohammed Jawad 
al-Jaza’iri 
Culture Minister Shiite 
 
14 Ali Faiq Al-Ghabban Youth and sports Minister Shiite 
 
15 Malik Dohan Al-Hassan Justice Minister Shiite  
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16 Taher Khalaf Jabur Al-Bakaa Higher Education  Shiite  
17 Louay Hatem Sultan Al Erris Transportation Shiite  
18 Mohammed Mostafa al-
Jibouri 
Trade Minister Sunni  
19 Leyla Abdul Latif Labour and Social Affairs Minister Sunni  
20 Aiham Al-Sammarae Electricity Minister Sunni  
21 Hajem Al-Hassani Industry and Minerals Sunni 
 
22 Omar Al-Farouq Salim Al-
Damluji 
Housing and Construction Sunni  
23 Mishkat Moumin  Environment  Sunni 
 
24 Bakhtiar Amin Human Rights Minister Kurd PUK 
25 Abdul Latif Jamal Rashid Water resources Kurd PUK 
26 Nasreen Mustapha Berwari Public Works Kurd KDP 
 State Ministers 
27 Wa’il Abdul al-Latif Minister of State for Provinces Shiite  
28 Narmin Othman Minister of State for Women Kurd PUK 
29 Kasim Daoud Minister of State Sunni  
30 Mamu Farham Othman Minister of State Kurd  
31 Adnan al-Janabi Minister of State Sunni  
32 Pascale Isho Warda Displacement and Migration Christian Assyrian 
33 Rashad Mandan Omar Science and Technology Minister Turkomen  
Table 4: Rating Ministers and Posts in the Interim Government 
Table 4 shows that there was reasonably proportional representation of all communities. The 
president was Sunni, the first deputy Shiite, and the second deputy was Kurd. The Kurds did 
not get either president or Prime Minister but obtained the post of deputy Prime Minister, 
which the Sunnis did not have. The Sunnis had obtained more powerful posts because they 
did not have a deputy Prime Minister. According to the TAL, the cabinet government should 
be named unanimously by the presidency council, which consisted of representatives from 
the three main communities. This meant that the holders of these three posts had to reach a 
consensus about the ratio of ministers from each community holding posts. Ministers in the 
IIG were selected from each of the three communities according to the ratio, but participation 
from Sunni groups was extremely weak.342   Thus, while the IIG supposedly consisted of 
representatives from all communities, Brahimi thought it was a failure because he claimed 
that Allawi’s government “was not fully representative.” 343   In addition, it was not fully 
independent, because it was under Bremer’s authority. Thus, CPA Regulation number 10 
stated, “the CPA acknowledges that the individuals designated as members of the Iraqi 
Interim Government will exercise authorities in their respective ministries effective June 1, 
2004 until such time as the Iraqi Interim Government assumes full government authority for 
Iraq.”344 In July 2004 sovereignty was formally transferred to the IIG.345 In reality, however, 
the actual power remained in the hands of the US-led occupation, not the Iraqi people.    
Consequently, key actors tried to embody power sharing in the government through 
appointing high-level positions from members of the three main communities. In fact, the 
distribution of those posts was decided mainly by the CPA, with advice from the special envoy 
of the UN. That made a strong basis for rebuilding political institutions that would reflect a 
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power-sharing arrangement. The main reason for representation from all three communities 
derived from the TAL, because there were several places in it that required unanimous 
agreement between actors. The second reason was that the US-led coalition efforts 
supported the formation of that kind of government.  Thus, the role of the grand coalition 
and external actors helped the people of Iraq to form the IIG. However, it faced problems, 
such as the lack of Sunni representatives, even though some posts were held by Sunni people.    
5.6 The Interim National Council (INC) 
The INC was another political institution that exercised its functions as the legislative power 
beside the interim government for a brief time from 15 September 2004 to 30 January 2005, 
headed by the Kurdish leader Fuad Masum.346 It was instituted in light of the Annex of the 
TAL Section three, which stated, “members of the Interim National Council will be chosen by 
a National Conference that will meet in Baghdad during the month of July 2004.”347 The IIG 
arranged the committee for that conference.  It stipulated that the INC would “include 
members of the Governing Council without other governmental positions, representatives 
from the regions and governorates, and other distinguished Iraqis known for their capability 
and integrity.”348 This meant that the INC should consist of all communities’ representatives. 
It was comprised of 100 members, and included members of the Governing Council.349 The 
conference elected 75 members through one list, which was organised by a committee of 
representatives from all communities the day before the National Conference was held.  They 
then added 25 members of the IGC to reach 100 seats.350 It was clear that there was no 
competition for getting a seat, as there was only one list, including all members’ names, and 
these names were selected by conference attendees. Obviously, it looked like a kind of 
appointment because it was clear that it was the outcome of an agreement among the key 
communities: Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd.351 The main point was the formula of the INC, because 
it had formed in light of the same diversity demonstrated in the makeup of the IGC’s members.  
It contained 40 Shiites, 25 Sunnis, 25 Kurds, 6 Turkomens, 2 Christians, and 1 Yazidi.352 
The process shows that they interacted with each other to produce power-sharing 
arrangements, especially to reflect proportionality. When a Shiite obtained the post of Prime 
Minister and a Sunni became president of Iraq, they tried to give another high-level position 
that is, speaker of the Interim National Council, to a Kurdish politician. That position was 
suggested by Brahimi. The CPA accepted it in order to maintain the balance among all of 
them.353 Mohsen Abdel Hamid, member of the IGC, said, “INC is the same as the interim 
parliament; our transfer from the IGC to the INC was crucial.” 354  Transferring the IGC’s 
                                                     
346 Interview with: Bayan Tofiq, July 26, 2014. 
347 Iraq, “Annex on Law of 2004 of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” June 1, 
2004, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/government/TAL_Annex.html [accessed 6 June 2014]. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Interview with: Bayan Tofiq. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Ibid. 
353 Ibid. 
354 طسولاا قرشلا ”,تقؤملا ينطولا سلجملا ىلا لاقتنلال نودعتسي لحنملا مكحلا سلجم ءاضعأ :دادغب“ ,ضايف دعم, 
June 15, 2004, 9331 edition.  
Chapter 5 Origin of the Constitution  
 
73 
 
members directly to the INC demonstrates the desire for integration between both 
institutions. Consequently, it was established as one of the main political institutions for the 
particular purpose of legalising cases like the national budget and producing consensus 
among different communities. This was the first time that the term ‘consensus’ was used 
formally: section three in the TAL states: “the Interim National Council will meet periodically 
to promote constructive dialogue and create national consensus, and to advise the Presidency 
Council and Council of Ministers.”355 This meant that they wanted to create power-sharing to 
make peace among the people of Iraq.  
Therefore, while the INC did not play a significant role during this brief time period, it 
produced a number of advantages. First, it gathered all communities together towards the 
common goal of power-sharing. Second, it formally enshrines the desire for national 
consensus. Third, it represents a step forward towards a broad-based parliament. Another 
crucial point was that the role of the Iraqi people in the process improved slightly, especially 
concerning who could become a member of the list of 75 seats. However, Iraq remained an 
occupied country, and as such could not act completely independently. The impact of the US-
led coalition on the political process was much bigger than Iraqis’ own contributions.  
 
5.7 Transitional National Assembly 30 January 2005 (TNA)   
As highlighted briefly above, proportional representation is formally reflected in Article 30 
Section C and electoral law Article 3. The electoral law stated, “Iraq will be a single electoral 
district, and will be all the seats in the National Council on the distribution of political entities 
through a system of proportional representation.”356 That was based on the TAL provisions, 
which said, “The National Assembly shall be elected in accordance with an electoral law and 
a political parties law.  The electoral law shall aim to achieve the goal of having women 
constitute no less than one-quarter of the members of the National Assembly and of having 
fair representation for all communities in Iraq, including the Turcomans, Chaldo Assyrians, 
and others.”357 The point was that the US-led coalition originally wrote the electoral law, and 
the TAL had been written mostly by the CPA team, as mentioned above. Thus, provisions of 
the TAL and electoral law demanded for proportionality in the TNA, which was held on 30 
January 2005. There were many political entities that participated in the election that took 
place at the Assembly.  It was the first election held after the collapse of Saddam’s regime. 
However, the election result was not proportional. As can be seen in Table 5, the Sunnis were 
not significantly represented. This means that while proportionality was reflected formally in 
the TAL and electoral laws, the outcome was not proportional.    
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The Result of January 2005 Election 358 
Political Entities  Percentage    
of Votes  
Number 
of Votes  
     Seats Percentage    of 
seats 
Ethnicity 
1 United Iraqi 
Alliance 
48.2 4,075,292 140 50.90 Shiite Arab, headed by Abdal-Aziz 
al-Hakim and Ibrahim al-Jaafari  
2 Democratic 
Patriotic Alliance 
of Kurdistan 
25.7 2,175,551 75 27.27 Kurd, Headed by Barzani and 
Talabani.  
3 Iraqi List 13.8 1,168,943 40 14.54 Iyad Allawi, secular group. 
4 The Iraqis 1.8 150,680 5 1.81 Sunni, Ghazi al-Yawer 
5 Iraqi Turkmen 
Front 
1.1 93,480 3 1.09 Turkmen  
6 National 
Independent 
Cadres and Elites 
0.8 69,938  3 1.09 
 
7 People's Union 0.8 69,920 2 0.72  Communist party  
8 Kurdistan Islamic 
Group   
0.7 60,592 2 0.72 Kurd/Islamic Party 
9 Islamic Action 
Organization in 
Iraq - Central 
Command 
0.5 43,205 2 0.72 
 
10 National 
Democratic 
Alliance 
0.4 36,795 1 0.36 
 
11 National Rafidain 
List 
0.4 36,255 1 0.36 Christian, Yonadem Kana 
12 Reconciliation and 
Liberation Bloc 
0.4 30,796 1 0.36 Sunni Arab  
13 Other  5.3 444,819 - --- --- 
 Total  99.9 8,456,266 275 99.94  
Table 5: The Result of January 2005 Election 
The table shows that while many political entities from a range of different ethno-religious 
groups participated, only twelve won seats. Three of them controlled the vast majority of 
seats. If you look at the top three political entities as shown in the table, the United Iraqi 
Alliance, the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan, and Iraqi List, they had 87.7 % of all 
votes, and 92.71% of all seats, but none of these top parties represented the Sunni people. 
This means that the vast majority of seats went to what were explicitly sectarian parties of 
Shiites and Kurds. The Shiites in particular achieved an absolute majority of 140 seats out of 
275. The only explicitly secular party was Iraqi National List, which received 14.54 % of seats 
and 13.8 % of votes. In fact, the Sunni political entities won only 17 seats through several lists. 
This meant that they could not viably represent the Sunnis. Unwilling to participate in the 
election, the TNA was faced with a lack of Sunni representatives.359 Since the other, much 
smaller parties, received less than 2% of the vote, they may be disregarded. Thus, despite the 
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US-led coalition’s efforts to bring the Sunni people into the election process, they did not 
participate.  This was largely because the Sunnis’ leader encouraged people to boycott that 
process. The Sunnis’ absence affected proportionality, which could not be achieved.  Even so, 
the election was run under the US-imposed TAL and electoral provisions. Thus, the TNA was 
not a good start for the implementation of proportionality, one of the fundamental 
characteristics of consociationalism. In this instance, ethno-religious communities did not 
interact with each other to produce proportionality. This process led to an increase in the role 
of the Shiites and the Kurds.  
Therefore, one of the main communities did not have an appropriate number of 
representatives in the TNA, which affected the true reflection of proportionality. Mohammed 
Senamoky, a member of the TNA said, “the TNA included a variety of communities without 
true representatives of the Sunnis’ community because they did not participate in the election 
and boycotted the political process.”360 The majority of Sunnis did not want to be part of the 
political process, especially under the US-led coalition forces. Many Sunni leaders 
nevertheless criticised their companions’ position, which they counted as a catastrophic 
mistake. Ammar Wajih, a Sunni leader, for example, asserted that the biggest mistake the 
Sunnis made was the decision to boycott that election particularly and the political process 
generally. 361  There were two main reasons affecting Sunnis’ participation. Firstly, the 
influence of Fatwas from Islamic scholars called on Sunnis to attack the US-coalition and the 
political process. Secondly, the Baath Party demanded seizing the Iraqi government again. 
Thus, the TNA could not achieve proportionality. The structure of the TNA reflected only the 
proportionality of political parties, rather than that of communities.  
On Sunday 3 April 2005 Hachim Hasani, a Sunni Arab, was elected as speaker of the TNA, and 
two deputy speakers, a Kurd and a Shiite, were elected.362  Sunni participation was one of the 
important points that the US-led coalition was hoping to achieve, in order to ensure the 
participation of all communities in the Constitutional Drafting Commission (CDC). 
Consequently, proportionality was formally reflected, but in practice, it was not because of 
the Sunnis’ position on the political process and their boycott of the TNA’s election. It was a 
critical time for the political process because among the members of the constitution-drafting 
commission appointed by the TNA there were not enough Sunnis, which resulted in a lack of 
proportionality, which affected the whole political process, and brought instability rather than 
stability.  
5.8 Transitional Government from 3 May 2005 to 20May 2006 
The Iraqi Transitional Government (TG) was another opportunity for the actors to pursue their 
wishes and embody power-sharing arrangements. According to the TAL, the mechanism for 
selecting the candidate for the Prime Minister should obtain unanimous acceptance from the 
presidency, as stated in Article 38 Section A: “the Presidency Council must agree on a 
candidate for the post of Prime Minister within two weeks.” 363  The presidency council 
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consisted of the three main community’s leaders. The president was Kurd, and the Shiites and 
Sunnis each one got one vice-president. This gave each community the chance to bargain with 
each other to form a consensus about the Prime Minister and other ministers as well. 
According to the TAL: “the Presidency Council shall name a Prime Minister unanimously, as 
well as the members of the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister.”364 Thus, the TAL gave the opportunity to the three significant communities to make 
a grand coalition government without any exclusion.   
The negotiation for forming the TG started after a formal declaration of the election result for 
TNA. The Shiites demanded powerful position because, as noted earlier, they received just 
under the absolute majority of votes (see Table 5). Akram Al-Hakim said, “we are a majority 
of the Iraqi people and the winner of the TNA’s election, so the Prime Minister position should 
go to the Shiites.”365 Following that, the Kurds demanded that they should have one of the 
sovereign posts, particularly the presidency of Iraq, because they came in only second to the 
Shiites, receiving 77 seats. 366  Mohammed Senamoky pointed out that “the Kurds really 
emphasized the presidency should be run by Kurdish people, and that was the main 
controversial point between the Kurds and a number of the Sunnis’ leaders who wanted that 
post.367 The reason why the Sunnis’ leaders did not accept a Kurd to take the presidency was 
because they did not want an Arabic country to be led by a Kurdish politician. Moreover, there 
was no actual participation form the Sunnis, and they could not pressure the other 
communities enough to receive more posts. Although they did not really participate in the 
political process, especially the TNA election, there were a number of posts held by Sunnis. In 
addition, at the beginning of the cabinet the Shiites and Kurds left vacant cabinet posts to 
negotiate with the Sunnis,368 but they refused to participate, and so the posts were filled by 
Shiites and Kurds.   
Furthermore, following the announcement of the election results, the US-led coalition 
thought that the Sunnis’ boycott of the political process was a major issue. For solving that 
issue, bringing the Sunnis to power, and allowing them to share in the political process, the 
Bush administration sent Zalmay Khalilzad to Iraq. Khalilzad attempted to solve that issue, 
which aimed to encourage the Sunnis to participate in the government and contribute to the 
constitution-drafting commission. While there were a number of Sunnis who did receive posts 
in the TNA (the presidency and a few minsters), the cabinet was overall not appropriately 
inclusive of Sunnis.369  Zalmay Khalilzad said, “I went to Iraq with the clear view that we 
needed to bring the Sunni Arabs into the political process because they had boycotted the 
election.”370 Thus, the US-led coalition forces followed the provisions of the TAL to enforce 
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power-sharing among the three main communities. However, Khalilzad’s efforts to bring 
Sunnis into the cabinet did not work, because the Sunnis denied participating in the political 
process and the cabinet. Table 6 clearly shows how the structure of the cabinet was controlled 
by the Shiites and Kurds, without any actual contribution from the Sunnis.  
Rating Transitional Government, from May 2005 to May 2006 371 
 Name  Position  Ethnicity Political 
Party 
 Presidency 
1 Jalal Talabani President of Iraq Kurd PUK 
2 Ghazi Ajil Al-Yawar Vice President  Sunni 
 
3 Adel Abdul Mahdi Vice President  Shiite  SIIC 
The government leadership  
1 Ibrahim Jaafari Prime Minister  Shiite Dawa 
2 Rosh Nuri Shaways Deputy Prime Minister  Kurd KDP 
3 Ahmed al-Chalabi Deputy Prime Minister Shiite  Iraqi 
National 
Congress 
4 Abd Mutlaq al - Jubouri Deputy Prime Minister Sunni   
Powerful Ministers (Sovereign Ministers) 
5 Saadoun al - Dulaimi Defence Minister  Sunni  
6 Bayan Jabr Interior Minister  Shiite  SIIC  
7 Abdul Karim al - Enzi National Security Affairs Shiite  Dawa/Iraq  
8 Ibrahim Bahr al- Uloum Oil Minister  Shiite  
 
9 Ali Abdel Amir Allawi Finance Minister Shiite  
10 Barham Salih Planning Minister Kurd PUK 
11 Hoshyar Zebari Foreign Affairs Minister Kurd  KDP 
Low Powerful Minister (Service Ministries) 
12 Abdul Muttalib Ali 
Mohammed Saleh al - Rubaie 
Health Minister Shiite  Linked to 
al- Sadr  
13 Osama Abdul Aziz al-Nujaifi Industry and Minerals Sunni  
14 Abdul Falah Hassan Hamadi Education Minister Shiite  
15 Jassim Mohammed Jaafar Housing and Construction Shiite/Tur
koman  
 
16 Nuri Farhan al- Rawi Culture Minister Shiite 
 
17 Taleb Aziz Zinni Youth and sports Minister Shiite 
 
18 Abdul Hussein Shandal Justice Minister Shiite  
19 Sami Abdul-Mahdi al 
Muzaffar 
Higher Education  Shiite  
20 Salam Faleh al - Maliki Transportation Shiite  
21 Ali Hussein Bahadli Agriculture Minister Shiite  
22 Mohsen Shalash Electricity Minister Shiite   
23 Idris Hadi Labour and Social Affairs Minister Kurd  KDP  
24 Abdul Basit Karim Maoloud  Trade Minister Kurd  PUK 
25 Joan Fuad Masum Communications Minister Kurd  PUK 
26 Narmin Othman  Environment  Kurd PUK 
27 Abdul Latif Rashid Water resources Kurd PUK 
28 Nasreen Berwari Municipalities and Public Works Kurd KDP 
29 Basema Youssef Boutros Science and Technology Minister Christian  
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30 Suhaila Abd Jaafar al-kinaani Displacement and Migration Faily  
State Ministers 
31 Azhar Abdul - Karim al Sheikhli Minister of State for Women Affairs Ayad 
Alawi List 
 
32 Saad Nayef al - Hardan Minister of State for Provinces Affairs Shiite  
33 Alaa Habib Kazim Minister of State for Civil Society Affairs Shiite   
34 Hashim Abdul Hassan Ali al - 
Hashemi 
Minister of State for Tourism and Antiquities Affairs Shiite  Fazialla  
35 Safa al- Din Mohammad Safi Minister of State for National Assembly Affairs Shiite   
Table 6: Rating Transitional Government 
The table shows that the government was not broad-based, but that certain groups were 
monopolising power instead. The Shiites got exactly what they wanted, which was to govern 
Iraq as the majority people, and to obtain the posts in light of that. They only achieved these 
aims, however, because there were not enough Sunnis to compete with them in the 
government. In addition, it was a fortuitous time for the Kurdish people because they were 
enabled to participate strongly in the cabinet and get what they wanted. They showed the 
other communities that they could have an impact on the political process, and should no 
longer be regarded as second-class citizens. On the other hand, many opposition groups, such 
as Ayad Allawi’s group, criticized that government because it failed to provide safety and basic 
services, and for indecisiveness, incompetence, and degeneration in job opportunities, and 
accused the government of opening the door to Iran’s interests and more bidding in Iraq.372 
Therefore, while the US-led coalition troops worked hard to make grand coalition government, 
the Sunnis did not responded positively, and so there was no chance to form a broad-based 
cabinet.  
5.9 Inside the Constitutional Drafting Commission (CDC) 
According to the TAL Article 60, writing the permanent constitution was one of the top 
functions of the TNA. It stated: “the TNA shall carry out this responsibility in part by 
encouraging debate on the constitution.” 373  At the beginning, the CDC consisted of 55 
members: 28 Shiites, 15 Kurds, 8 Ayad Allawi, and 4 from the Turkoman, Assyrian, and 
Christian sects, all elected by the TNA on 15 March 2005. It started its functions on 24 May 
2005 without the Sunnis, and the deadline for the constitution draft was no later than 15 
August 2005.374  After extensive negotiation with the Sunnis, they eventually achieved the 
same ratio of members as the Kurds (15). They already had 2 within Ayad Allawi, but added 
13 members on 5 July 2005.  Thus, the CDC ended up with 68 members.375 Two points should 
be raised about this. First, the Shiites obtained absolute majority of the CDC. Second, the 
Sunnis joined the Committee very late, so the majority of the groundwork had already been 
done. In addition, when they came to the CDC, after two weeks they boycotted the 
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negotiations because three of their members had been killed in a terror attack.376 Thus, the 
permanent constitution was mostly written by Shiites and Kurds. 
The committee worked hard until it finished the draft of the permanent constitution on 28 
August 2005.377 After that, a Political Kitchen was established and supervised by the US.  This 
Political Kitchen consisted of senior political leaders from all communities. It was created to 
finalise the issues that arose among the CDC and TNA.378  As part of this, a discussion was held 
concerning the draft of this constitution, regarding what should and should not be in it, on 19 
September 2005. After further discussion, the National Assembly accepted the final draft with 
the Sunnis’ critique about some controversial points. Finally, that draft passed in the 
referendum on 15 October 2005, 78.6% in favour and 21.4% against, nationwide.379 That 
result indicated that the Sunnis’ group did not participate sufficiently at that referendum, 
since most of them rejected it. Alaa Makki, former Sunni Member of Parliament said that 
some of the Sunni people did not accept that constitution because they felt that they did not 
have enough time to formulate their interests in it.380  
There were different views among the CDC about how to deal with the TAL as they wrote the 
permanent constitution, that is, whether it should be a fundamental source for the new 
constitution. Fuad Masum the President of Iraq argued that the “TAL should be the 
fundamental source for the discussion during writing the permanent constitution.”381 The 
reason that the Kurds demanded this was because the TAL had included most of the Kurds’ 
demands. However, the Shiites did not support that idea because they wanted to change 
some points which were not compatible with their wishes. Khodair al-Khozaei, a Shiite leader, 
pointed out that the “TAL was not written by the Iraqi people; it was imposed on them. For 
that reason, it is not fit to be the fundamental source for the permanent constitution.”382 
Therefore, after a long discussion among CDC members about that point, Humam Hamoudi, 
the Chair of the CDC, finalised all talks, and said “we made an agreement that the TAL is one 
of the sources. It is not compulsory. We consider as priorities the TAL, the previous Iraqi 
constitution, and the UN recommendations.”383 Thus, the TAL became one of the sources for 
writing the permanent constitution, but was not the only one. This meant that all 
controversial points could be discussed again among negotiators, which led to difficulties in 
writing the constitution because they needed to discuss all points. Therefore, it took a long 
time to achieve consensus about each subject. National consensus was the main principle for 
dealing with any subject during negotiations, so that there was no need for voting.384 Thus, 
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they tried to reach a consensus among all communities when writing the permanent 
constitution.  
Writing the permanent constitution was a crucial step for shaping the political system in Iraq. 
In fact, the process that led to the constitution-drafting had a massive impact on negotiations 
to finalise the constitution draft. Considering the above discussion of the entire process, from 
the starting point up to this section, each governing or electing body mentioned had a role in 
writing the constitution, particularly the TAL and the US-led coalition forces, along with senior 
political leaders from all communities. In the following section, I will address how the 
negotiations produced consociational elements. This will be discussed through an 
examination of each element, starting from the more controversial characteristics and 
progressing to the less controversial. I shall begin with federalism, and move in turn to mutual 
veto, proportionality, and grand coalition.  
Centralising and decentralising the political system was one of the main points discussed 
during negotiations about federalism and autonomy. Alaa Makki said “at that time the Sunnis 
supported the centralization approach and they were calling for the unity of Iraq.” 385 
Obviously, this was the result of the Sunnis’ nostalgia for the Iraq that the Sunni Arabs had 
controlled since 1921, particularly during Saddam’s era.386 At the first meeting of the Sunnis’ 
participation in the CDC, Kamal Hamdon from the Sunnis’ community argued against 
federalism, stating that “Iraq is one country, I will ask to remove the ‘Iraq is a federal country’ 
and it is an Arabic country.”387 His comment was an attempt to ward off federalism, which 
had received acceptance from the Shiites and Kurds. In addition, the Sunni leader Salim al-
Jabouri said, “do not take that point in the negative way, there is an Arabic word ‘Al-Etihad’ 
slightly lower than federalism: we can use it instead.”388 Thus, the Sunni communities were 
so strongly against federalism that they did not even like the word. This meant that the Sunnis 
did not support a system based on federalism, and wished to remove it radically. Mijbil Shex 
Issa, one of the two Sunnis previously mentioned who died in a terror attack, said, “we have 
to find the solution for unifying Iraq and its interests.”389 His proposal included removing 
federalism. The solution in the mind of the Sunnis was to ignore federalism and return to 
centralization, without writing any provisions for federalism. Their claim was based on the 
assumption that the Sunni population did not accept the idea of federalism.  
After long discussion among the Sunni leaders, Mijbil Shex Issa brought up two decisions from 
the Sunnis’ senior leaders’ meeting, first considering the Duhok, Erbil, and Suleiman’s 
situation. These latter three are provinces controlled by the Kurds since 1991. Second, he 
recommended that the state should consist of 18 regions and not allow any merges between 
them.   Iraq already had 18 provinces and a political system based on that.390 Mijbil Shex Issa’s 
attitude demonstrated that the Sunnis would support only the possibility of continuing with 
18 regions, rather than moving to a system of just two or three regions, as the Kurds and 
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Shiites wanted.  Negotiation on this issue continued until the last step of drafting the 
constitution, with constant disagreement from the Sunni community. At the end of the 
negotiation in the CDC, the Sunnis demanded an alternative system instead of federalism.391 
This meant federalism had not received any acceptance at all from the Sunnis. 
When the Shiites saw that the Sunnis’ position about federalism was so negative, their 
political leaders divided between two sides. The first side, coming from the Supreme Council 
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Fazila party, supported federalism and 
establishing a southern region. Nadeem al-Jabri, the head of Fazila, in his contribution in the 
CDC stated, “practically Iraq has been divided since 1991 when the Kurds established their 
region. They demanded neither independence nor con-federalism. Kurdistan’s needs must be 
understood, and those of the south of Iraq, because it is a de facto, and another crucial point 
is that federalism should be decided upon for all of Iraq.”392 The Fazila party’s clear vision was 
to consider the Kurds’ claim and the claim of the Shiites in the south to establish their region. 
Jalal al-Din Ali al-Saghir from the SCIRI said “federalism does not lead to separation and I do 
not think it is bad to implement it.”393 In another meeting, he emphasized that the Shiites 
should be considered as well as the Kurds because the Shiites wanted the southern region for 
its authority and resources.394 Moreover, on 11 August just four days before submitting the 
constitutional draft to the TNA, the head of the SCIRI Abdul Aziz al-Halim “in front of a large 
demonstration in Najaf announced the fundamental demand for a southern Shiite region of 
nine provinces.”395 The issue was that until that time there was no article in the constitution 
draft that stipulated this demand for a southern region. 
The second side supported federalism as a principle, since they liked the arrangement of 
multiprovince regions. The only difference between these sides and what the Sunnis 
demanded was one point, which was that the Sunnis did not believe in federalism at all, 
however, the second side of the Shiites believed in federalism, but preferred multiprovince 
regions. Humam Hamoudi pointed out that the “Sadri’s group and the Dawa party were not 
supporting federalism and their views were the same as the Sunnis that federalism led to 
breaking the unity of Iraq, but we as SCIRI supported.”396 Ali Dabax, the Shiite leader from the 
Dawa party, indirectly supported multiprovince regions, arguing that “it is the right of 
provinces to establish the region.”397 In addition, Maliki pointed out in the CDC that the 
direction of the negotiations seemed to be going towards giving provinces the chance to make 
the regions.398 Recently, Maliki expressed a similar view in conversation with the researcher. 
In addition, he explained that during 2005 the Shiites did not agree with Abdul Aziz Al hakim’s 
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proposal for establishing a southern region.399  Thus, it was not easy to write and retain 
provisions for federalism in the permanent constitution.  
However, the Kurds strongly demanded autonomy, wanting to shape the political system 
through the federal system and basing it on the decentralization approach, since they had 
already “enjoyed unprecedented stability and prosperity in their autonomous zone since 
1991.”400 Mahmod Othman said: “Kurds want a guarantee for their rights, which is reflected 
in the federal system.”401 They felt that the federal system was a guarantee for unifying Iraq 
and preventing separation, and opposed the Sunnis and the second side of the Shiites’ 
thought. The Kurds felt that if their rights were not reflected in the permanent constitution, 
they would not participate in rebuilding Iraq. So, Abdulhkalik Zangana, a Kurdish leader and 
member of CDC, said, “we should not turn back from federalism in Kurdistan at all, and we 
should allow it for the South as well.” 402  Therefore, the Kurds worked hard to retain 
federalism in the permanent constitution, facing challenges from the Sunnis. But the Sunnis 
consequently failed to remove federalism in the draft of the constitution because the Kurds’ 
delegates insisted strongly on retaining autonomy for Kurdistan as a federal state.  This was 
reflected in the constitution.   
The mutual veto was another controversial point but during the negotiation of the permanent 
constitution it did not receive much discussion. This is because it was already written in the 
TAL, and had been transferred from it to the constitution draft. Khalilzad pointed out that the 
Kurds “had effectively secured a veto over the future Iraqi constitution and established 
themselves as the decisive swing-vote bloc.”403 The Kurds were not the only community that 
received advantages from the two-thirds majority. The Sunnis also received benefits from it. 
Khalilzad argued the two-thirds majority veto “which the Kurds had designed to ensure that 
their three provinces would effectively wield a veto, also empowered the Sunni Arabs.”404 
Humam Hamoudi pointed out that the Shiites “agreed on the two-thirds majority veto from 
the Kurds because their participation was essential in the political process.” 405 This meant 
that the only community opposed the two-thirds majority was the Shiites, and they continued 
their efforts to change it but could not achieve this. Khalilzad pointed out that the Shiite leader, 
Abdul Aziz al hakim, a few days before the ratification of the constitution in October 2005, 
“suggested waiving the requirement that gave three provinces a potential veto over 
ratification. [he said] I cautioned him about changing the rules at this late date.”406 The reason 
was that Khalilzad, the envoy of the US, liked it, arguing that “this supermajority provision 
was a good rule, because it would require Iraqis to work toward inclusive politics.”407 Thus, 
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while the Shiites tried removing that kind of veto, it was retained in the permanent 
constitution.   
Proportional representation, another element, was not reflected broadly in the permanent 
constitution. In fact, it was discussed briefly in the CDC because firstly all communities agreed 
that one seat in the parliament would represent 100,000 Iraqi persons, and secondly, 
proportional representation was managed by electoral law, which meant that it did not 
require detailed discussion in the CDC.408 Obviously, the Sunnis tried to change the electoral 
law. Arato noted that “on an issue, especially important to Sunnis Arabs given the experience 
of the January 2005 elections, it was almost certain that the electoral rule was going to change 
in the direction of provincial lists.” 409  The Sunnis demanded changing the electoral law 
because the TNA election gave them the idea that the election rule could not assure the 
correct proportion of representation of their population in the next election. Thus, their 
demand was based on changing the method of constituencies. The TNA election had been 
based on a single district, and they proposed to change it to multi-district representation, 
based on provinces. Another important subject was related to ensuring balance in the Iraqi 
armed forces and security services.410 Maliki argued that the word “balance” means sectarian 
because you cannot establish institutions; you have to look to bring the representatives from 
each community, which is hard to imagine.411 However, there was no voice opposed to the 
issue at that time because each community thought its right would be retained. That could 
answer the question regarding why there were so few articles about proportionality: because 
it did not matter at that time among communities, and the priority that each of them had was 
for some other issue, usually directed against the ideas of another group.   
It was obvious that there was an article in TAL pointing out that the presidency council had to 
name the Prime Minister unanimously, which encouraged all communities to make the 
political process inclusive. Unfortunately, this was not transferred to the permanent 
constitution draft. Instead of that, the majority rule for making government is reflected in the 
permanent constitution.  This meant that the permanent constitution did not include the 
method of grand coalition government. The Shiite majority could be the main reason for the 
lack of reflection of grand coalition provisions, because during the CDC negotiations they were 
more in favour of majority rule, with themselves as the majority.412 Another reason could be 
the lack of information about the role of grand coalition government. Alia Nossaif, a Shiite 
member of parliament, said, “there was no clear vision about writing the constitution.”413 
Negotiators could not solve that issue in the CDC because they did not know how to manage 
it. Humam Hamoudi argued, “we thought and discussed it is impossible to write provisions 
about grand coalition cabinet and even electing the presidency by the two-thirds majority is 
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very hard.”414 Thus grand coalition could not obtain approval among the negotiators, because 
they thought that the method of majority rule was more compatible with democratic values.  
Another crucial point was the role of the US-led coalition forces during the CDC functions and 
the Political Kitchen. One of the challenges the envoy of the US-led coalition, Khalilzad, faced 
was “the drafting of the Iraqi constitution. The deadline was less than three months away 
[when he arrived in Baghdad for conducting his role].”415 Humam Hamoudi, the chair of the 
CDC, met with President Bush during the drafting of the constitution.  He argued that there 
was no imposition by the US-led coalition on the CDC.  He noted that some of the US’s 
delegates had tried to impose some points, but failed. He said that “we as the CDC met 
President Bush, who insisted “I need to retain human rights [in the constitution],” and I 
responded we have done it perfectly.”416 This was really the goal of Khalilzad when he came 
to deal with the Iraqi issues, because he wanted “to ensure protections for human rights 
generally and women’s rights in particular.”417 In addition, there were other views opposed 
Humam Hamoudi’s. Senamoky, a member of the TNA, stated that the US-led coalition did 
have an impact on the CDC, because when the members did not reach a consensus about a 
particular subject, the US envoy pressured the leaders in the Political Kitchen to come to an 
agreement about that issue.418 That is compatible with Barham Salih’s argument that the US-
led coalition administrated the process of the CDC.419 One piece of evidence that the US-led 
coalition did impose certain strictures was that in August 2005, on the day that the CDC 
completed the draft of the constitution, in front of all the members of the TNA, Talabani 
declared that the US-led coalition imposed on them through its envoy, Khalilzad.420 Thus, the 
role of the US-led coalition affected the process of the CDC and concessions among all 
communities in order to make a consensus for finalising the permanent constitution.  
5.10 Conclusion  
In light of the above discussion, it is clear that only very few consociational provisions can be 
found in the permanent constitution. This is related to the dynamics of the negotiations. 
Obviously, consociationalism was reflected strongly in the TAL, but that only formed one of 
several foundations for the permanent constitution. There were three main factors shaping 
the dynamic that led to that kind of outcome. The first one is related to the role of the US-led 
coalition. It had a significant impact on the political process, especially the negotiations for 
drafting the TAL, starting with appointing the IGC members and establishing the formula for 
the participation of each community. Moreover, the TAL mostly reflected the US-led 
coalition’s will, since it was written by the US-led coalition, with slight revisions by Iraqis. 
While the US-led coalition was present during the negotiation of drafting the permanent 
constitution, its role was not as strong as before. In fact, the US succeeded in the 
establishment of a power-sharing arrangement that would form the main principle for 
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rebuilding the political institutions. Thus, its role was crucial at that time, since it aimed to 
prevent a system of majority rule or a constitution written under a majority.  
The second dynamic was the Sunnis’ attitude, because their voices pushed towards 
centralisation and against federalism, but none of the other communities supported them. 
This meant that the Sunnis were strongly opposed to consociational elements appearing in 
the constitution. They could not obtain their stated desires (centralisation, for example), 
because they did not participate in the political process. While the US-led coalition wanted 
the Sunnis’ voice to be heard alongside those of the other communities, the Sunnis’ demands 
did not emerge in the constitution. While the US-led coalition did not succeed in bringing the 
Sunnis to the political process and encouraging them to participate in the government, it did 
shape the political system: without the coalition including the Sunnis, the political process 
could not work fairly. Its efforts eventually succeeded in bringing the Sunnis into the CDC, 
which affected the direction of the negotiations.   
The third dynamic affecting that process was that the Shiite majority did not continue with 
their support of the power-sharing arrangement, and there was a dissenting voice among 
them, opposed to power-sharing. The main point was that they wanted to govern Iraq by their 
majority and frequently demanded that this should be considered. This meant that for the 
most part the Shiites did not fully support consociationalism, especially during the CDC. This 
affected the reflection of consociational elements in the constitution. Thus, although the 
Kurds and some of the Shiites were highly in favour of consociationalism, this was not enough 
for a full reflection of consociational aspects in the constitution. Consociational elements are 
therefore partially reflected in the permanent constitution, and at least informally the new 
Iraqi situation should be compatible with the core values of consociationalism.  
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6 Chapter 6 Consociationalism in Iraq from 2006 to 2010 
 
6.1 Introduction 
After the referendum for the permanent constitution in October 2005, the Iraqi people held 
the first parliamentary election under the permanent constitution in December 2005. All 
communities had participated in that process, and they received different ratios of votes and 
seats. Thus, after the declaration of the December 2005 election result, the most significant 
winners from each community negotiated to form a new cabinet. At the end of this process, 
a National Unity Government was formed. All the political parties in each community sought 
to obtain more power through the incoming cabinet. In this chapter, I will discuss what 
actually happened in the political institutions in light of Lijphart’s criteria. How were the 
consociational elements implemented in practice? Then, within each section, I will provide an 
account of the key actors’ visions, in order to better understand how those involved dealt 
with the situation. To further examine this, I will discuss Proportional Representation and how 
it was applied through legislative and executive power.  Following that, it is important to 
discuss the Grand Coalition government, what happened during the formation of the cabinet, 
and how it was realised.  After that, I will discuss how Mutual Veto worked during that period. 
Finally, it is vital to look at the desires of certain communities regarding the creation of their 
own region during that period, what actually happened, and why this was the case.    
6.2 Proportional Representation 
It will be useful to illustrate the instances of proportional representation in the permanent 
constitution through two aspects: firstly, how it is reflected in the legislative power and 
secondly in the executive power. Legislative power is the provision of the Council of 
Representatives (CoR) and the Federation Council (FC).421I will just concentrate on the Council 
of Representatives, due to the fact that the Federation Council had not been established at 
the time. Executive power is handled by the President and Council of Ministers, 422  both 
discussed in the following sections. My main aim is to show how Proportional Representation 
was implemented in the political institutions. Are the CoR and the government representative 
of the political parties involved in the process? Do the CoR and government also represent 
sectarian interests? Do they take into account ethnic-religious representation? How do the 
key actors interact each other to achieve proportional representation? To answer these 
questions, I will start with proportional representation in the CoR.  
6.2.1 Proportional Representation in the Parliament 
The December 2005 election was one of the crucial steps stipulated by the provisions of the 
permanent constitution. Its aim was to create political institutions that represented all 
significant communities. The key question is: what was the election system of the December 
2005 election? Obviously, the election system was determined by electoral law number 16 in 
2005. Article 9 determined the type of election that it would be, asserting that “candidacy 
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shall be through the closed list method, but a candidate may contest as an individual.”423 
According to the closed list method, voters elect a party list, rather than a specific candidate 
within each entity. This gives significant influence to the party machine in determining who 
will have a good chance of being elected, and putting them at the top of the list. This is 
important for consociationalism because a consociational system relies on the control of the 
political system by party elites. A closed list contributes more to the goals of 
consociationalism because it is the party who determines the list and its order, so that those 
candidates at the top of the list are really the best people for the job, and have the interests 
of the country at heart. Article 12 states that “seats allotted to an entity or coalition shall be 
awarded to candidates in accordance with the order of the names on the list.”424 This means 
that a closed list system is more compatible with consociationalism than the open list system.  
Electoral districts were another crucial point, as they affected the result of the election. The 
system of electoral districts had also been changed, and was different from that used for the 
TNA elections. Under electoral law, Iraq is divided into 18 electoral districts according to the 
18 Iraqi provinces. This is located in Article 15 section two: “each governorate is one electoral 
district in accordance with official borders and shall be allotted a number of seats 
proportional to the number of registered voters in the governorate.”425 This meant that the 
election result should bring proportionality through seat distribution among governorates, 
since each political entity should have a candidate list in the different governorates. The 
system of 18 electoral districts is in contrast to the TNA system, where each party has one list 
for the country as a whole. In the new system of Article 15 section 2, each district has a certain 
number of seats. One of the consequences is that the new arrangement benefits particular 
communities. Because of the geographic concentration of different communities this benefits 
those communities with low electoral turnout, in particular the Sunnis, and not those with 
high electoral turnout, in particular the Kurds.  That was one of the main points that brought 
together the Shiite and Sunni communities with the purpose of changing the electoral district 
from one district to 18. According to the TNA election, the election quota for one seat was 
same in the entirety of Iraq, but in the CoR election (December 2005) each governorate had 
a different election quota for one seat. Participation from the Sunnis’ and the Shiites’ 
governorates was very low, but in the Kurdistan region was very high. That was why in the 
TNA the Kurds obtained 77 seats, but in the CoR this figure decreased to 55 seats.426  
Another important amendment was the seat distribution. The Council of Representatives 
consisted of 275 seats, 230 seats distributed in advance among all provinces as a pre-
determined process, and another 45 seats, which remained as nationwide seats and 
compensatory seats.427 All political parties competed for a certain number of seats in each 
governorate, so that the election quota would be different in each electoral district. This is 
found under Article 15 section one of the electoral law, which states that “the House of 
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Representatives shall be composed of 275 members, 230 seats shall be distributed to the 
electoral districts and 45 of them shall be distributed as compensatory seats.”428 Thus, “each 
province would have a share of the 230 seats proportional to its share of registered voters in 
the country.” 429  This method helped to enhance proportional representation and bring 
representatives from all communities into the parliament, because all governorates had 
already obtained in advance a number of seats in the parliament. For more detail, see Table 
8. Article 16 explicitly stated: “seats allotted to electoral districts shall be allocated to entities 
through the system of proportional representation.”430 This meant that the electoral law 
aimed to transfer the actual vote into a seat, which would be compatible with real 
proportionality. In addition, there was a fixed quota for the participation of women in the 
government, at a ratio of 25%. Article 11 states that “one in every three names on each 
Candidate List be female.”431 
However, there were no articles supporting representatives from minority groups to obtain 
their quota in order for them to have the correct proportion for representing their groups in 
the CoR. According to the electoral law, there were compensatory seats which should be 
distributed among entities. Under the electoral law provisions for distributing these 45 seats, 
“the total number of votes obtained by each entity shall be divided by the "national 
average432" to determine the number of seats allotted to it.”433 It was obvious that the biggest 
list would obtain the most considerable number of compensatory seats, not the smallest list. 
Thus, there was not much provision to support minority representation in the law (such as 
Christian, Turkoman, etc). So, the minority groups formed almost the smallest list, which 
meant that the biggest lists took more advantage of compensatory seats than the minority 
groups. For more detail see the Table 8. 
In light of this electoral law, the Iraqi people held an election in December 2005. In that 
election, all groups, Shiite, Sunni, Kurd, and other minority groups, participated through 
different lists. There were 307 political entities, which included political parties, individual 
candidates and 19 coalitions. Altogether, 7655 candidates were competing for 275 seats.434 
Obviously, that number of candidates indicated that there was strong competition among all 
groups to win as many seats as possible. Table 7 shows how many lists won seats in the 
parliament.   
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December 2005 Elections 435 
 Election lists  ةيباختنلاا مئاوقلا Per cent of 
Votes 
Number of 
Votes  
     
Seats 
Per cent    
of seats 
Ethnicity 
1 United Iraqi Alliance 
(UIA) 
 يقارعلا فلاتئلاا
دحوملا 
41,19 5,021,137 128 46.55 % Shiite  
2 Kurdistan Alliance  يناتسدروكلا فلاحتلا 21,67 
 
2,642,172 53 19.27 % Kurd 
3 Iraqi Accord Front. 
Jabhat Al-Tawafuq  
 يقارعلا قفاوتلا ةهبج 15,09 1,840,216 
 
44 16.00 % Sunni  
4 Iraqi National List  ةيقارعلا ةمئاقلا
ةدحوملا 
8,02 977,325 25 9.09 % Ayad Allawi/ secular 
Sunni List.  
5 Iraqi National 
Dialogue Front 
 راوحلا ةهبج ينطولا
 يقارعلا 
4,10 499,963 11 4.00 % Saleh Al-Motlag. Sunni  
6 Kurdistan Islamic 
Union 
 يملاسلاا داحتلاا
 يناتسدروكلا 
1,29 157,688 5 1.82 % Kurd, Jointed to Kurdish 
Alliance  
7 Liberation Bloc/ 
Reconciliation 
 
 عمجت
ةحلاصملا/ريرحتلا 
1,07 129,847 3 1.09 % Misha'an al-Juburi. Sunni  
8 Al-Takadomeon نويمدقتلا 1,19 145,028 2 0.73 % Shiite. Jointed to UIA  
9 Iraqi Turkmen Front  نامكرتلا ةهبج
 نييقارعلا 
0,72 87,993 1 0.36 % Turkoman  
10 Rafidain List  نيدفارلا ةمئاق 0,39 
 
47,263 1 0.36 % Assyrian 
11 Mithal al-Alusi List for 
Iraqi Ummah  
 يسوللاا لاثم ةمئاق
 ةيقارعلا ةملال 
0,26 32,245 1 0.36 % Sunni Arab  
12 Yazidi Movement   ةيديزيلا ةكرح 0,18 
 
21,908 1 0.36 % Yazidi  
13 Others   4.83 - 0 -  
 Total   95,17 
 
11580877 275 99.99 %  
  Table 7: December 2005 Election’s Result  
However, while many lists from different ethno-religious groups participated in the election 
process, just 12 of them won seats. On the other hand, only three of these controlled the vast 
majority of seats. If you look at the three top parties, which were the main representatives of 
the three core groups, they had just under 80% of the total votes and 81.82% of the seats. 
This meant that the vast majority of seats went to what were explicitly sectarian parties. The 
only single party explicitly secular was the Iraqi National List, which got 9.09% of seats and 
8.02 % of votes. Fundamentally, every other list obtained less than 5% of votes. Thus, the 
smallest parties were not really taken into account. What mattered most were four coalitions, 
three in particular.  The first was the Shiites, which had 130 seats as the largest coalition, and 
then the Sunnis in second place with 58 seats. The Kurdish coalition also obtained 58 seats. 
In light of those results, each community voted for their own community and supported them 
to win against the other communities. This meant that people voted based on sectarian, 
religious and national background lines. That was the outcome of the election system, 
showing that “the issue of proportionality is significant in the Iraqi context since the election 
results illustrated the balance along the ethnic lines.”436 Thus, it was clear that the election 
system drove the outcome, resulting in proportional representation in the parliament along 
sectarian lines, as seen in the table.   
Consequently, each community obtained its proportion in the parliament. It was the outcome 
of the implementation of electoral law based on numerous constituent provinces. In 
particular, it was the outcome of seat distribution among provinces. Table 8 shows how 
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parliamentary seats were distributed before the election and how communities received their 
proportion. 
 Pre-distribution of Parliamentary Seats in December 2005 Elections and the Result for 
Key Political Entity in Each Governorate.437 
Name of Governorates  Pre-distribution 
of Seats  
  
Shiite  
Seats  
Sunni  
Seats  
Secular list 
Ayad Alawi  
Kurd  
Seats  
Note 
1 Sulaymaniyah 15    15  
2 
Erbil  
13 
 
   13  
3 
Duhok   
7 
 
   7  
4 
Kirkuk 
9 
 
 3  5 1 Turkoman  
5 
Nineveh 
19 
 
2 10 2 4 1 Yazidy  
 
6 Diyala 10 2 5 1 2  
7 Saladin 8 1 6 1   
8 Al Anbar  9  9    
9 
Baghdad  
59 
 
35 14 8 1 1 Christian 
10 
Babel  
11 9 1 1  The secular seat 
was from 
communist 
party 
11 
Basra  
16 13 1 2  The secular seat 
was Shiite 
12 
Karbala 
6 5  1   The secular seat 
was Shiite  
13 
Najaf 
8 7  1  The secular seat 
was Shiite 
14 Maysan 7 6  1   
15 Muthanna 5 5     
16 
Al-Qadisiyah 
8 7  1  The secular seat 
was Shiite 
17 
Dhi Qar 
12 11  1  The secular seat 
was Shiite 
18 Wasit 8 7  1   
 Compensatory seats 45 20 9 4 11  
Total   275 130 58 25 58 3 
Table 8: Pre-distribution of Parliamentary Seats 
Consequently, proportionality in the CoR was different from proportionality in the TNA. The 
main reason was the electoral law, because the CoR system permitted better proportionality 
for each community. The question is: does the vote directly transfer to the seat? Comparing 
this result with the TNA election result shows a significant difference between vote and 
number of seats. The Kurds lost around 17 seats, with a drop of 1.87% between number of 
votes and number of seats. The Shiites, on the other hand, obtained a higher proportion of 
seats than votes by 4.9%, despite losing 12 seats. The Sunnis, however, reached a ratio of 44 
seats, obtaining slightly more seats than votes by 0.95%. This meant that while the Kurds and 
the Shiites lost a number of seats, their representation was still proportional. For more 
information, see Table 9.  
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Percentage of Votes and Seats in January and December 2005 Elections 
January 2005, TNA December 2005, CoR 
 Ethno religious 
groups 
Percentag
e of votes 
Percentag
e of seats 
Differenc
es  
Percentage 
of votes 
Percentage 
of seats 
Differenc
es  
+ 
- 
Notes  
1 Shiite  48.2 50.9 2.7 42.38 47.28 4.9 + -  
 2 Sunni  1.8 1.8 0.0 20,50 21.45 0.95 + - 
3 Kurd  25.7 27.2 1.5 22.96 21.09 1.87 + - 
 Secular list  13.8 14.5 0.7 8.02 9.09 1.07 + - 
4 Minorities  0.4 0.4 0.0 0.57 0.72 0.15 + - 
 Iraqi Turkmen 
Front 
1.1 1.1 0.0  0,72 0.36 0.36  + - 
5 Others  5.3 0000 - 4.83 0000 - + - 
         
Table 9: Percentage of Votes and Seats in January and December 2005 Elections 
In light of that process and the implementation of proportionality, significant communities 
distributed all high-level posts under the Erbil Agreement among themselves. According to 
the Agreement, the Sunni Arabs took the role of Speaker of Parliament, the Shiites Deputy for 
Shiite and the Kurds second Deputy.  The speaker was Mahmoud al-Mashhadani from the 
Iraqi Accord Front (IAF), but after two years he was replaced by Ayad al-Samarrai from the 
same entity, who continued until he finished his term. The First Deputy was Khaled al-Attiyah 
from UIA, and the second was Arif Tayfor from the Kurdish Alliance (See Table 10). 
The Leadership of Parliament 438 
Name  Position Ethnicity Election 
Lists 
Political 
party 
Note 
Mahmoud al-
Mashhadani and Ayad 
al-Samarrai 
Speaker Sunni Arab IAF Iraqi Islamic 
Party 
Al-Mashhadani from 
2006 to December 2008. 
Al-Samarrai from April 
2009 to 2010. 
Khaled al-Attiyah First Deputy Shiite Arab UIA 
 
Independent   
Arif Tayfor  Second Deputy Kurd Kurdish 
Alliance  
KDP 
 
 
Table 10: The Leadership of Parliament 
6.2.2 Proportional Representatives in the Executive  
Proportional representation in the cabinet was more important than in the parliament, 
because there was no substantial system for distributing cabinet posts, and the cabinet had 
more power as an institution than the parliament. In fact, that was the main reason that 
pushed all groups to obtain more posts, in order to contribute successfully to the decision-
making process and guarantee their interests. There were different levels of positions, 
including the Presidency Council, Prime Minister, Deputies, and Minsters. Obviously, all high-
level positions were allocated together, because political leaders wanted to deal with them 
as one package. That was one of the reasons that led to a delay in the formation of the political 
institutions, which took five months’ discussion among all political parties.439 In the end, they 
decided to distribute leadership of the three key institutions of parliament, government, and 
state among the three main communities: Shiite, Sunni and Kurd. That process, which was in 
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accordance with proportional representation, was the method for distributing the posts from 
2003. Thus, they continued to rebuild all political institutions under the aegis of proportional 
representation in order to obtain stability and collaboration among key communities. 
Constitutionally, the second political institution, the Presidency Council, had to be formed 
before the government because of its duty to nominate the Prime Minister from the largest 
bloc. Therefore, the Presidency Council’s posts were distributed among the three main 
communities. The Kurds gained the Presidency, the Sunnis first Vice President, and the Shiites 
second Vice President. The crucial point was that during that period each member of the 
Presidency Council had the same powers, and each had a veto to reject any decision or law 
recommended by the CoR. Its decisions had to be taken unanimously, not by majority or by 
the President alone. As Article 138 section 4 states, “the Presidency Council shall issue its 
decisions unanimously.” 440   Another interesting point was the Sunnis’ challenge to the 
Presidency. They wanted to take the Presidency instead of the roles of Vice President and 
Speaker of Parliament, but the Kurds did not agree to step down from this position.441 This 
was firstly because Tariq al-Hashemi, the Sunni leader, had already been vetoed by the Shiites 
because he was strongly against Ibrahim Jafari becoming the Prime Minster for a second time. 
Secondly, as there was an informal discussion between Talabani and Tariq al-Hashemi 
regarding who would become the President of Iraq, Tariq al-Hashemi understood that it 
would be impossible to get the position. Thirdly, al-Hashemi had been offered the Vice 
Presidency, and he accepted because it had the same power as the Presidency during that 
period. Thus, the Presidency Council had been formed and consisted of three representatives 
from the main communities. See Table 11.  
Presidency Council 2006-2010 
Name Position Ethnicity Election Lists Political party Note 
Jalal Talabani President Kurd Kurdish Alliance  PUK  
Tariq al-
Hashemi 
Vice- President Sunni IAF Iraqi Islamic Party 
Adil Abdul 
Mahdi 
Vice-President Shiite UIA Islamic Supreme 
Council of Iraq (ISCI) 
Table 11: Presidency Council 2006-2010 
Another aspect of proportionality was the government, which distributed all ministerial posts 
in light of the agreement among the three main communities. This led to dividing all posts 
among Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds in order to achieve power sharing arrangements and 
cooperation in the decision-making process. The Shiites obtained the position of Prime 
Minister because they were a majority in Iraq and won more seats in the December 2005 
election. Following that logic, the Kurds and Sunnis each received one Deputy Prime Minister 
Position. This will be discussed in detail in the grand coalition section.  
Consequently, proportional representation was reflected in legislative and executive power 
at various levels. In fact, the ratio of representatives that occurred in the political institutions 
could please all communities, even the Kurds, despite the fact that their ratio decreased 
slightly compared with the previous election. Therefore, the CoR included a variety of 
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representatives from 12 entities. In addition, although proportional representation had been 
applied in the distribution of positions of executive power, it was not present in the 
parliament because there were differences between each community’s percentages in both 
institutions. So, for example, the Shiites obtained an absolute majority in the government, 
which they did not have in the CoR.  
6.3 Grand coalition government 
Grand coalition is one of the most essential elements required for consociationalism to 
function in a deeply divided society. In fact, one of the most controversial points among 
political leaders was the possibility of establishing a broad-based government. The December 
2005 election provided a foundation for establishing the cabinet, but political leaders 
understood very well that the government should include all communities, not only those 
who received the highest number of seats. As the permanent constitution mentions in Article 
76 Section 1, “the president of the republic shall charge the nominee of the largest Council of 
Representatives bloc with the formation of the Council of Ministers.”442 According to this 
Article, the UIA were tasked with forming the cabinet because they were the largest bloc. In 
reality, however, the process of forming the cabinet and deciding who would become the 
Prime Minister required consensus among all key communities. In these negotiations, 
election results turned into bargaining chips. All communities demanded that the government 
should be established by consensus, because – despite the election and its results – Iraq was 
simply not ready for the kind of majority government that the constitution suggested. Thus, 
all of major parties were aiming at grand coalition government, but had different views about 
what it should look like. In this section, I will discuss how the cabinet was established. What 
actually happened? Which type of government did they intend to establish? How did the 
power-sharing arrangement operate?  
6.3.1 Negotiations for forming the new cabinet 
After the result of the December 2005 election was declared, political leaders started 
negotiations to form the new cabinet. All communities participated in the process, because 
they all wanted representation in the incoming government.  That is, each community wished 
to ensure that the cabinet adhered to a clear power-sharing arrangement. At that time, none 
of them demanded a majority government, even the Shiites, who, as the largest bloc, had 
received 128 seats out of 275, because they knew it would be impossible for one single 
community to govern Iraq. However, there were two key issues for negotiation. First, who 
should become the Prime Minister, and second, what kind of government was required, 
majoritarian or grand coalition. Regarding the first issue, while the Shiites had the right to 
nominate a Prime Minister from the largest bloc, they still required approval from the other 
communities. As Khalilzad pointed out, “Iraqi leaders recognized the need for collaborating 
and building consensus.” 443  The Shiite community, and especially the Shiite bloc, held a 
meeting to select its candidate for the Prime Minister position.  Of the two candidates, 
Ibrahim al Jaafari and Adil Abdul-Mahdi, Jaafari defeated Abdul-Mahdi by one vote.444 This 
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created tension, because Jaafari was not acceptable to the Kurds and the Sunnis. Both 
communities individually sent official messages to the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) Shiite bloc, 
requesting that they remove Jaafari, and substitute a more acceptable candidate.445 On this, 
Ayad Allawi said, “we want to practice the national unity government’s program through 
participation by all political parties. I do not have any issue with the Shiite bloc and Ibrahim 
al-Jaafari, but whoever takes the Prime Minister’s position should get acceptance and support 
from all communities.”446 Without support from two of the three main communities, Jafaari 
could not legitimately remain Prime Minister.447  
Another crucial point was the US’s role in selecting who should become the Prime Minister. 
The US was not in favour of Jaafari becoming the next Prime Minister, and the US’s 
ambassador in Baghdad, Khalilzad, informed Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the Shiite bloc, 
that President Bush “doesn’t want, doesn’t support, and doesn’t accept that Jaafari should 
form the next government.”448 President Bush had directly asked Khalilzad, “can Jaafari be 
stopped from becoming prime minster?449 The Bush administration’s message was delivered 
to Jaafari, and his spokesman Hadier al-Ubady informed the US “that the prime minister had 
heard the message.” 450  The opposition of both internal and external actors to Jaafari 
disappointed him, and made it impossible for him to become the Prime Minster. Thus, in light 
of that situation, “on April 20, Jaafari stepped aside in favour of another senior Da’wa Party 
figure, Jawad al-Maliki.”451 That decision came from the UIA, which, in a meeting, reached 
out to candidate Maliki instead of Jafaari, who were both in the same political party, Da’wa.452 
Khalilzad emphasised that the selection of Maliki was choice favoured by the US. Khalilzad 
then stated that he had an agreement with Maliki before the UIA’s selection of him, which 
stipulated that as Prime Minister he would “pursue political reconciliation seriously, take a 
balanced approach in combating both the insurgency and militias, selecting defence and 
interior ministries who were not sectarian, reach out to the Arab world, particularly Saudi 
Arabia, and move quickly to conclude an agreement on distributing oil revenue, modifying 
de-Baathification, and other fundamental issues dividing the country.”453 As Khalilzad pointed 
out, Maliki agreed to all conditions, and was not seen by the key communities as a 
controversial figure, although the Sunnis were doubtful about his stance on de-Baathification. 
Maliki stated that “in the first term the role of the US was good and supportive.”454 With the 
assistance of the US, Maliki had been chosen as the only candidates for the Prime Minister 
position. This meant that the US was one of the key actors affecting the direction of the 
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rebuilding of political institutions. By selecting and supporting the Prime Minister, they could 
put direct pressure on him to pursue what the US wanted.  
The second issue was related to the formation of the government: what type of cabinet 
should it be? Why was a broad-based cabinet, rather than a majority cabinet, selected?  While 
the Shiites had received the majority of votes and seats in the CoR, they could not call for a 
majority government. Hesham al-Suhail, a Shiite MP, said that “the external actors did not 
allow us to do it and they pushed towards consensus.”455 In line with this, Maliki explained 
that there was no real chance of forming a majority government, because if a community 
tried to form government based on the number of seats in the CoR, other communities would 
refuse to support it in the political process. The only solution, he continued, was to support 
them through the sectarian allocation principle and consensus, which were imposed on 
them.456 Ayad al-Samarrai, former Speaker of the CoR from the Sunni community, argued 
“that the government completely will be a Shiite government, so we must have the national 
government represent all communities.”457 Thus, all communities deemed a broad-based 
government most likely to be the best possibility. Furthermore, there was a rumour that the 
Sunni community might not participate in the cabinet, and without them true stability and 
peace could not be achieved.  
Further support for a broad-based government came from political leaders within the Shiite 
community, like Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim, who stated: “we are emphasizing that the Sunni group 
should participate in the political process and should take an actual role in making the new 
government.”458 Later on, Adil Abdul-Mahdi noted: “in my view, we need real national unity 
government because our country has many problems, and any decision you want to take 
about, for example, security, the economy, foreign troops, and the establishment of new 
relations, requires consensus, so we need national unity government.”459 In the same vein, 
the Kurdish leader also asserted that the new cabinet needed to represent all communities. 
Masoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan region, said, “we are attempting to make a 
coalition government, taking into account the election result and representatives of Iraqi 
society.”460 In addition, he stated: “we are sharing in the process of making political and 
federal decisions, which is more important than the number of positions we have.”461 It was 
clear that the incoming government had a huge responsibility to bring all parties together in 
order to institute a broad-based cabinet. Further support for national unity government came 
from the Sunnis, whose senior leader, Adnan al-Dulaimi, said, “our position is very clear and 
aims to make a government for all Iraqi people, not just for one group or community or 
nation.”462 In light of the above statements, the incoming government needed to form by 
drawing from all communities, allowing no significant community to be marginalised. This was 
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an outcome of a meeting that had been held among senior political leaders from the three 
main communities, after which they declared in a press conference that all political parties 
had agreed to form a National Unity Government (NUG).463 The NUG was a common point 
between communities, which did not neglect any key community. This meant that in the end 
all communities supported the formation of a broad-based government, and none of them 
demanded a majority government.  
There were several reasons why the NUG was conceived as a solution by all key communities. 
First, each community understood well that Iraq could not be governed by a single community 
even if it had an absolute majority of seats in the CoR. This is first because Iraq is deeply 
divided among ethno-religious groups, each having endured unpleasant experiences and 
neglect from a single community’s governance. Second, while the provisions of the 
permanent constitution are compatible with forming a majority cabinet, this was not 
demanded by any community. Maliki stated in his interview that he demanded the formation 
of a majority cabinet. But in reality his desire was not shared, and no one listened to it.  Third, 
the US-led coalition forces did not support the implementation of a majority government. 
This was because the US wanted to form a broad-based government that included all 
communities, especially the Sunnis, because they had boycotted the previous election.  Finally, 
the same methods that had been used to form the various new political institutions between 
2003 and 2005 had a positive impact on pushing for a broad-based government. This is 
because each of these institutions was specifically designed to provide a chance for every 
single community to be represented by its proportion in the government, setting an example 
for future institutions to follow.        
6.3.2 National Unity Government (NUG) 
Although all communities agreed to form a new government under the name of the National 
Unity Government, the structure of that government was not simple, because each 
community had different views about distributing high-level positions. The Sunnis were one 
of the main communities demanding a bigger proportion than their 55 seats.464 However, the 
Shiites “emphasized a governmental balance based on the election results.”465 Moreover, 
Kurdish leaders had tried to find a compromise between both sides. As Barzani highlighted, 
“the incoming government should be a coalition cabinet based on the election results and 
national components.”466 This meant that there were two main factors at play: the election 
results and consideration of the key communities’ ratio. The process of deciding the 
distribution of posts required hard discussion among all political leaders. The US had a 
positive impact on assisting the communities to reach an agreement to make the NUG an 
inclusive cabinet. Khalilzad pointed out that he worked with Iraqi leaders to form “a fully 
representative government.”467 He encouraged the Iraqi people to create a balance in the 
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NUG, with non-sectarian candidates taking over the security ministries. 468  Thus, the US 
carefully followed the formation of the NUG, and worked to achieve what it wanted.  
After five months of negotiations, the process of forming a government was completed, based 
on the election results, but also taking into account the key differences between individual 
communities. Nouri al-Maliki declared his cabinet on May 20, 2006. The main issue that 
caused the postponement was the selection of the Prime Minister, which was solved on April 
20, 2006. This meant that Maliki had one month to form his cabinet, ensuring appropriate 
proportionality for communities and solving the problem of their ratio in the government. 
Maliki’s cabinet consisted of 39 ministers, including two Deputy Prime Ministers, Barham Salih, 
a Kurdish leader, and Salam al-Zubaie, a Sunni Arab. Other ministerial posts were distributed 
among all key communities. Twenty-one posts went to Shiites; ten to Sunnis; seven to Kurds; 
and one to a Christian.469 Khalilzad recommended that independent politicians should take 
over the Interior and Defence ministries, but one was given to a Shiite, the other to a Sunni. 
For more detail, see Table 12. The cabinet was the outcome of long-term negotiations. All the 
selected politicians accepted their posts because they had contributed to making this cabinet 
for four years. The cabinet’s agenda took the place of the informal agreement among all of 
them because it secured the demands that they had made during negotiations. Maliki’s 
government “roughly reflects the country’s diversity”, as McGarry and O’Leary reported not 
long after the event.470 Thus, the NUG began its functions with a grand coalition drawn from 
all relevant communities.  
Rating Ministers in the Nouri al-Maliki Cabinet 2006-2010471 
 Name  Position  Ethnicity Bloc and 
Political Party 
The government leadership 
1 Nouri al-Maliki  Prime Minister  Shiite UIA Daawa 
2 Salam Zaubai Deputy Prime Minister  Sunni IAF 
3 Barham Salih Deputy Prime Minister  Kurd PUK 
Powerful Ministers (Sovereign Ministers) 
4 Jawad al-Bulani Interior Minister Shiite UIA/independen
t 
5 Bayan Jabr Finance Minister Shiite UIA SCIRI 
6 Hussein Shahristani Oil Minister  Shiite UIA 
7 Shirwan Waily  National Security Minister Shiite UIA Daawa 
8 Abdul Qadir Obeidi Defence Minister Sunni Independent 
9 Ali Baban  Planning Minister Sunni IAF Iraqi Islamic 
Party 
10 Hoshyar Zebari Foreign Affairs Minister Kurd KDP 
Less Powerful Ministers (Service Ministries) 
11 Ali al-Shemari  Health Minister Shiite UIA Sadrist 
12 Khudayer al-Khuzaie  Education Minister Shiite UIA Daawa IO 
13 Abed Falah al-Sudani  Trade Minister Shiite UIA Daawa IO 
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14 Karim Waheed  Electricity Minister Shiite UIA 
15 Yarrub Nazim  Agriculture Minister Shiite UIA Sadrist 
16 Karim Mahdi  Transport Minister Shiite UIA Sadrist 
17 Abdul-Samad Rahman  Migration Minister Shiite UIA 
18 Jassim Mohammed Jaafar  Youth and Sports Minister Shiite UIA 
19 Mohammed Tawfiq  Communications Minister Shiite UIA 
20 Mahmoud Mohammed al-
Radhi  
Labour and Social Affairs Minister Shiite UIA 
21 Riyad Gharib  Municipalities and Public Works Minister Shiite UIA 
22 Raed Fahmi  Science and Technology Minister Sunni Iraqi National 
List 
23 Assad Kamal Mohammed  Culture Minister Sunni IAF Iraqi 
People's 
Conference. 
Adnan al-
Dulaimi 
24 Hashim al-Shibli Justice Minister Sunni Iraqi National 
List 
25 Abed Theyab  Higher Education Minister Sunni IAF Iraqi Islamic 
Party 
26 Fawzi al-Hariri  Industry Minister Kurd KDP 
27 Latif Rashid  Water Resources Minister Kurd PUK 
28 Bayan Dazee  Housing and Construction Minister Kurd KDP 
29 Narmin Othman Environment Minister Kurd PUK 
30 Wijdan Mikaeil  Human Rights Minister Christian   
Ministers of State for Affairs 
31 Adel al-Assadi  Minister of State for civil society affairs Shiite UIA 
32 Safa al-Safi  Minister of State for House of Representatives' Affairs Shiite UIA/ 
independent 
33 Liwa Semeism (Shia) -  Minister of State for Tourism and Archaeology Affairs Shiite UIA 
34 Akram al-Hakim  Minister of State for National Dialogue Shiite UIA Daawa 
35 Fatin Abdel-Rahman  Minister of State for Women's Affairs Sunni  
36 Saad Tahir Abid  Minister of State for Provincial Affairs Sunni  
37 Rafaa al-Esawi  Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sunni IAF Iraqi Islamic 
Party 
Ministers of State/ without portfolio  
38 Mohammed Abbas Auraibi  Minister of State Shiite Iraqi National 
List 
39 Hassan Rhadi Khazim  Minister of State Shiite UIA 
40 Ali Mohammed Ahmed  Minister of State  Kurd KIU 
Table 12: Rating Ministers in the Nouri al-Maliki Cabinet 2006-2010 
 
According to Table 12, the Shiites received 22 posts, which included 4 of 7 the Sovereign 
Ministries and 11 of the 20 Service Ministries. Among these were the Ministries for Interior, 
Finance, Oil, National Security, Health, and Education. The next most represented group was 
the Sunni Arabs, who took 10 Ministries. Their most powerful posts were Deputy Prime 
Minister, and the Ministries for Defence and Planning. The last group was the Kurds, who had 
seven ministers. Their most important posts were Deputy Prime Minister, and Foreign Affairs 
Minister. Although Maliki’s government was a broad-based cabinet, there was no real balance 
among communities. The Shiites, having received an absolute majority of posts, clearly 
dominated the entire government.  This meant that despite the fact that the Shiites had not 
won an absolute majority in the December 2005 election, they nevertheless acquired more 
powerful posts than the other groups. The distribution of posts, then, was not based on the 
election results alone, because, as the table shows, the attainment of posts also depended on 
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the key communities. For example, during the negotiation, the Sunnis’ delegate tried to 
prevent the Shiites from getting an absolute majority in the cabinet, but did not succeed. As 
Ayad al-Samarrai stated, “we knew very well that the Shiites wanted to get absolute majority 
in the cabinet and I suggested to our negotiator team to be aware of that point, but they 
could not prevent it.”472 The Sunni group was clearly afraid of a Shiite majority in the cabinet, 
predicting that the Shiites would dominate political institutions through their proportion.  
An interesting question arises: why did the Shiites obtain this absolute majority? There are 
several reasons that explain their disproportionate representation in the cabinet. First, they 
received 47.27% of the CoR seats, just under an absolute majority. Second, the Shiites make 
up around 60-65% of the population in Iraq.473 Finally, when the situation changed after 2003, 
the Shiites obtained an absolute majority in all of the US-led coalition’s newly-established 
institutions, like the IGC among others. The IGC consisted of 25 members, 13 Shiites, 5 Sunnis, 
5 Kurds, 1 Turkoman and 1 Christian. The Bremer government was established with the same 
proportions, which continued to be implemented up to the establishment of the NUG.474 For 
these reasons, Shiites were far more likely to attain positions than Sunnis and Kurds, even 
though the Shiites did not win an absolute majority in the December 2005 election. For their 
part, the Shiites asserted that since they comprise 60% of the total population of Iraq, they 
should get more posts.475  
Although high-level positions were distributed among the three main communities, there 
were other posts that were not distributed at the same level, such as the appointment of the 
Deputy Minister, general director, and military army officers. This occurred because of the 
Sunnis’ position in the political process from 2003 to 2006, as they took an opposing stance. 
Thus, the Shiites appointed their own people, with the knowledge that they would be loyal.  
Another reason relates to Iraq’s instability. Ayad al-Samarrai asserted, “when we demanded 
that there should be balance in the cabinet, Maliki said, ‘we wanted the Sunni group to 
participate but they refused, so in that situation I had to bring the Shiites to appoint them in 
order to run the government. Yes, that was true, but they said when we nominated some 
people to become a general director that they had been killed by Shiite militia or Al Qaida and 
that there would be no protection for them.” 476  Maliki himself said that “when they 
boycotted the political processes, we had to nominate people for those posts and rebuild 
political institutions. After that, when they did participate, they asked for those posts. We said 
that the process needs time, and we cannot retire all those people who run those posts; it 
should be step by step.”477 That was why Yonadam Kana, a member of the CoR from the 
Christian group, pointed out that the power was monopolised by a council of ministers, 
causing the Iraqi army, and the appointment of Deputy Ministers and general directors to be 
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run by one sect.”478 The Sunnis’ absence from the political process gave the Shiites a good 
chance to take what they wanted. Saleem al-Jubouri said, “there was no balance in the 
political institutions, and there were dismissals and rejections of people, not because they 
were not qualified or not capable, but because they belonged to particular ethno-religious 
groups.”479 Thus, proportionality was implemented in high-level positions only, but in other 
sectors and at lower levels, proportionality was absent.   
It is clear that at its formation, the Maliki cabinet was grand coalition and proportional. It was 
described by Khalilzad as “a power-sharing arrangement under a national unity government 
with an agreed agenda and process for near-consensus decision-making on issues of national 
importance.” 480  However, this only pertained to the beginning of the cabinet, and only 
concerned high-level positions, such as leadership posts and ministry posts. After a while, this 
began to change. This meant that grand coalition and proportionality were not practised up 
to the end of the period. It was reflected only in the performance of the NUG and the way 
that Maliki operated whilst conducting his duty.  
6.3.3 National unity government performance 
To achieve the cabinet’s aim of creating peace and stability, Maliki was responsible for 
operating a power-sharing arrangement. The power-sharing arrangements of the NUG were 
compatible with the provisions of the permanent constitution. As a first step, Maliki declared 
the “National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project” on 25 June 2006, aiming to bring insurgent 
groups into the political process.481 That was one of the main conditions from Sunni groups 
to participate in the political process, specifically in Maliki’s cabinet. The project was 
welcomed by all of them, and they thought that it was a good step towards stability and 
collaboration between the Shiites and the Sunnis. However, Maliki’s methods of governing 
began to change, and his emphasis moved towards controlling power, ignoring others, and 
centralisation. He “challenged the power sharing arrangements by trying to empower the 
central government and the secular Shi’ite bloc.”482  The motivations of his actions were 
criticised by other groups, as he began to dominate institutions and neglect other groups. For 
instance, the Sunni groups demanded a balance in the appointment of posts in the institutions, 
but Maliki did not listen, instead only appointing those who had loyalty for him or his 
community. This meant that there was no strategic plan for achieving power sharing and 
implementing the cabinet’s program.  
Maliki tried hard to control the source of power in the government through the creation of 
new institutions. These overlapped with the duties of the Minister of Defence and Minister of 
Interior, which led to the marginalisation of both ministers’ roles. That attempt started with 
the Baghdad Security Plan in February 2007.483 When he attacked Sadr’s militia in Basra in 
2008 and al-Qaeda in the Sunni provinces, he appeared to be a strong leader and state 
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builder.484  In fact, the security and military forces were the most important sectors for him 
at that time to allow him more power to control other institutions. He established new 
security institutions, such as the office of the commander in chief and Provisional Command 
Centres, in order to tighten his grip over the Iraqi security forces.485 Toby Doge pointed out 
that both institutions were extraconstitutional organisations designed to guarantee 
domination.486 Maliki’s plan aimed to bring all forces under his own hand, so that the Iraqi 
armed forces could be controlled directly by his office only.487 People doubted the reasoning 
behind his actions during that time, but were unable to do anything because formally he was 
the commander-in-chief.  As the permanent constitution Article 78 states, “the Prime Minister 
is the direct executive authority responsible for the general policy of the State and the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.” 488  In his interview, Maliki argued that 
constitutionally he was the commander-in-chief of the armed forces in Iraq, so he just wanted 
to practise his duty in line with those provisions, and nothing more.489 In reality, the criticism 
was not about his rights as head of the government, but about his way of operating the NUG, 
which was incompatible with previously agreed and expected power-sharing arrangements. 
This was one of the main reasons that there was no opportunity for conflict resolution.   
The aim of Maliki’s newly-created Provisional Command Centres was to hold sway over forces 
in each governorate. Through them, he could “coordinate all Iraqi forces, both police and 
army, in the city.”490 Maliki “quickly realised its potential importance and increased its staff, 
influence and reach. He moved the organisation [Provisional Command Centres] into the 
Office of the Prime Minister and appointed his close ally, Farouk al-Araji, to run it and staff it 
with trusted functionaries.”491 His total monopoly of control demonstrates that his plan was 
to sideline both the Defence and Interior Ministers. Following these steps, he targeted Iraq’s 
intelligence services by increasing conflict between the head of the National Intelligence 
Service and the Minister of State for National Security Affairs. Maliki appointed Shirwan Waily, 
who had already proven loyal to him, as the Minister of National Security Affairs, which led 
the head of the National Intelligence Service to resign. Thus, in addition to the armed forces, 
Maliki now controlled Iraq’s intelligence services.492 Marisa Sullivan judged that “Iraqi Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s centralization of control over the last five years is not surprising.”493 
Maliki was against a power sharing arrangement because it did not benefit his own interests. 
But the consequence of this was increased conflict among communities, rather than its 
                                                     
484 Al-Qarawee, Harith Hasan, “Iraq’s Sectarian Crisis A Legacy of Exclusion” (Carnegie Middle East Center, 
2014). P.6 
485 Dodge, Toby, Iraq. P. 127  
486 Dodge, Toby, “Can Iraq Be Saved?,” Survival 56, no. 5 (September 3, 2014): 7–20. P.12-13 
487 Sullivan, Marisa, “Middle East Security Report 10: Maliki’s Authoritarian Regime” (The United States of 
America: Institute for the Study of War, 2013). P.11 
488 Iraq, “Permanent Constitution.” 
489 Interview with: Nouri al-Maliki, interview. 
490 Dodge, Toby, Iraq. p. 128 
491 Ibid. P.127-128.  
492 Ibid. p. 129  
493 Sullivan, Marisa, “Middle East Security Report 10: Maliki’s Authoritarian Regime.” P.9 
Chapter 6 Consociationalism in Iraq from 2006 to 2010  
 
102 
 
reduction, which was what had been expected from the implementation of a grand coalition 
government as a tool for conflict resolution.   
Attempts by all communities to protest against Maliki’s way of operating the NUG began at 
an early stage. In fact, political leaders wanted to obtain guarantees for their rights in the 
political institutions, but very soon, they felt that Maliki was a considerable threat to their 
interests.  The first attempt to remonstrate against Maliki’s government was from Moqtada 
al-Sadr. He protested by withdrawing his six ministers from the NUG. Hani Mousa, from the 
Sadrist bloc states that “the main reason for our minister’s withdrawal was Maliki’s way of 
operating the NUG because he controlled everything and cancelled the role of the Council of 
Ministers and the Council of Representatives.”494 On the other hand, Maliki pointed out that 
“sectarian identities and self-interest dominated national identities and public interests at the 
time when I attacked Sadr’s Militia (the Mahdi Army) in Basra under the name of Sawlat al-
fursan (which means the charge of the knight).495 They told me, ‘if you do it, we will withdraw 
from the government’, and I did it. That was the only reason for six ministers’ withdrawal 
from my cabinet.”496 Maliki’s claim seems to be at odds with the reality of that case, because 
the operation of Sawlat al-fursan happened on March 2008, but the withdrawal of the 
ministers had already taken place in April 2007. There must, then, have been another reason 
for the Sadrists to withdraw from the NUG. One plausible suggestion is that Sadr “tried to 
press Prime Minister Nouri Maliki to set a timetable for a US troop withdrawal and Maliki 
refused.”497 That could be the main reason that Sadrist ministers withdrew from Maliki’s 
cabinet.  
Moreover, in his statement Moqtada al-Sadr stated that “the six ministries shall be handed 
over to the government itself, in the hope that this government will give these responsibilities 
to independent bodies who wish to serve the interests of the people and the country.”498 
Nevertheless, as Hani emphasised, “Maliki replaced those ministries by people in his party, 
who had loyalty for himself.”499 That step by Maliki complicated the political process, because 
Maliki had become strong enough to control the cabinet by vast majority. Thus, Maliki 
received more benefits from the Sadrist withdrawal than disadvantages. On the other hand, 
the whole debacle negatively affected the power-sharing arrangement.  
A further withdrawal from Maliki’s cabinet was the Sunnis’ group, which withdrew under the 
name of Jabhat Al-Tawafuq. In fact, their participation in the political process had been 
unprecedented, because they after 2003, their only participation in politics was in Maliki’s 
cabinet. They had 6 cabinet ministers and 44 seats in the CoR.  They made some demands, 
such as “balancing the distribution of posts, real participation in the decision-making process, 
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and the release of innocent people.”500 Obviously, this situation affected Maliki’s cabinet 
because the government was based on coalition among all groups, and his government 
agenda was decided by delegations from all communities. Maliki’s government was now 
threated on a daily basis by those who had supported him in becoming the Prime Minister. In 
his interview, Maliki asserted that the reason for Jabhat Al-Tawafuq’s withdrawal was the 
same as the Sadrists.  As he claimed, “one of the ministers had a hand in a terror attack. I 
demanded that he should go to the Court, because it was my duty as Prime Minister, but they 
withdrew their ministers and boycotted the political process.”501 Despite the fact that the 
National Unity Government aimed to rule Iraq with input from all communities, the 
government continued its functions without the Sunni groups and without one of the biggest 
political parties within the Shiite group. This meant that the NUG was under threat of collapse 
because of those withdrawing, making Iraq’s situation more unstable and unsustainable.   
There were some attempts by the Kurdish and Shi’ah leaders to bring back the Sunni leaders, 
but they could not achieve this until the following year [2008].502 Consequently, Jabhat Al-
Tawafuq’s leader returned their ministers to the cabinet after negotiation with Maliki. Ahmed 
A. al-Masari, one of the Sunnis’ leaders, said, “the process of withdrawal from the government 
did not work and they had to return, because a boycott was not part of the solution.”503 Thus, 
the Sunni group did not have any real choice, and was forced to the understanding that the 
only way to guarantee their rights was to participate in the political process.  
Another crucial actor was the US-led coalition, which helped Maliki to conduct his duty in 
order to achieve the goal of a power-sharing arrangement. Khalilzad pointed out that he 
“developed a good working relationship with Maliki, urging him to see the Sunni Arab militias 
as a twin problem to be attacked simultaneously.”504 The US encouraged Maliki to make 
peace and bring down sectarian violence because the US-led coalition thought it was 
problematic “that political progress had not brought down the level of violence.”505 Maliki 
emphasised that the “US’s role during the first cabinet was very helpful, collaborating with 
him to conduct his functions, especially attacking extremist groups.”506 While Maliki received 
the US’s support to drive out the Iraqi extremist militias in Baghdad and other provinces, in 
some situations the US-led coalition was against him. This was especially clear when he tried 
to stir up trouble against the Kurds. When he wanted to force the Kurds to place Iraqi forces 
in the Kurdish city of Khanaqin, the US-led coalition did not allow him to approach Kurdish people, 
and prevented his activities. Dr. Shaways pointed out that “when Maliki wanted to bring Iraqi 
troops to Khanaqin, we were against that activity, but he continued with his plan, whereas 
the US stopped him.”507 Thus, the US was active in preventing Maliki from expanding his 
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power, ensuring that he avoided the kinds of activities that would lead to attacking other 
communities. In this way, the US-led coalition was able to create a kind of balance among 
communities, acting as a check on Maliki and his ambition to dominate.  
A question that remains to be answered is: why did the government not fall when such a large 
number of ministers withdrew?  In fact, there were many reasons why this did not lead to the 
collapse of Maliki’s government. First, the Kurds did not withdraw their ministers, and 
continued to participate in the cabinet, despite not always agreeing with Maliki’s activities. 
The second reason relates to the nature of Sadrist bloc. When they withdrew, they did not 
make any demands for Maliki to leave his position, or for the cabinet to be disbanded or 
modified. They criticised Maliki’s performance, and demanded a set deadline for the 
withdrawal of the US’s troops, but they did not call for the destruction of the cabinet.  The 
third reason relates to the Sunnis. Even when Jabhat Al-Tawafuq withdrew, there could be no 
mass withdrawal of all Sunni Arabs in the cabinet, because Ayad Alawi’s list, which included 
Sunnis, neither withdrew its ministers nor demanded the collapse of the cabinet.508 The final 
reason that the government did not fall relates to the provisions in place for a vote of no 
confidence in Maliki, which was a complex process. According to Article 61 Section Eight B 1 
of the Constitution, “the President of the Republic may submit a request to the Council of 
Representatives to withdraw confidence in the Prime Minister.”509 At the time, this article 
could not be put into practice because there was another article stating that the provisions 
of the constitution could only be implemented after the transitional period, which would end 
in the second election process to be held under the permanent constitution.  The first section 
of Article 138 states that “the provisions related to the President of the Republic shall be 
reactivated one successive term after this constitution comes into force.”510  
Another way of withdrawing confidence can come from parliament. The same section B2 
states, “the Council of Representatives may withdraw confidence in the Prime Minister based 
on the request of one-fifth of its members.”511 Although the Sadrist groups and Jabhat al-
Tawafuq withdrew their Ministers, they did not request a formal withdrawal of confidence in 
Maliki through the CoR. Neither group could muster the necessary 56 MPs, since the Sadrists 
had 30, and Al-Tawafuq had 44 members. Nor were they willing to collaborate. Even if they 
had the one-fifth required for making the request, it would have been very difficult to get an 
absolute majority of votes to accept the request. The permanent constitution explicitly states: 
“the Council of Representatives may decide to withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister 
by an absolute majority of the number of its members.”512 The stipulations of the permanent 
constitution meant that it was not easy to withdraw confidence from Maliki at that time, so 
he continued with his agenda to grab as much power and as many posts as possible.  
As I have shown, grand coalition partially implemented. The NUG ended up being dominated 
by one political party within the Shiite group, Maliki’s party. A far cry from implementing the 
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anticipated power-sharing arrangement, Maliki’s behaviour looked like one-man rule. The 
idiosyncratic way in which Maliki operated the NUG and dealt with each community meant 
that grand coalition and proportionality were unable to be effective as conflict resolution 
tools.  
6.4 Mutual veto 
As we have noted, in the permanent constitution of 2005, mutual veto was present in some 
articles in different ways. First, the Presidency Council had the right to use the veto. This is 
found in Article 138 Section 4, which states: “the Presidency Council shall issue its decisions 
unanimously.”513 This meant that each member of the Presidency Council had the right to 
veto any decision or law. The super majority veto exists in a number of articles, such as Article 
142 Section 4: “the referendum on the amended Articles shall be successful if approved by 
the majority of the voters, and if not rejected by two-thirds of the voters in three or more 
governorates.”514 This means that two-thirds of the voters in three provinces had the power 
to reject amendments accepted by all other voters. On the other hand, many issues require 
two-thirds of votes in the CoR, but none of the communities had this number of seats in the 
parliament or even in the government. This meant that if any single community objected to 
the process for deciding about some particular subject, it could not succeed, and the proposal 
could not pass. In this section I will investigate how mutual veto was actually practised as part 
of a tool for conflict resolution during that period.   
6.4.1 Presidency veto (formal veto) 
The first important veto was the Presidency veto. It could be used by the President and the 
two Vice Presidents. The Presidency Council consisted of three members from the three key 
communities, Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd. Constitutionally, this veto related to a specific term, the 
transitional period from 2006 to 2010.515 During that period, all members of the Presidency 
Council used it many times. It was generally believed that the process helped each community 
to protect its rights and receive more benefits. Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, a former Speaker 
of Parliament, worked out that “this veto had been used many times by all Presidency Council 
members. Formally, they had the right to use the veto, and they did it. There were many laws 
returned to the Council of Representatives by Tariq al-Hashemi and Adil Abdul Mahdi 
becauseeach used vetoes in order to obtain his community’s right.”516 The veto was a very 
good opportunity to protect minority rights in a parliament where it was hard to prevent 
majority domination. For precisely that reason, President Talabani had used the veto. For 
example, the Council of Representatives passed an electoral law for the provinces on 22 
August 2008, which concerned minority groups’ seats in provincial councils. It gave just six 
seats to minorities, all of which had to be divided between Christians, Yezidis, and other 
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religious groups.517 At that time, Talabani pointed out, “the Presidency Council will never pass 
this law.”518 Moreover, he “confirmed his full support to ensure that the Christians’ and other 
minorities’ rights remained fully intact.”519 Thus, President Talabani rejected that law and 
demanded that parliament approve an amendment to guarantee that the CoR would be 
compatible with minorities’ demands. In cases like this, the veto clearly helped people to 
protect their rights.  
Another important example of the veto’s use was Tariq al-Hashemi’s veto on 18 November 
2009.520 As Vice President and representative of the Sunni Arabs, he had argued against an 
electoral law amendment that related to the Sunni people’s representation in the following 
election process. He “revoked Article 1 of the law, and called for the representation in 
Parliament of displaced people to increase to 15%.”521 The main reason for his veto was 
because most Sunni Arabs had fled after 2003 and lived outside Iraq, affecting the results of 
the 2010 election. Obviously, he wanted to protect the Sunnis’ right in the upcoming election, 
and guarantee their votes in the Council of Representatives.522 That was the real reason that 
he pushed for a veto on Article 1. As he pointed out, “it did not give a voice to the four million 
Iraqis, mostly Sunni Arabs, who left the country after 2003.”523 On the other hand, the Shiite 
group, particularly Prime Minister Maliki, did not welcome that veto. As Maliki said “the 
rejections represent a dangerous threat to the political process and democracy, because it is 
not based on constitutional law and goes against the nation's interests.”524 Nevertheless, 
Hashimi rejected the electoral law, and his reasons for rejection were considered by the CoR. 
Following this, the Presidency Council accepted the amendment, and changed the draft of the 
law. That kind of veto could lead to a delay in the election process of more than three months. 
Despite this, during the period 2006-2010 the formal veto worked well. Each community used 
it to protect its rights, and it was particularly well regarded by minority groups, who used it 
to protect their benefits. The main reason for the success of this kind of veto was that it was 
reflected formally in the permanent constitution and could be easily used by any member of 
the Presidency Council.  
6.4.2 Super majority veto 
The second type of veto is a super majority requirement (two-thirds). There are two types of 
two-thirds majority. The first one, for some legislations, requires two-thirds of CoR seats, and 
the second one relates to two-thirds of voters in three or more provinces. There are 12 areas 
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where the super majority requirement is applied. 11 of them relate to the CoR, and just one 
relates to two-thirds of voters in governorates.525 During this period, the second type of super 
majority veto was never practised, because the permanent constitution had not been 
amended. The first type of super majority veto, which regulated the CoR’s passing of laws or 
their election of the Presidency Council partially worked. At the beginning, when the 
Presidency Council had been elected by the CoR, it received more than two-thirds of the vote 
(198 votes) from 256 members of CoR.526 Although there were around 58 members who did 
not vote or rejected the process, this did not affect the process, because the presidency 
Council received more than two-thirds overall.  
Forming the FC was an example of the two-thirds majority veto working in practice. According 
to the constitution, the FC is the second part of the Legislative Power, designed to operate 
alongside the CoR.527 According to Article 65, the FC should “include representatives from the 
regions and the governorates that are not organized in a region. A law, enacted by a two-
thirds majority of the members of the Council of Representatives.” 528  Forming the FC 
required consensus among all communities, because if one of the communities did not agree 
with it, it could not be established. Forming the FC was very difficult because none of the 
groups, in particular the Kurds, would make any concessions.  
Arif Tayfor, a Kurdish leader and former Deputy Speaker of the CoR, pointed out that “the Bill 
for the Federation Council was hardly discussed among MPs and nearly passed, but it was 
stopped because we demanded that the Kurds should have the veto in the FC, but others did 
not agree. So we declined to accept that law.”529 The reason that the Kurds asked for the veto 
relates to the proposed structure of the Federation Council and the voting process. The FC 
was required to include representatives from all the regions and governorates, and the Kurds 
had only 3 or 4 provinces out of a total of 18. In that case, the Kurds had no guarantees that 
their rights would be protected when the FC was conducting its functions. As Tayfor argued, 
“when the FC wants to issue a law or take a decision by a majority of its members, there is no 
guarantee for the Kurds’ interests [to be represented].”530 Therefore, the Kurds rejected the 
establishment of the FC. Other communities, especially the Shiites, would not engage because 
they knew that it was impossible to form the FC without participation from the Kurds. 
According to the above discussion, it is clear that a super majority veto worked for a time, and 
                                                     
525 For more information, you can see all cases which need a two-thirds majority within the Iraqi Permanent 
Constitution through articles, “52 First, (the authenticity of membership in the CoR), 61 Fourth, (Regulating the 
ratification process of international treaties and agreements by a law), 61 Ninth A, (Declaration of war and the 
state of emergency), 65, (establishing the Federation Council.) 70 First, (electing a President), 92 Second, (making 
the Federal Supreme Court), 126 Second and Third, (amendment of constitutional articles and the approval of 
the amendments). 136 Second, (dissolve of the Property Claims Commission), 137, (Application of the articles 
related to the Federation Council). 138 Second A and D, (electing the President and two Vice Presidents by one 
list and replacement of a vacant seat in the Presidency Council), and 142 Section 4, (the referendum on the 
amendment articles shall be successful if not rejected by two-thirds of the voters in three or more provinces).”  
526 “Electing the Presidency Council,” Al Sabaah, Arabic Newspaper, April 23, 2006, 816 editions. 
527 Iraq, “Permanent Constitution.” Article 47. 
528 Ibid. 
529 Interview with Arif Tayfor the former deputy speaker, September 12, 2014. 
530 Ibid. 
Chapter 6 Consociationalism in Iraq from 2006 to 2010  
 
108 
 
helped Iraq to avoid the tyranny of a majority. This was especially apparent in the case of 
establishing the FC. Minority groups could use the power of the veto to stop processes which 
would harm their rights.  
During that period, mutual veto was used by all groups in different situations, usually with the 
aim of protecting minority interests. Obviously, the presidency veto was effective, as its use 
by President Talabani, Vice-President Adil Abdul Mahdi and Tariq Ai-Hashemi demonstrates. 
That kind of veto was formally enshrined in the permanent constitution, which allowed it to 
be practised during the transitional period. Furthermore, the super majority veto proved 
effective, as in the case of the establishment of the FC, which had no support from the Kurds. 
Thus, during that period, the option of using the vetoes made it difficult to neglect any group.  
6.5 Creating a New Region  
Creating a new region is a fundamental point of segmental autonomy. In the case of Iraq, it is 
explicitly reflected in the permanent constitution through a number of articles. Article 118 
contains Regional Law number 13. Instituted in 2008, it explains the procedure for forming 
new regions.531 It was a positive step towards the actual practice of creating new regions in 
the federation system. Although provisions for creating a new federal region by three 
governorates or just one governorate explicitly exist in the permanent constitution,532  in 
reality it remains a controversial issue. 
The situation was complicated when Abdul Al-Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Islamic 
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), demanded the establishment of a southern Shiite region in 
Iraq. Al-Hakim’s proposal was the first attempt by the Iraqi people, especially by the Shiites, 
to practise that particular consociational element. He pointed out that “to keep the political 
balance of the country, Iraq should be ruled under a federal system alongside the central 
government… we think it is necessary to form one entire region in the south.”533 Al-Hakim 
led that process in an attempt to create another federation state in Iraq for the Shiites. 
Although he relentlessly pursued this aim, he did not receive approval from other Shiite 
groups. As Humam Hamoudi, the leader of the ISCI, summarised, “none of the Shiite groups 
supported our proposal for creating a new region. All of them rejected it. Even Grand 
Ayatollah Sistani did not accept it. When we asked Sistani, ‘what do you think about making 
a southern region?’, he put forward some impossible conditions, which we took to mean that 
he did not agree with that project.”534 Moreover, even Maliki, as Prime Minister, refused that 
approach, pointing out that it was simply the proposal of Al-Hakim.535 
Another group against creating a new region was Sadr’s group within the Shiite Arabs. Hani 
Mousa, leader of the Sadrist bloc, said, “we supported the permanent constitution – and it 
includes federalism – but this was not a good circumstance for implementing it.”536 The 
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Daawa party and the Sadrists with Sistani were in favour of unifying Iraq, and so did not agree 
with any development that could lead to decentralisation.537 Thus, the Shiites did not support 
the creation of a new region for themselves in the south of Iraq, despite supporting both the 
permanent constitution and Law Number 13, both of which allowed for the creation a new 
region. The situation was a paradox, because the Shiites accepted the proposal theoretically, 
but refused it in practice. Although they had supported federalism during the drafting of the 
permanent constitution, they were now against practising what they had supported before.   
That was compatible with the Sunnis’ position about federalism. They had consistently 
refused to support federalism and the creation of a new region, even if it was for their own 
people. As discussed in the previous chapter, during the negotiations for making the 
permanent constitution the Sunnis’ delegation strongly refused any approach that 
incorporated federalism. Maliki pointed out that the Sunnis had the same position as he had 
regarding the creation of a new region, and that they supported unity for Iraq.538 As Saleem 
al-Jubouri pointed out, “the Sunnis thoughts were based on the assumption that their rights 
would be protected through the central state, not under federalism.”539 Another reason for 
protesting the creation of a new region was highlighted by Mohsen, a senior Sunni leader. He 
said, “we did not agree with the Sunni region and the Shiite region, because the issue was 
that they would divide Iraq on the basis of nationalism.”540 Thus, the Sunnis’ position was 
clear. They did not want a new region, thinking that it would lead to a divided Iraq, which was 
an unacceptable outcome for them.   
The question is: why did the Shiite Arabs change their position very soon after they got power 
through the political institutions? Perhaps one of the reasons that the Shiite group changed 
its mind about practising federalism came from outside Iraq. As Shiite MP, Alia Nossaif, 
confirmed, “at the beginning of making the constitution the idea arose of creating a region 
for Shiites in the south, involving Shiite provinces, but after they came to power, their 
direction shifted towards governing the whole of Iraq, and our neighbours had an impact on 
that process.”541 This is backed up by the fact that when Maliki became the Prime Minister in 
May 2006 “he was the main defendant of the central authority and an opponent of the 
“excessive” decentralization that “leads to division.” 542  Thus, the Iraqi situation changed 
completely when the Shiite group saw that their position was more powerful than that of the 
other groups. Realising this, they changed their strategy from governing a region to governing 
the whole of Iraq. Another reason was that the majority of Shiite and Sunni communities 
refused to support the creation of a new region, so al-Hakim’s proposal received support only 
from the Kurds, which was not enough to achieve its goal.543 This meant that there was no 
real chance to create another region. Iraq was not ready.    
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As we have seen from the above discussion, it was impossible to create a new region as an 
autonomous political entity because of constant opposition from multiple key communities. 
Although one of the Shiite groups tried to establish a new region for Shiites in the south of 
Iraq, the proposal was strongly rejected by some Shiite political parties and Sunni Arabs. Thus, 
while provision for the creation of a new region could be found in the permanent constitution, 
which had even produced a particular law relevant to such cases in 2008, there were many 
people strongly opposed to implementing it. Thus, during the first term of Maliki’s 
government, federalism was marginalised. It is clear that the creation of a new region as a 
tool for reducing ethno-religious conflict did not work during 2005 to 2006 because it was 
thought that establishing a new federal region would lead to an increase in conflict violence.  
6.6 Conclusion 
I have demonstrated how consociational elements were implemented from 2006 to 2010. It 
is clear that the implementation of all elements was not at the same level. As the above 
discussion shows, Proportional Representation was implemented in the CoR and the cabinet. 
Each community received its ratio in the parliament, based on the electoral law. In addition, 
high-level positions were distributed based on both the election result and consideration of 
each community’s weight in the country.  
The second consociational principle was grand coalition, which was implemented through an 
informal agreement among all communities to form a broad-based government under the 
name of the National Unity Government. In reality, however, the NUG’s performance 
indicated that it was totally opposed to the values of grand coalition government, tending 
instead towards one-man rule.  
The third principle of consociationalism was mutual veto, which was clearly practised by each 
community’s representative in the Presidency Council. Each community used the veto to 
protect its rights during that period. It was a formal requirement that prevented any 
community from being outvoted. 
The final element of consociational democracy that we examined was the creation of a new 
politically autonomous region. However, this was not implemented because the majority of 
Shiite groups and all Sunnis were against it. There were no formal stipulations in the 
constitution that pushed for the creation of a new region. Rather, it was an opportunistic 
move.  
Thus, in areas where there were formal requirements, such as the election system, the 
outcome of which was important for PR reasons, consociational elements were largely 
implemented. In areas where more discussion was necessary because formal requirements 
were lacking, consociational elements were only partially implemented.  The NUG is a good 
example of this. Overall, we find better implementation of consociationalism where elements 
of it were formally required. (Table 13 clarifies the implementation of each elements). 
Consequently, consociational elements partially implemented during the period. 
Because of these inconsistencies, peace and stability were not produced during that time, and 
conflict violence remained strong among ethno-religious groups, especially the Shiites and 
Sunnis. Theoretically and practically, consociationalism should produce peace and stability, 
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but in Iraq it was opposed. While some consociational implementation occurred, conflict 
violence was strong, and instability was a big challenge that the Iraqi people faced.  The issue 
was not with the theory of consociationalism, but the way that consociational elements were 
unable to operate very well in practice. 
During the transition period, the US was present in Iraq and had an impact on its political 
development. The US assisted in the selection of the Prime Minister and in controlling security 
issues. Compared to the US-led coalition’s role in the previous period, 2003-2005, there were 
some big differences. The US was now letting the Iraqi people operate power-sharing 
arrangements without high pressure for directing political development. This meant that the 
US-led coalition stepped back from intervening in political processes, agreeing to control 
security issues instead. The role of the US-led coalition decreased day by day, and the role of 
the Iraqi people in controlling the entire political process increased. This led to a lack of 
stability and balance among all communities involved in political development. 
Rating the implementation of consociational elements in Iraq from 2005-2010  
 Consociational 
elements  
Implemente
d  
Partially 
implemented 
Not 
implemen
ted   
Notes  
1 Grand coalition  
 
√ 
 
While there was a cabinet shaped as a grand 
coalition government, its performance 
showed that it was opposed the values of 
grand coalition government, tending instead 
towards one-man rule. 
2 Proportional 
Representation  
√ 
 
  Each community received its ratio in the 
parliament, based on the electoral law. In 
addition, high-level positions were distributed 
based on both the election result and 
consideration of each community’s share in 
the country. 
3 Mutual Veto  
 
√ 
 
The presidency veto was obviously 
implemented by each community’s 
representative in the Presidency Council. 
However, other kind of vetoes were not 
implemented. 
4 The Creation of 
a new 
autonomy 
region   
  
√ The creation of a new region was not 
implemented because the majority of Shiite 
groups and all Sunnis were against it. 
However, there was a Kurdish region that was 
mostly a federal region since 1991. 
Table 13: Rating the implementation of consociational elements (2005-2010)       
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7 Chapter 7 Consociationalism in Iraq from 2010 to 2014 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Under the permanent constitution of 2005, political parties held the second election in March 
2010. Obviously, all three main ethno religious groups participated. They attempted to get 
powerful posts in the cabinet to affect political process and to represent their communities. 
The Iraqi situation required collaboration among communities to operate power-sharing 
arrangements and to obtain conflict resolution. Throughout this chapter, I am going to discuss 
the implementation of consociational elements from 2010 to 2014 in the light of Lijphart’s 
theory. This aims to answer the question of what actually has happened in Iraq and why did 
it happen? There were four key events during that period which affected the political process, 
especially the power-sharing arrangements. Firstly, the withdrawal of the US-led coalition 
because, from 2003 to 2011, Iraq was under the US authority but after 2011 the US-led 
coalition left and Iraqi people gained full sovereignty. Secondly, instead of the US after 2011, 
Iran’s influence increased strongly, putting more pressure on the Sunnis and helping the Shiite 
community to dominate entirely. Thirdly, Maliki's increasingly authoritarian rule over the 
entire country lead to increasing levels of conflict among significant communities. Fourthly, 
the rise of so-called Islamic State (IS) in 2014 and their control over key Sunni provinces very 
quickly affected the development of the political process. That changed the political 
equations among political parties. Thus, the new cabinet after the 2010 elections, with the 
above key events, are the main points contributing to build this chapter. I will do this through 
an investigation of four elements, Proportional Representation, Grand Coalition, Mutual Veto 
and creating a new region.  
7.2 Proportional Representation  
Through this section, I will explore the ways in which Proportional Representation was 
reflected in the parliament and the government. Through each of them, I will discuss how 
proportionality was implemented practically and how that ratio reflected the ratio of each 
community. Clarification of the proportionality process in both institutions required details of 
each communities’ real participation in the political process, especially within decision-
making processes. In the following sections I will discuss the proportionality for each 
community through the CoR and the cabinet.  
7.2.1 Proportional Representation in the CoR 
How was Proportional Representation reflected in the Parliament? Proportional 
representation was designed to achieve a broad representation for each ethno-religious 
community. Proportionality in the parliament was based on electoral law and the people’s 
votes directly translated into seats in the CoR.  The March 2010 election was held under the 
electoral law which had been amended by the CoR in 2009. The main aim for doing that was 
to make the CoR more proportional. In order to achieve that purpose, the CoR amended the 
Elections Law No (16) of 2005. The question is what was changed? How did it affect 
proportional representation in the CoR?  
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According to the 2009 amendment, three main changes occurred; firstly, changing the 
election method from closed list to open list or to almost open list. This now meant voters 
could rank the candidates within one list instead of choosing candidates from different lists. 
That was placed in Section 1 of Article 3, “candidacy shall be through the open list method.”544 
It was one of the main changes in the electoral law, but in reality, it did not affect the 
proportionality in the election process because almost all lists formed along ethno religious 
lines. For instance, the Kurdish list only included Kurdish candidates so, in light of that change, 
the proportionality was not affected by the voter ranking of candidates as all of them were 
Kurds. Hence, the only thing voters could change was the order of the candidates within the 
specific list. The second important amendment related to component seats. Minorities now 
had a guaranteed quota of 8 seats. These eight seats were distributed among the minority 
groups, Christians 5, Yzidi 1, Sabean 1 and Shabak 1 seat.545 It was a crucial step toward 
increasing minority representation from 2 to 8 seats, which meant that this parliament was 
more proportional than under the previous electoral law. Decreasing the number of 
compensatory seats in the CoR was the third change that occurred. While the number of seats 
in parliament increased to 325, the number of National Compensatory Seats decreased from 
45 to 7.546 (See Table 15). This was an interesting change because in 2005, just 230 seats were 
distributed among the provinces and 45 remained as compensatory seats. However, in the 
2010 election, 318 seats were distributed among the provinces, 310 general seats, 8 
component seats, and 7 compensatory seats.547 This meant the majority of seats came in by 
direct votes based on the number of voters.  Just 15 seats came as a quota for minority and 
compensatory seats. These changes led to greater proportionality for communities in the CoR 
and it was the aim of the amendment. Compared with previous periods the amendment 
slightly affected the representation of the ethno religious communities. (See Table 16) 
In the light of that amendment, there was a strong competition between all communities and 
candidates to get as many seats as possible in the March 2010 election. All of them, Shiite, 
Sunni and Kurd, participated through a wide range of political parties and none of these ethno 
religious groups boycotted the election process. There were 297 political entities and 12 
political coalitions competing for 325 seats through 6225 candidates.548 However, only 10 lists 
received seats through coalitions or through political parties. (See Table 14). 
  
                                                     
544 IHEC, “Electoral Law Number (16) for the Year 2005 / an Amended Law 
Http://www.ihec.iq/ar/index.php/legal.html” (2009). 
545 Ibid. 
546 Ibid. 
547 IHEC, “Council of Representatives Elections: Seat Allocation. Regulation No. (21)” (2010). And see Table 15: 
Pre-distribution of Parliamentary Seats in December 2010. 
548 See IHEC, http://www.ihec.iq/ar/index.php/political.html 
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The Result of March 2010 Election549 
Political Entities   مئاوقلا
ةيباختنلاا 
Percentage    
of Votes  
Number 
of  
Votes  
     Seats Percentage    of 
seats 
Ethnicity 
1 Iraqi National 
Movement  
 ةيقارعلا 24.7 2,849,612 91 28 Mostly represented 
Sunni Arab  
2 State of Law 
Coalition  
 نوناقلا ةلود 24.2 2,792,083 89 27.4  Shiite Arab  
3 Iraqi National 
Alliance  
 فلاتئلاا
 ينطولا
 يقارعلا 
18.2 2,092,066 70 21.5 Shiite Arab  
4 Kurdistan Alliance  فلاحتلا
 يناتسدروكلا 
14.6 
 
1,681,714 43 13.2  Kurd 
5 Movement of 
Change  
 رييغتلا ةكرح 4.1 476,478 8 2.46 Kurd 
6 Iraqi Accord Front. 
Jabhat Al-
Tawafuq  
 قفاوتلا ةهبج
 يقارعلا 
2.6 298,226 
 
6 1.84 Sunni Arab 
7 Unity Alliance of 
Iraq 
 ةدحو فلاتئا
 قارعلا 
2.7 306,647 4 1.23  Sunni Arab 
8 Kurdistan Islamic 
Union 
 داحتلاا
 يملاسلاا
 يناتسدروكلا 
2.1 243,720 4 1.23 Kurd/Islamic Party.  
9 Kurdistan Islamic 
Group   
 ةعامجلا
 ةيملاسلاا
ةيناتسدروكلا 
1.3 152,530 2 0.61 Kurd/Islamic Party.   
10 Minorities    تايلقلاا 0.5 
 
61,153 8 2.46 
 
 Others   5.0 572,183  - - - 
 Total   100 % 
 
11,526,41
2 
325 99.93 %  
Table 14: The Result of March 2010 Election 
This table shows several important points. While various political entities and coalitions 
participated in the 2010 election, just nine of them got seats. According to Table 14, four main 
political coalitions got 81.3% of the votes and won 90.1 % of the seats. This meant that these 
four coalitions represented vast majority of population. The Iraqiya list won the election with 
the highest number of votes and seats, 24.7 % and 91 seats respectively. That was a result of 
the strong participation of the Sunni community and “one of the main features of this year's 
election is the return of Sunni self-confidence.”550 That list was headed by Shiite secular Ayad 
Alawi and involved the vast majority of key Sunni political parties, which meant it represented 
the Sunni community in Iraq.551 Following the Iraqiya, the State of Law coalition (SOL), headed 
by Maliki, came second and received 89 seats with 24.2 % of votes, just slightly under the 
Iraqiya list. Another Shiite list was Iraqi National Alliance, which received 70 seats and the 
final key list was Kurdistan Alliance with 43 seats. In the light of the above, those lists formed 
                                                     
549 See IHEC, http://www.ihec.iq/ar/index.php/result.html   
550 Cockburn, Patrick, “Maliki Beaten into Second Place in Iraq Poll 
Http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-East/maliki-Beaten-into-Second-Place-in-Iraq-Poll-
1928753.html [accessed: 20 February 2016],” Independent, March 27, 2010, sec. News. 
551 Iraqi National Movement consists of 20 political parties vast majority from Sunni people, for more info visit 
http://www.ihec.iq/ar/index.php/political.html and http://www.ihec.iq/ar/files/eatlafat2212.pdf   
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the cabinet and structured the administration of the parliament, because in total they had 
90.1 % of the seats.   
According to the above table, you can see a clear diversity of ethnic religious groups because 
if you combine some groups together it is obvious that Shiites won 159 seats, Sunnis won 
around 101 seats, and Kurds got 57 seats. In fact, those lists were divided among ethno-
religious groups and there were some Shiite with Sunni people such as Ayad Allawi and Alia 
Nassif Jassem with vast majority of Sunni parties and Hajim al-Hassani, famous Sunni leader, 
with Maliki’s list. This meant that two of the lists were mixed, but it did not affect the ratio of 
the representation of any community because people voted through the open list, and they 
took seats based on the ethno-religious background lines and it did not make a big difference 
because there were a small number within each list. In this context, proportionality in the 
parliament came through the direct votes. Obviously, that method helped each community 
to know their proportion of representatives in the CoR. Moreover, parliament broadly 
involved all single ethnic religious minorities such as Yazidi, Christian, Assyrian, Sabean and 
Shabak through a fixed quota.  
Consequently, there was diversity in the CoR based on the provisions of the permanent 
constitution and electoral law, which translate the actual votes to seats in the parliament. 
Each community received its proportion and most of them received more seats than their 
ratio. Only the Kurds received less than its proportion. (See Table 16.) The main point that 
helped that kind of proportionality was the seat distribution in advance between provinces, 
which was based on population. (See Table 15.) Hence, each community felt that it had been 
represented. 
 
Pre-distribution of Parliamentary Seats in December 2010 Elections and the Result for Key 
Political Entity in Each Governorate.552 
Name of Governorates  Pre-distribution 
of Seats  
  
Shiite  
Seats  
Sunni  
Seats  
Kurd  
Seats  
Note 
1 Sulaymaniya 17   17  
2 
Erbil  
15  
 
  14 1 seat for the 
Christians 
3 
Duhok   
11  
 
  10 1 seat for the 
Christians 
4 
Kirkuk 
13  
 
 6 6 1 seat for the 
Christians 
5 
Nineveh 
34  
 
1 22 8 1 seat for the 
Christians, 1 seat for 
the Yzidi and 1 seat 
for the Shabak  
6 Diyala 13 4 8 1  
7 Saladin 12  12   
8 Al Anbar  14  14   
9 
Baghdad  
70  
 
43 25  1 seat for the 
Christians and 1 seat 
for the Sabean 
10 Babel  16 13 3   
11 Basra  24 21 3   
12 Karbala 10 9 1   
                                                     
552 See IHEC, http://ihec.iq/en/index.php/results.html 
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13 Najaf 12 12    
14 Maysan 10 10    
15 Muthanna 7 7    
16 Al-Qadisiyah 11 9 2   
17 Dhi Qar 18 17 1   
18 Wasit 11 9 2   
 Compensatory seats 7 4 2 1  
Total   325 159 101 57 8 
Table 15: Pre-distribution of Parliamentary Seats in December 2010 
The seat distribution between provinces as shown in this table shows an interesting point 
about proportionality based on population.  According to the electoral law, 310 seats should 
be distributed among provinces, political entities compete for those seats within electoral 
districts because each province is one electoral district.553 If you look across Table 15, there 
was diversity among the three main communities. The Shia political parties knew they had 
the Shiite provinces’ seats, especially Najaf, Maysan, Muthanna and Karbala. On the other 
hand, the Sunnis controlled Saladin, Al Anbar and Nineveh. Kurdish provinces were controlled 
by Kurdish people. This meant there was a clear diversity in terms of pre-distribution seats 
among governorates. Four of the eighteen governorates are strongly mixed between ethno-
religious groups. For instance, the Sunnis and the Kurds each received 6 seats in Kirkuk, and 
Kurds got 8 seats in Nineveh but Sunnis got 22. Another example was between Shiites and 
Sunnis in Baghdad, where Shiites got 43 seats but Sunnis 25.  In Diyala Sunnis got 8 but Shiites 
got 4. This meant, while each group controlled a number of provinces there were four 
provinces strongly mixed between two of them at least. Hence, the electoral law had an 
impact on implementing proportionality in advance through Pre-distribution of seats. The fact 
that the list work in the province level not national level, there were separate list for each 
province. Certainly, for the provinces dominated by one ethno-religious groups, it was very 
clear that the vast majority of seats would go to that group because no party list for other 
groups.  
Percentage of Votes and Seats Between 2005 and 2010 Elections 
December 2005, CoR March 2010, CoR 
 Ethno religious 
groups 
Percentag
e of votes 
Percentag
e of seats 
Differenc
es  
Percentage 
of votes 
Percentage 
of seats 
Differenc
es  
+ 
- 
Notes  
1 Shiite  42.38 47.28 4.9 42.40 48.90 6.5 + -  
 2 Sunni  20,50 21.45 0.95 30.00 31.07  1.07 + - 
3 Kurd  22.96 21.09 1.87 22.10 17.50 4.6 + - 
4 Secular list  8.02 9.09 1.07 Joint the Sunnis list under the Iraqi 
National Movement 
+ - 
5 Minorities  0.57 0.72 0.15 0.50 2.46 1.96 + - 
6 Others  4.83 0000 - 5.00 0000 - + - 
         
Table 16: Percentage of Votes and Seats Between 2005 and 2010 Elections 
This table shows three interesting points; first, the 2005 elections showed better 
proportionality than the 2010 elections, because all ethno religious groups in 2005 were 
sharing between percentages of votes and seats, which were closer together than 2010. 
Second, in terms of minority seats, the minority seats increased from 0.72 in 2005 to 2.46 in 
2010. That is one of the main outcomes of amending the electoral law, which provided more 
                                                     
553 IHEC, Electoral Law number (16) for the year 2005 / an amended law 
http://www.ihec.iq/ar/index.php/legal.html. 
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seats for minority communities through a fixed quota. Three, in terms of the outcome, only 
the Kurds lost seats in 2010 when compared with 2005, but the Shiites and the Sunnis got 
more seats. That was why the Sunni community strongly supported that amendment, 
because it received more seats than before. Only the Kurds did not support that amendment 
because they knew it would affect their proportion in the parliament. This meant that the 
2010 election was less proportional in terms of Kurdish representation in the CoR.  
Another important point was the distribution of leadership posts in the CoR. According to 
Article 55, “the Council of Representatives shall elect in its first session its speaker, then [the] 
first deputy and second deputy, by an absolute majority of the total number of the Council 
members by direct secret ballot.” 554  According to Table 14and Table 16, none of the 
communities received an absolute majority, and it required a coalition between two or three 
communities. That situation encouraged all communities to come to an agreement in order 
to solve the issue. The Erbil agreement 555was the main agreement for distributing all posts 
among Shiite, Sunni and Kurd. In the light of that agreement, the Speaker and two deputy 
positions were divided among the communities, the Sunni received the Speaker position, 
Shiite and Kurd got the deputy positions. Thus, the distribution was not based on the seats in 
the CoR because the Sunnis were the second largest bloc, and the Shiites got the highest 
number of seats in general. The main aim was to obtain a power-sharing arrangement to help 
reduce conflict violence. Proportionality was reflected in more than the leadership, it was also 
reflected in the administration and committee chairs556 of Council of Representatives, which 
was based on the consensus between communities in the light of the seats of the CoR. (See 
Table 17)   
The Leadership of Parliament 2010-2014 
Name  Position Ethnicity Election Lists Political party 
Osama Abd Alzeez 
Nujayfe 
Speaker Sunni  Iraqi National 
Movement  
Iraqiya/ Iraqi National 
Gathering 
Qussay AL- Saheel First Deputy Shiite  Iraqi National 
Alliance 
 
INA/ Sadrist 
Arif Tayfor  Second Deputy Kurd Kurdish Alliance  KA/ KDP 
 
Table 17: The Leadership of Parliament 2010-2014 
7.2.2 Proportional Representation in the Executive  
The second area of PR was in the Executive. The main question is how was Proportionality 
reflected on the cabinet? The Presidency is part of the Executive and its posts distributed 
among Shiite, Sunni and Kurd. The Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, gained the presidency. He 
had three Vice-Presidents.  The Shiites gained two of these, and the other one was Sunni. The 
fact that the Shiites received two Vice-Presidents reflected the fact that the majority 
                                                     
554 Iraq, “Permanent Constitution.” 
555 This is an agreement signed by senior political leaders in Erbil, 7 November 2010. It consisted of nine 
aspects: Administration and Finance, Legislations/Laws, The Oversight Role, Security Reform Paper, Judicial 
Reform Paper, Balance in state institutions, Reform of the Executive Authority, National Accord (Consensus) 
and Accountability, Justice and national reconciliation.  
556 There were 26 committees in the parliament, committee chairs distributed among all groups 13 for Shiite, 7 
for Sunni, 4 for Kurd, 1 for Christian and 1 for Yzidi. For more info see 
http://www.parliament.iq/Commsites.aspx   
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population was Shiite and so should get more than others. This ratio in favour of the Shiites 
affected the balance between Presidency members, but the President had more power than 
the Vice-Presidents and they had no veto right.  Thus, PR was reflected in the Presidency 
Council and the Shiites received one more Vice-President than in the previous term. (See 
Table 18). 
The Presidency of the Republic 2010-2014 
Name Position Ethnicity Election Lists Political party Note 
Jalal Talabani President Kurd Kurdistan Alliance  PUK  
Tariq al-
Hashemi 
Vice- President Sunni Iraqi National 
Movement  
Renewal List 
(Tajdeed) 
 
Adil Abdul 
Mahdi 
Vice-President Shiite Iraqi National 
Alliance  
Islamic Supreme 
Council of Iraq (ISCI) 
He resigned in 11 
July 2011  
Khudier Al-
Khuzae  
Vice-President Shiite  State of Law 
Coalition 
Islamic Dawa Party – 
Iraq Organisation 
 
Table 18: The Presidency of the Republic 2010-2014 
However, it is the Council of Ministers that is the most powerful part in the Executive Power 
and the core of its political institutions. There was a strong competition among the political 
parties for these powerful positions, especially that of Prime Minister.  The post of Prime 
Minister was a controversial position which led to conflict between senior political leaders, 
especially between Maliki and Alawi. That situation affected the political process and delayed 
the formation of a government for more than nine months. After difficult negotiations among 
all communities, Maliki took the Prime Ministership according to the Erbil Agreement. I will 
be discussing this in the next section.  
Two important points are illustrated above. Firstly, Proportional Representation was explicitly 
reflected in the CoR because all communities received their seats according to the ratio as 
specified in the electoral law, which based on the permanent constitution. That led to 
diversity in the parliament. Moreover, proportionality was reflected in the structure of the 
committee chairs and the administration in the Parliament. However, the Kurdish community 
was under-represented.  Secondly, as well as a distribution of posts among communities, 
there was also a division along ethno religious lines and party lines within the cabinet. 
Proportionality was according to a points system based on the number of posts and the 
weighting of the posts. However, power-sharing was not achieved because one group, 
especially one political party, dominated the most powerful posts and side-lined other groups. 
This meant that the number of posts was broadly proportional, but when taking into account 
the weighting of the posts, it was not proportional. The question is why did these other 
communities approve the cabinet? They approved on the promise that it was going to become 
more proportional shortly, but it took two years of pressure on the prime minister to change 
just one of the posts, and he then appointed a Sunni leader as Defence Minister.  Maliki never 
appointed any others. Later on, I will discuss this in detail.    
7.3 Grand coalition government 
Forming coalition government is one of the main elements of the consociationalism, which 
aims to make power-sharing government between divided groups. In Iraq, political leaders 
thought grand coalition government could be the way to solve the conflict among ethno-
religious communities because it would consist of representatives from all communities. The 
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question is, what then happened in Iraq? How did the political leaders negotiate to make a 
grand coalition government? What was the outcome of that government? Throughout this 
section, I will discuss what happened and why it happened. I will start with the negotiation 
process, exploring the reality of the genuine national partnership government and end with 
the performance of Maliki’s cabinet.    
7.3.1 Negotiation for forming the cabinet 
Two main issues arose before starting negotiations to form the new cabinet. The first one was 
that senior political leaders had negative attitudes about the first term of Maliki’s government. 
The second was that Maliki’s coalition had failed to win the election as a largest bloc.  It was 
Alawi’s list that won the election, but Maliki asserted his authority to take the second term as 
Prime Minister. At the beginning of the negotiations both issues affected relations between 
political parties, especially Maliki’s and Allawi’s bloc. Allawi, as the winner of the elections, 
called for negotiation in order to form the new government.  He said, “we will shift now to 
discussions for forming the next government and the negotiations should start 
immediately.”557 He was against Iranian roles in Iraq and said, “Iran wants to impose its 
agenda on the Iraqi situation but that is totally unacceptable.”558 This give us a good indication 
that this is what Iran was trying to do, and Allawi was afraid about Iran’s role in Iraq because 
he knew “Iran invited all main political parties except Alawi’s list to Teheran to discuss how 
the political process should be.”559 Thus, Iran stated by strongly attempting to ignore Allawi 
and by the end succeeded in preventing him from becoming Prime Minister. That kind of the 
intervention from Iran led to increasing conflict between communities, especially between 
Shiites and the Sunnis.  
Obviously, Iran’s role in Iraq came through the Shiite political parties, which meant it had no 
direct intervention. Patrick Cockburn said, “the departure of the US troops and the success of 
the Sadrists in the election means that Iranian influence will be higher under the new 
government.”560 This did happen during the negotiation process, especially when “Tehran has 
been seen as trying to forge Shiite unity behind one Shiite prime ministerial candidate, 
whether or not that is Maliki.”561 For that purpose, “Iran hosted negotiations in Tehran on a 
preliminary agreement for a Shiite-Kurdish alliance to form the Iraqi government.”562 Dara 
Saeed, Kurdish former minster and member of the delegation for forming the government, 
pointed out “explicitly, Iran demanded that Maliki take the second term instead of Allawi 
because it thought if Allawi become Prime Minister, it means the return of the Ba'ath 
                                                     
557 Independent, “Allawi: Iraqis Need to Protect Their 
Countryhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/allawi-iraqis-need-to-protect-their-country-
1928989.html,” March 27, 2010, [accessed: 20 February 2016] sec. News. 
558 Azzaman Arabic Daily Newspaper, “Against Iran’s Intervention", Vol/12 Issue 3555. 
http://www.azzaman.com/qpdfarchive/2010/03/31-03/P1.pdf,” March 31, 2010. 
559 Azzaman Arabic Daily Newspaper, “Press Conference", Vol 12, Issue 3556. 
http://www.azzaman.com/qpdfarchive/2010/04/01-04/P1.pdf,” April 1, 2010. 
560 Cockburn, Patrick, “Links to Baathists Could End Allawi Hopes of Seizing Power" 
Http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-East/links-to-Barsquoathists-Could-End-Allawirsquos-
Hopes-of-Seizing-Power-1930673.html [accessed: 20 February 2016],” Independent, March 29, 2010. 
561 Katzman, Kenneth, “Iran-Iraq Relations (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, April 15, 
2010),” 2010. P.7  
562 Parker, Ned and Usama Redha, “Maliki Warns Nearby Nations.,” April 13, 2010. 
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Party.”563 Moreover, Saeed said “a number of Shiite parties did not accept Maliki as the Prime 
Minister for the second term but Iran asserted that he should be the Prime Minister, and so 
he became.” 564  Thus, Iran was driving the political process especially when the US-led 
coalition started to withdraw its troops from Iraq. Iran’s influence now replaced that of the 
US-led coalition. 
Calling for national unity government was the top priority of all political parties because the 
situation required it, and because there was little hope of forming a majority government. 
Although Allawi won the election, he did not propose a majority government, but rather 
demanded national unity government. This was declared after Allawi and Talabani’s meeting.  
In their press conference Talabani and Allawi noted that they “discussed [their] ideas about 
the current situation, and there is necessity for a genuine power sharing government.”565 
Moreover, Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, asserted “that 
there is a necessity to form the National Unity Government, including the four main blocs 
which received the vast majority of votes.”566 See Table 14. This meant that all communities 
believed that they should collaborate in order to form the incoming government.  It also 
meant that it was impossible for any group to form the new cabinet alone, even the groups 
who received the largest percentage of seats. According to the permanent constitution the 
largest bloc in the CoR shall take the responsibility for forming the government.567 Formally, 
the largest bloc was Allawi’s list, which represented the Sunnis, but it did not have the chance 
to take that responsibility because the Shiites – and especially Maliki – demanded continuing 
for the second term.   
In addition, the Shiites tried to make a coalition between the two main Shiite coalitions, SOL 
and INA, in order to make the largest bloc in the CoR and obtain the right to take responsibility 
for forming the cabinet. That attempt started early after the conclusive results of the March 
2010 elections. Regarding this, Khaled al-Asadi declared, “both coalitions, SOL and INA, made 
an agreement for forming the largest bloc in the parliament to obtain the nomination for the 
Prime Minister by the president elect.”568 They made that kind of coalition under the name 
of the National Alliance (NA), which included all Shiite political parties and coalitions. After 
that, the main point for them was to select who would be the Shiites’ candidate for forming 
the incoming government. That was the big issue, not just among Shiite political parties but 
for the whole process, particularly during the negotiations.  In addition, the external actors, 
especially the US and Iran, had points of view about who should take that position.   
                                                     
563 Interview with Dara Saeed former Minister in the KRG, March 3, 2016. 
564 Ibid. 
565 Azzaman Arabic Daily Newspaper, “Press Conference", Vol 12, Issue 3556. 
http://www.azzaman.com/qpdfarchive/2010/04/01-04/P1.pdf,” January 4, 2010. 
566 Al-Hindawi, Fawzi, “Supreme Council", Azzaman Arabic Daily Newspaper, Vol 12, Issue 3557. 
http://www.azzaman.com/qpdfarchive/2010/04/03-04/P1.pdf,” March 4, 2010. 
567 Iraq, “Permanent Constitution.” Article 76 Section 1 
568 Al-Hindawi, Fawzi, “The Initial Agreement between SOL and INA Lead to Dialogue with Kurdistan Alliance," 
Azzaman Arabic Daily Newspaper, Vol 12, Issue 3567. http://www.azzaman.com/qpdfarchive/2010/04/14-
04/P1.pdf,” April 14, 2010. 
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Internally, there were political entities that were against Maliki becoming Prime Minister for 
the second term. Firstly, the Sadrist bloc protested Maliki’s nomination for a second term, 
and demanded the SOL to suggest three candidates, with the NA being permitted to select 
one of them.569 The Sadrist group had a negative relationship with Maliki, because during his 
first term Maliki had attacked them and arrested many of their members. For that reason, the 
Sadrist group did not support him to be the Shiites’ nominee for the position of Prime Minister. 
The Sadrist group wanted to bargain with Maliki.  They offered to support his nomination for 
Prime Minister in exchange for the release of their prisoners. Ali Al-Adeeb570 pointed out that 
“the SOL discussed some of the demands from the Sadrist group in order to solve that issue 
among the NA and the Sadrists’ primary demand to release their prisoners.” 571  After 
negotiations, Maliki made an agreement to address their demands, and promised to release 
those who had not committed criminal offences. Later on, he did in fact follow through, but 
only on some of the promises. Thus, the Sadrist group changed their mind about Maliki and 
worked towards solving the issue between them, through buying and selling the positions.572   
Secondly, the Iraqiya bloc rejected Maliki’s bid to become the Prime Minister for a second 
term for two main reasons: 1) They knew that constitutionally the position should be held by 
a member of Iraqiya because it was the largest bloc and won the election, and 2) They said 
that their refusal of Maliki was not a personal issue, but in line with the notion of the peaceful 
rotation of power. For these reasons, Allawi called Maliki to give up the attempt to run for a 
second term because he thought that the rotation of power was necessary for developing a 
peaceful and stable political process.573 That conflict between Allawi and Maliki remained up 
to the day that Maliki formally became the nominee for forming the cabinet.    
Obviously, Maliki was not the only candidate to run for that position. Adil Abdul-Mahdi was 
another Shiite candidate in the running to be the Prime Minister, but he was a leader from 
the ISCI. Hamid Moalla, the Shiite leader, said, “the NA tried to solve the candidate issue 
through choosing Abdul-Mahdi as the only candidate by agreement among the Shiites, 
including the Sadrist group, and it could have been a positive solution.”574 This meant that 
instead of Maliki, Abdul-Mahdi had a strong chance to become the Shiites’ candidate. That 
attempt was welcomed by other political entities, particularly Allawi’s list.  Therefore, Iraqiya 
decided to support Abdul-Mahdi to be the Prime Minister. That decision arose from a general 
meeting of the Iraqiya bloc, which resulted in making the decision to form an alliance with 
                                                     
569 Sami, Zena, “SOL We Do Not Have Candidate except Maliki," Azzaman Arabic Daily Newspaper, Vol 13, Issue 
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the ISCI and support its candidate for Prime Minister.575 As Alia N G, a member of Iraqiya, said, 
that decision was the outcome of Iraqiya’s acceptance of the reality that it would have 
difficulty obtaining the position of Prime Minister, because day by day the supporters of 
Maliki increased. 576  While Abdul-Mahdi gained support from the Iraqiya list, he did not 
receive broad support to obtain the position of Prime Minister. While Maliki received 89 seats 
in the CoR, Abdul-Mahdi’s list received 30 seats. Moreover, external actors, particularly Iran, 
preferred Maliki to Abdul-Mahdi.       
Consequently, Maliki was chosen on 1 October 2010 by the NA for a second term, but the 
leaders of Fadila and the ISCI did not agree with this step. That was good progress in the 
situation because Maliki became the only formal Shiite candidate supported by the vast 
majority, and was welcomed by others, for example the Kurds. Nechervan Barzani, the Prime 
Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, said, “the KDP welcomed that step and tried 
with its allies [SOL] to persuade other political groups in a positive way in order to form the 
National Unity Government.”577 The main reason that Barzani welcomed Maliki’s candidacy 
was that his party had previously (on 8 August 2010) made an agreement with Maliki to 
support him for the next term. According to that agreement, Talabani would be the President, 
and Maliki the Prime Minister. The speaker of CoR would be a member of Iraqiya. The 
agreement also stipulated the creation of a National Council of High Policies for Allawi.578 This 
meant that before Maliki’s nomination by the NA in October 2010, they had already made 
decisions about all the main posts, distributing them among senior political leaders. This 
indicates that Maliki had a strong relationship with the Kurdish leader, and relied on this 
advantage to obtain his second term.  
Another important point to consider is the impact of the external actors during that time. In 
fact, there was external influence regarding the choice of Prime Minister and how the cabinet 
would be formed. As mentioned earlier in this section, Iran was one of the key players to 
determine who would be the Prime Minister. At the beginning, Iran hosted the Shiites and 
the Kurds in Tehran to discuss solving the problem of the nominations for Prime Minister. Iran 
was particularly interested in obtaining a second term for Maliki. However, Hassan Kazemi 
Qumi, the ambassador of Iran to Iraq, denied it was attempt to influence government 
formation, stating that it was, “not realistic because the Iraqi people have an ability to form 
their government without any support from anyone, and Iran has a good relationship with all 
blocs and political entities. That issue is an internal issue. We do not have any intention to 
intervene in forming the incoming government.” 579  In reality, Iran indirectly intervened 
through the Shiites’ political entities. This was emphasized by Allawi many times, and he 
                                                     
575 Esra and Marwan, “Iraqiya Permit Their Leaders to Make an Alliance with ISCI." Azzaman Arabic Daily 
Newspaper, Vol 13, Issue 3725. http://www.azzaman.com/qpdfarchive/2010/10/19-10/P1.pdf,” October 19, 
2010. 
576 Interview with: Alia Nossaif. 
577 Basel al- Kateeb, “Nechervan Barzani Welcomed Maliki’s Candidate." 
http://www.azzaman.com/qpdfarchive/2010/10/05-10/P1.pdf,” Azzaman Arabic Daily Newspaper, Vol 13, 
Issue 3713, October 5, 2010. 
578 Document, “Erbil Agreement between Maliki and Barzani 8/8/2010,” August 8, 2010. 
579 Azzaman Arabic Daily Newspaper, “Press Conference", Vol 12, Issue 3556. 
http://www.azzaman.com/qpdfarchive/2010/04/01-04/P1.pdf.” 
Chapter 7 Consociationalism in Iraq from 2010 to 2014  
 
123 
 
pointed out that Iran hosted all blocs except Iraqiya, questioning what their motivation was 
for this. 580  Moreover, Hanan Fatlawi said, “there was an Iranian role for forming each 
government through negotiation with political entities.”581 In addition, the Iranian delegation 
met with key political parties in Iraq, especially those of the Shiites and Kurds, to obtain 
support for Maliki, and made concessions among them.582 Thus, Iran was a key player during 
the negotiation for selecting the Prime Minister, and ensuring that Allawi missed out on this 
position. Why did Iran strongly support Maliki for a second term? First, Iran wanted the Shiites 
to take that position because they had the majority in Iraq and their loyalty towards the 
Iranian people would be stronger. Second, Maliki was stronger than the other Shiite leaders, 
especially Abdul-Mahdi, because Maliki had received 89 seats in the March 2010 elections. 
Finally, they regarded Maliki as being more comfortable with dealing with Iranian interests in 
Iraq than the other candidates.    
Another key external player was the US-led coalition. Its agenda was to bring all political 
parties together through Joe Biden’s proposal. His plan “would alter the structure of Iraq’s 
government by bringing additional restraints to the authority of Iraq’s Prime Minister and 
establishing a new committee with authority to approve military appointments, review the 
budget and shape security policy.”583 Moreover, the US-led coalition was “sympathetic to a 
compromise plan in which Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki might retain his post with 
somewhat more limited powers while a new council with binding authority would be 
established under Ayad Allawi.”584 This meant that the US-led coalition’s plan was to drive the 
negotiation towards distributing posts among senior political leaders and to create a new 
institution for Allawi to lead, allowing him some influence in the political process.585 Biden’s 
plan involved creating a new post for Allawi and shifting some powers to it from the Prime 
Minister. That suggestion meant that Maliki would remain in his post for the second term, 
and would prevent Allawi from becoming the Prime Minister.  
As Biden argued, “the Iraqi people deserve a government that reflects the results of those 
elections, that includes all the major blocs representing Iraq’s various communities and that 
does not exclude or marginalize anyone.”586 To achieve that approach, Biden visited Iraq 
several times and “had telephone contacts with Maliki, Allawi and Barzani to get support from 
them for forming the government.”587 That plan did not come from Biden himself, but from 
Obama’s administration, which drew up the proposal and put it forward. Biden pointed out 
that “President Obama and I — and an outstanding team of American officials in Washington 
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581 Interview with Hanan Al Fatlawi Shiite MP, interview. 
582 Interview with Dara Saeed former Minister in the KRG. 
583 Gordon, Michael and Anthony Shadid, “U.S. Urges Iraqis to Try New Plan to Share Power."  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/10/world/middleeast/10policy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0,” The Network 
Times, September 9, 2010. 
584 Gordon, Michael, “Biden in Iraq for Talks and Handover,” August 31, 2010. 
585 Gordon, Michael and Anthony Shadid, “U.S. Urges Iraqis to Try New Plan to Share Power."  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/10/world/middleeast/10policy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.” 
586 Biden, Joseph, “What We Must Do for Iraq Now,” N.Y. TIMES, November 20, 2010. 
587 Al-Hindawi, Fawzi, “Vice President of the United States Calls Maliki, Allawi and Barzani," Azzaman Arabic 
Daily Newspaper, Vol 13, Issue 3665. http://www.azzaman.com/qpdfarchive/2010/08/07-08/P1.pdf,” August 
7, 2010. 
Chapter 7 Consociationalism in Iraq from 2010 to 2014  
 
124 
 
and Baghdad — played an active role in supporting this effort.”588 This meant they were 
strongly invested in solving that issue, and that it was the position of Obama’s administration 
that Maliki should remain for a second term. This point-of-view was also shared by Iran.  
However, the US wanted to bring Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds into a coalition government, while 
Iran wanted to ignore the Sunnis, even going so far as to exclude them during discussions for 
forming the new cabinet.  
From that point, Allawi did not support Biden’s plan because it revealed that indirectly Biden 
supported Maliki. Mahmod Othman said, “Allawi refused America’s proposal, which was 
based on the approach of Maliki remaining as the Prime Minister, and Allawi running the 
National Council of High Policies.”589 The main reason was that Allawi wanted to be the Prime 
Minister. As he pointed out “if there were powers, and there was clarity, and there was an 
explanation why we should not be able to form a government, then why not, to serve the 
country?”590 It was very clear that Allawi understood that it was impossible for him to be the 
Prime Minister, especially when Biden suggested that he should run the new committee.591 
But there was also strong opposition from within Maliki’s bloc, because they did not agree on 
shifting powers from Maliki to Allawi. Ali Allak, the senior Shiite leader in SOL, “refused Biden’s 
plan, which was based on shifting some powers from the Prime Minister to the new 
committee, which would probably be run by Allawi.”592 Moreover, Wael Abdul Latif from the 
NA said, “the US’s call for shifting powers from the Prime Minister is opposed to the 
permanent constitution.”593 Thus, the US’s proposal did not receive support from both sides 
for different reasons. First, Allawi did not accept the new committee because it would not 
have much power and because it had not been established at that time. Second, Maliki and 
his group did not agree with shifting power from the Prime Minister to the new committee 
headed by Allawi. 
During that time, there was an attempt from inside Iraq to find a solution between political 
parties to form the new cabinet, which was Masud Barzani’s initiative. In fact, all political 
parties and external key players (the US-led coalition and Iran) welcomed that attempt.594 
This was partly because Barzani had openly declared his initiative, and had discussed it with 
the US and Iran, since there was little difference between what he proposed and what Iran 
and the US wanted. The US supported Barzani in achieving his aims and Biden “praised the 
recent initiative put forward by President Barzani to break the political impasse and move the 
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political process forward.”595 In light of his initiative, Barzani called for a roundtable meeting 
among senior political leaders in Erbil (the capital city of Kurdistan). 596   They met on 7 
November 2010 after eight months of elections. In his press conference, Barzani said, “this is 
a historic day for Iraq. This gathering of all main Iraqi leaders… reiterating that real power-
sharing is the key to success for the new government in Iraq.”597 That indicated real progress 
in the negotiations among all of the leaders, since it allowed them to discuss their issues face 
to face, and to make final agreements about the incoming government. That vision was not 
only Barzani’s view. Other leaders “also emphasized the need for genuine power-sharing 
mechanisms in the new government.”598 In light of the roundtable meeting in Erbil, political 
parties made an agreement called the Erbil agreement, which divided the main posts among 
senior leaders. They agreed that Maliki would be the only candidate for Prime Minister, that 
the Speaker of the CoR would come from the Sunnis, that the Kurds would take the presidency, 
and that a new post with real power would be created for Allawi.599 Thus, Maliki received 
acceptance from all communities for his second term as Prime Minister, and on 8 November 
2010 the Erbil Agreement was signed. 
It consisted of nine main aspects: “Administration and Finance, Legislations, the Oversight 
Role, Security Reform Paper, Judicial Reform Paper, Balance in state institutions, Reform of 
the Executive Authority, National Accord (Consensus), and Accountability.”600Each aspect 
included a method, stating how it would be implemented during the second cabinet of Maliki. 
The agreement acted as the agenda for the new government, the aim being that Maliki would 
go through it systematically during his time in office. Obviously, it included all political parties’ 
demands, especially those of the Sunnis and Kurds, who asserted that the “vote on crucial 
issues like war and peace, strategic agreements, constitutional amendments shall be by 100 
percent consensus.”601  Moreover, they asked for “achieving national balance in: Deputy 
Ministers, Ambassadors and Heads of agencies and the Independent Commission etc.”602 
Because there was imbalance in the state institutions, they wanted reform in this area.  
Consequently, although the negotiations took nine months, they resulted in an agreement 
designed to form a new government based on genuine power-sharing methods, as they 
claimed. While there was strong competition between Allawi and Maliki to obtain the role of 
Prime Minister, all communities’ political parties demanded a National Unity Government 
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based on consensus. Furthermore, there were bargaining deals among political parties to 
offer their support to different candidates. The Sadrist bloc, for example, strongly opposed 
Maliki at the beginning, but when many Sadrist followers had been released, they changed 
their position and supported Maliki. The Kurds also had an agreement with Maliki before he 
took the position. Iran and the US held the same point-of-view about Maliki, wanting him to 
be Prime Minister for a second term. Thus, all communities agreed to form the Genuine 
National Partnership Government, which consisted of all political parties. This is discussed in 
the following section.  
7.3.2 Genuine National Partnership Government (GNPG)603  
In light of the Erbil Agreement on 12 November 2010, senior political leaders agreed to 
distribute the main posts based on consensus among communities. After signing the Erbil 
Agreement Barzani said, “we [political leaders] agreed to settle the issue of the three 
presidency posts so that the parliament can begin its task from today onward.”604 Barzani 
emphasised that the process should produce “a government of real national partnership.”605 
Therefore when the president nominated Maliki to form the cabinet, Maliki started another 
round of negotiations to establish the so-called Genuine National Partnership Government. 
Talabani said, “we believe that the government will be the Genuine National Partnership 
Government and will in no way exclude anyone.”606 The aim of the new government was to 
share the power and reduce conflict and violence among communities.  
In line with that aim, during the negotiation for forming the government political leaders 
made the decision to distribute ministerial posts based on two main principles. The first 
principle was to consider the weight of each community’s power. Barzani pointed out that 
“we cannot have one side taking everything. Each of us took a part and took what we 
deserved.”607 They did not want one single community occupying the entire political system, 
so they ensured that there was no way that a group with the majority could run the entire 
country. That was why they elected Talabani as President, Osama Nujayfe as the Speaker and 
Maliki as the Prime Minister, each one from a different community. Moreover, the Vice 
Presidents, Deputies of the Prime Minister and Deputies of the Speakers were distributed 
among the Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd communities. Those positions were distributed based on 
the weight of each community. 
The second principle for distributing ministerial posts had its basis in the election results, and 
how many seats each community received. The political leaders made a point system based 
on parliamentary seats in order to distribute ministerial posts. Each post was allotted a certain 
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number of points, and each point was equal to 2.24 seats.608 While high-level positions were 
distributed in accordance with the weight of each component (Shiite, Sunni, or Kurd), they 
needed to adhere to the point system as well. Thus, the presidency was worth 10 points, the 
Vice Presidency and Deputy 5, the Sovereign Minister 4, the service Ministers 3, and the less 
important service Ministers 2, and the Minister of state just one point. 609  See Table 19. 
However, because some leaders criticised the point system, it was not fully implemented. The 
weight of the posts was based on the power, influence and role of each post within the 
political institutions.  Consequently, both principles, the weight of each community’s power, 
and the points system were implemented in order to reach a power-sharing arrangement and 
establish grand coalition government as a tool for conflict resolution.  
Distributing Posts by Point System    
Posts  Shiite Points  Sunni  Points  Kurd  Poin
ts  
Note  
1 The President of 
the Republic 
 
   1  10 Each point is equal to 2.24 seats.  
Shiites had 159 seats, 159/2.24= 
70.98 points 
Sunnis had 101 seats, 101/2.24= 
45.08  
Kurds had 57 seats, 57/2.24= 
25.44  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There was similarity between the 
percentage of points and the 
percentage of parliamentary 
seats for each group. 
Kurds obtained more than the 
others by 2.9, because they took 
the minority ministry of Yazedy. 
This meant it was broadly 
proportional.   
2 The Vice president  2 10 1 5  
 
3 The Speaker  
 
 1 10  
 
4 Deputy of Speaker 1 5   1 5 
5 The Prime 
Minister  
1 10    
 
6 Deputy of Prime 
Minister  
  
1 5 1 5 1 5 
7 Sovereign 
Minister  
4 16 2 8 1  4 
8 Service Minister  10 30 7 21 3 9 
9 Minsters without 
Portfolio  
4 8 3 6 1 2 
10 State Minister 4 4 1 1 2 2 
 
Total Shiite  88 Sunni  56 Kurd  37 
Total points were 181 
 
 Percentage of 
points  
Shiite 48.6 Sunni 30.9 Kurd 20.4 
 Percentage    of 
seats in the 
Parliament  
 48.9  31.0   17.5  
 Differences   0.3  0.1  2.9 
Table 19: Distributing Posts by Point System    
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Another interesting point was Maliki’s deal with all groups to establish his cabinet early. In 
fact, this was the reality of the Iraqi situation at that time, because political parties looked 
after their own interests and bargained with each other to obtain more power. In his 
interviews, Maliki said, “when I wanted to establish the cabinet, there were selling and buying 
positions. The Sadrists, for example: I bought their position by posts and I gave them two 
more ministers in return for supporting me in forming the cabinet.”610 That was a reflection 
of conflict among political parties, which led to increasing the number of ministerial posts to 
46. After nearly one month of Maliki’s negotiation with political parties, he was able to deliver 
his cabinet to parliament for voting. On 21 December 2010, the CoR unanimously approved 
Maliki’s cabinet, but his cabinet did not include all ministers, and he postponed a number of 
ministries for two main reasons. First, there was only a single woman in this cabinet out of 46 
ministers. Second, there were some candidates he regarded as suspicious, because he did not 
know they linked to Baathist party or not, or committed crime or not, so he asked some blocs 
to exchange those candidates for others.611 Thus, ministerial posts were distributed among 
the three main groups and then political parties. Maliki pointed out the Genuine National 
Partnership Government was the most difficult type of government because there is diversity 
among communities, religions and loyalties, and it is difficult to satisfy everyone.612 Moreover, 
he emphasised that it was a “hard task because we need to find places in the government for 
all those who participated and won in the elections.”613 Having finalised the cabinet after 
three months, Maliki delivered the second list to parliament for approval, which was obtained 
after discussion on 13/2/2011.614 Consequently, Maliki’s government was approved by all 
groups because each of them obtained posts.  This did not mean, however, that it was not 
criticised. (See Table 20).  
 Rating Ministers in the Nouri al-Maliki Cabinet 2010-2014615  
 Name  Position  Ethnicity Bloc and 
Political 
Party 
Presidency of the Cabinet 
1 Nouri al-Maliki  Prime Minister  Shiite SOL/ Daawa 
2 Hussain al-Shahristani Deputy of Prime Minister  Shiite SOL/ 
Independent 
3 Roz Nouri Shawes Deputy of Prime Minister  Kurd KA/ KDP 
4 Saleh al-Mutlaq Deputy of Prime Minister  Sunni /Iraqiya/Hew
ar 
Powerful Ministers (Sovereign Ministers) 
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5 Acted by Maliki   Interior Minister  Shiite SOL/ Dawa 
6 Acted by Maliki National Security Minister Shiite SOL/ Dawa 
7 Abdul Karim al-Luaibi Oil Minister  Shiite Independent 
but 
associated 
with Daawa 
8 Ali Yusuf Shukri Planning Minister Shiite INA/Sadrist 
9 Rafaa al-Esawi Finance Minister Sunni Iraqiya/ 
Mustaqbal 
10 Acted by Maliki around two 
years and then Saadoun al-
Dulaimi 
Defence Minister  Shiite 
Sunni 
SOL/Dawa 
UAI 
11 Hoshyar Zebari Foreign Affairs Minister Kurd KA/ KDP 
Low Powerful Minister (Service Ministries) 
12 Majid Mohammed Amin  Health Minister Kurd KA/PUK 
13 Dindar Najman Migration Minister Kurd KA/ KIU 
14 Khairallah Hassan Babiker Trade Minister Kurd KA/PUK 
15 Raad Shallal al-Ani  Electricity Minister Sunni  Iraqiya 
16 Izzuldin al-Doula  Agriculture Minister Sunni Iraqiya/Iraqi
youn 
17 Mohammed Tamim  Education Minister Sunni Iraqiya/Hew
ar 
18 Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi  Communications Minister Shiite Iraqiya/Wifa
q 
19 Ahmed Nassar Dali al-Karbouli  Industry Minister Sunni Iraqiya/Tajdi
d 
20 Abdul-Karim al-Sammaraie  Science and Technology Minister Sunni Iraqiya/Tajdi
d 
21 Saadoun al-Dulaimi  
 
Culture Minister Sunni Unity 
Alliance of 
Iraq/ 
independent 
22 Adel Mhodr Radi Municipalities and Public works Minister Shiite  INA/Sadrist 
23 Liwa Smisim  Tourism Minister  Shiite  INA/Sadrist 
24 Mohaned al-Sa’adi  Water resources Minister Shiite  INA/Sadrist 
25 Mohammed Sahib al-Daraji Housing and Construction Minister Shiite INA/Sadrist 
26 Nasar al-Rubaie Labour and social affairs Minister Shiite INA/Sadrist 
27 Hassan Shimari Justice Minister Shiite INA/Fadhila 
28 Hadi al-Amiri  Transport Minister Shiite INA/ (ISCI)? 
29 Jassim Mohammed Jaffar  Youth and sports Minister Shiite SOL/Daawa 
30 Ali al-Adeeb Higher Education Minister Shiite SOL/ Daawa 
31 Mohammed Shiya al-Sudani  Human Rights Minister Shiite SOL/ Daawa 
32 Sargon Lazon Sliwah   Environment Minister Christian  Rafidain/Ass
yrian 
Democratic 
Movement 
Ministers of State for affairs  
33 Dakhil Qassim Hassoun Minister of state for civil society affairs Kurd KA/ YAZEDY 
34 Turhan Abdullah  Minister of state for provincial affairs Turkman  Iraqiya/Turk
man  
35 Ali Abdullah al-Sajeri  Minister of state for Foreign Affairs Sunni Unity 
Alliance of 
Iraq/ 
Wassat/Con
stitution 
Party 
36 Jamal al-Batix al-Shammari Minister of state for clans affairs  Sunni Iraqiya 
37 Safaa al-Din al-Saafi Minister of State for Parliament Affairs Shiite  SOL/ 
Independent 
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38 Amer al-Khuzai Minister of State for National Reconciliation  Shiite  SOL/ Daawa 
39 Ali Dabbagh  Minister of state and Government Spokesman Shiite  SOL/Daawa 
40 Ibtihal al-Zaidi Minister of state for women's affairs Shiite SOL 
Ministers without portfolio  
41 Abdul-Mehdi Hassan al-
Amtari  
Minister of state  Shiite INA/Sadrist 
42 Hassan Radia al-Sari  Minister of state Shiite INA/Hezbila
h 
43 Bushra Hussein Saleh  Minister of state  Shiite INA/Fadhila 
44 Diyah al-Asadi Minister of State  Shiite INA/Sadrist 
45 Salah Mazahim al-Jabouri Minister of state  Sunni Iraqiya/Hew
ar 
46 Yaseen Hasan Muhammed  Minister of state Kurd KA/ KIG 
47 Abdul Saheb Kahraman Isa Minister of state Kurd KA/Faeely 
Table 20: Rating Ministers in the Nouri al-Maliki Cabinet 2010-2014 
From the above table, you can see that the Shiite group received more posts, and they had 
an absolute majority. A Shiite obtained the post of Prime Minister, while another Shiite was 
granted the post of deputy, which meant that the leadership of the government was 
controlled by Shiites. Moreover, Shiites dominated the more powerful posts because they 
obtained five sovereign ministries out of seven, including the Interior, Defence and National 
Security Ministries. However, after two years, Maliki appointed Saadoun al-Dulaimi, a Sunni 
politician, to be the Minister of Defence. The first two years were very important for Maliki 
because during that time he appointed commanders from his party to powerful positions in 
the Ministry of Defence. Moreover, in June 2011, Maliki chose one of his followers, Falah al-
Fayyad, to become acting National Security Minister.616 Most of the Service Ministries were 
run by Shiites, because they obtained 10 out of 20 Ministerial posts, for both Ministers 
without a portfolio and Ministers of State. Thus, while the Shiites did not win the election, as 
the largest bloc they obtained the more powerful posts and an absolute majority of ministers. 
A number of points explain why they obtained the absolute majority of posts. First, they 
demanded that as the Shiite population totalled 60% in Iraq, they should obtain more posts 
by right. Second, they established the Shiite bloc, the NA, in the CoR, which consisted of 159 
seats: just under absolute majority. Finally, in practice, the NA has dictated the Prime 
Ministership from 2003 up to now, and they intend to continue in this way indefinitely.  
The second community to receive posts was the Sunnis. In general, the Sunnis won 31% of 
votes as the second largest component of Iraqi society. However, they received 28% of 
ministerial posts at various levels, but one of the powerful ministries intended for a Sunni was 
in fact run by Maliki for two years. This meant the Sunni group did not obtain a proportion 
percentage of posts in the cabinet. On the other hand, they won the March 2010 elections as 
the largest bloc, but this did not allow them to establish the cabinet. The third winner was the 
Kurds, who received eight ministers, one deputy Prime Minister, and one powerful ministry, 
that of Foreign Affairs. In the March 2010 elections, the Kurds won around 18% of seats and 
obtained 17% of ministers. This meant that the Kurds did not get more than was expected, 
and they did not make claims for more ministerial posts. As a result, grand coalition was 
reflected in the cabinet across the three main communities. While the Shiites received an 
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absolute majority of posts at each level, they tried to control other posts outside their 
jurisdiction, especially those which were more powerful. Maliki attempted to neglect the 
other communities and dominate the majority of influential posts. On the other hand, that 
action was not all by Shiite groups. Rather, it was because Maliki tried to control those posts 
by himself and he did not allow other Shiite parties to control security posts as well. Thus, 
that type of cabinet did not care about consociationalism as a tool for conflict resolution and 
peace. This is why it led to difficult issues among communities and created instability between 
political parties. 
7.3.3 Performance of the Genuine National Partnership Government  
When the cabinet first formed, political leaders welcomed the new government, and believed 
that the cabinet would lead to stability and conflict resolution. In fact, internal and external 
actors were very optimistic, voicing their opinion that the cabinet would “reinforce stability 
in Iraq and allow Iraq’s political leaders to work together for the benefit of their country and 
people.”617 However, after about a year the government faced strong opposition from the 
Kurds, the Sunnis, and some Shiite political parties. The main question is: why did Maliki face 
this opposition? What happened? Why did it happen?   
The government had been formed under the Erbil Agreement, with the three main 
communities all involved in shaping the agreement. However, the Erbil Agreement was not 
implemented perfectly because only some of its nine aspects were put into practice. Political 
parties from all three communities were constantly demanding its full implementation, but 
Maliki’s party, which was most powerful, did not consider their demands. In relation to that 
issue, the president at the time, Talabani, said, “generally, some participants in the political 
process surrounding the Erbil Agreement [referring to Maliki] do not recognise their 
obligations.”618 That kind of criticism arose after one year of Maliki’s cabinet because political 
leaders had been waiting for the implementation of the Erbil agreement’s strictures, but had 
not seen any action. Within Maliki’s cabinet, the opposition parties challenged Maliki to 
implement the Erbil Agreement because day by day they saw Maliki centralising the power 
and ignoring the other political groups. Yaseen Hasan, a former minister in Maliki’s cabinet, 
pointed out that “Maliki did not trust other parties, especially the Kurds, the Sunnis and 
Sadrist group in his cabinet. That situation led to him clashing with them, particularly with 
Sadrist Ministers, and specifically with Nasar al-Rubaie, the Labour and Social Affairs Minister. 
On two occasions, Maliki left a ministerial meeting because of arguments with Nasar.”619 Thus, 
instability spread even to the council of ministers, and the political atmosphere involved more 
conflicts among diverse groups, which produced a deep crisis among them. From that point, 
we can say that the kind of grand coalition government envisaged by the Erbil Agreement did 
not happen in practice.   
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Moreover, political crises increased when Maliki wanted to arrest the Sunni Vice President 
Tariq al-Hashimi in December 2011, “accusing him of enlisting his bodyguards to run a hit 
squad.”620 When Hashimi became aware that Maliki wanted to attack him and take him to 
prison, he immediately flew to Kurdistan to protect himself. The fact that this could happen 
was totally incompatible with the Erbil Agreement’s aims “to prevent the use of the law with 
double standards or to use the law for political purposes”.621 Maliki’s accusations led to an 
undermining of the previously-held consensus between the Sunnis and Maliki. While the 
Sunnis wanted to bring more of their members into the cabinet, they faced the uncomfortable 
reality that they were being targeted by him. 
Another instance of Maliki’s prejudice against the Sunnis was his raid on Sunni leader and 
Minister of Finance Rafaa al-Esawi’s ministry, house and office on 21 December 2012. Esawi 
said, “Militia forces had raided the finance ministry, my office and home in an illegal action 
and they arrested all the employees and guards.”622 The reason Maliki raided Esawi was 
because Esawi’s “bodyguards were reported to have been accused of terrorism-related 
offences.”623 Thus, Maliki continued to attack the Sunnis, and his acts made the political 
situation worse. 
Maliki only began to attack the Sunnis’ leaders, beginning with al-Hashimi, when the last US 
troops had left Iraq in December 2011. The US-led coalition had played a crucial role for 
creating a kind of balance among all ethno-religious communities, and in its absence the 
dynamic changed. That was why Gen. Odierno said, “I’ve always believed the United States 
played the role of honest broker between all the groups.”624 Thus, the US-led coalition’s 
withdrawal negatively affected the political process. While present, the US-led coalition 
prevented one group from dominating all political processes and neglecting other groups. As 
long as the US-led coalition was there, Maliki could not neglect and marginalise other 
communities, and the political process could develop.  
Maliki’s actions derived from his belief that a power-sharing arrangement would not work, 
and that majority rule was the only realistic method for leading Iraq. He argued that “power-
sharing cannot be the foundation of solving our problems.”625 Moreover, he said “relying on 
power-sharing and ignoring the constitution [which stipulated majority rule in the cabinet] 
disrupted state-building.”626 Maliki had changed his mind about a power-sharing government 
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and wanted to ignore what had been agreed in the Erbil Agreement. For that reason, Allawi 
criticized the situation, stating, “Maliki has violated the constitution to consolidate his own 
power by using security and military forces to intimidate and oppress political rivals.”627 Thus, 
the Genuine Unity Partnership Government did not succeed because Maliki was neglecting 
the Erbil Agreement and facing opposition from all other groups.    
Maliki was now facing strong opposition. Senior leaders from the Sunnis, the Kurds and Al-
Sadr tried to enact a vote of no confidence in the CoR. On 28 April 2012, Barzani, Talabani, Al 
Sadr, Allawi and Al Nojaefi wrote a letter consisting of 9 demands. It generally focused on 
preventing one-man rule, criticising Maliki’s way of governing, and demanding the adoption 
and upkeep of the Erbil Agreement.628 The nine demands were: the provision of services to 
all communities, the adoption of the Erbil agreement, that no one would act in place of 
another minister, that the role of parliament would be enforced, that dictatorial tendencies 
would end, that a politicised army would be avoided, and so too politicised security services, 
that the premiership would be limited to two terms, and that all involved would adhere to 
those principles.629 They sent the letter to the NA and put in place a 15-day deadline for 
receiving a positive response from the Shiites, especially Maliki. However, they did not receive 
a positive response. Maliki strongly opposed that letter and reasserted his own beliefs 
regarding the way a country should be led. That made the situation more complicated and 
led to more conflict between communities. His own views were clearly incompatible with a 
broad-based government and power-sharing arrangements.  In his interview, Maliki pointed 
out, “each one of those people had aims. The Kurds wanted to export oil independently and 
I said ‘no’. The Sunnis’ leaders, such as Al-Hashimi, had problems. I sent them to court, and 
they did not agree with that. The Sadrists wanted to release their prisoners and I did not 
accept that.”630 Thus, Maliki resorted to explaining the situation by making recourse to the 
actions of the other parties, rather than his own. He did not elaborate on any of the points 
that the other parties had seen as genuine issues of contention. It was this dismissive attitude 
that pushed the other political leaders to work together towards a vote of no confidence 
against Maliki and the establishment of a government with real partnerships.  
When the leaders learned that Maliki and the NA did not accept their letter, they went for 
the second option, which was the vote of no confidence. According to the permanent 
constitution Article 61 Section 8 B1, “the President or the Republic may submit a request to 
the CoR to withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister.”631 This vote of no confidence 
requires an absolute majority in the CoR.632  Those opposing Maliki needed to amass support. 
To guarantee that the action would pass, they collected signatures from MPs who would vow 
their support before the vote. An absolute majority was achieved. After that, the President 
was required to send his request to the CoR, but this did not happen, because some MPs 
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backed out, and withdrew their signatures at the last minute. Thus, the key leaders from the 
three main communities could not succeed in their plan, and Maliki continued as Prime 
Minister. Day by day the conflict between the communities increased dramatically, especially 
between the government and the parliament, which was headed by the Sunni leader Al 
Nojaefi. Thus, Maliki’s second term did not embody power-sharing arrangements. Rather, it 
produced instability, conflict, and violence instead of peace and stability.  
In light of the above discussion, while in name and distribution of posts, Iraq had a grand 
coalition government, in reality its implementation was incompatible with the values of 
consociationalism. In this case, partnership government was not a tool for conflict resolution. 
It did not bring peace, stability, power-sharing, and a fair decision-making process, which are 
the usual distinguishing features of a grand coalition government in a deeply-divided society.    
7.4 Mutual veto  
Mutual veto is another subject for analysis. We need to know how it was implemented and 
how it affected conflict resolution in Iraq during the second term of Maliki’s cabinet. As 
discussed in the previous chapter there are two types of mutual veto in the permanent 
constitution, presidency veto and super majority veto. In this section, I am going to illustrate 
how both were implemented and how they affected power-sharing arrangements.   
7.4.1 Presidency veto (formal veto) 
According to the permanent constitution, the presidency veto was defunct at the end of the 
first term of Maliki’s cabinet in 2010, because it was related to the transitional period from 
2005 to 2010. After 2010, the President of the Republic had more power than the Vice 
Presidents. According to the Article 73, Section 3, the duty of the President of the Republic is  
“to ratify and issue the laws enacted by the Council of Representatives.”633  This meant that 
when the president received laws from the CoR, he could either accept or refuse them. While 
the presidency council consisted of three main groups (see Table 18), the president alone had 
the right to sign or accept the laws. The Vice Presidents did not have this power. Thus, there 
was no Presidency veto, and no mutual veto, for all representatives in the presidency council. 
The presidency council did not function well during that period for two main reasons. First, at 
the end of 2012, President Talabani had been sick (he had suffered from a cerebral aneurysm) 
and he left his position without anyone taking his place. Second, two Vice Presents left the 
presidency council, Al Hashimi, who was attacked by Maliki in 2011, and Adil Abdul Mahdi, 
who resigned from his post on 11 July 2011. Therefore, just one of the Vice Presidents 
remained: Khudier Al-Khuzae from Maliki’s bloc. This meant that during that period the 
presidency lacked any clear function or influence on political development. While formally 
the presidency veto (formal mutual veto) finished its term in 2010, there was no way that it 
could have been implemented in practice. 
7.4.2 Super majority veto (Two-thirds) 
As discussed in the previous chapter, 12 cases in the constitution required a super majority, 
11 of them related to the CoR’s seats and just one related to two-thirds of voters in three or 
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four governorates.634 During that period, when the parliament conducted any of those cases 
it required two- thirds majority. This was a big issue because it was difficult to maintain two-
thirds majority. For instance, when the CoR wanted to elect the President by a two-thirds 
majority in 2010, it failed because none of the candidates obtained two-thirds at the first 
round of voting. However, in the second round of voting Talabani received the vast majority 
by 195 votes, and he became the President.635 The main reason why he did not get two-thirds 
initially was because Iraqiya boycotted voting and withdrew its members from the session, 
delaying the process. Thus, this type of veto, used by Iraqiya to break down the process for 
electing the presidency, did not work because constitutionally there was a way to solve it: 
through the second round of voting.636 
Another issue related to the super majority veto is the formation of the Federal Supreme 
Court under the permanent constitution. According to Article 92 Section 2 “the Federal 
Supreme Court shall be made up of a number of judges, [and] experts … the work of the Court 
shall be determined by a law enacted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Council 
of Representatives.”637 In order to pass that law, the CoR prepared a bill in 2011, but it did 
not obtain support from all communities. There were different views about forming the 
Federal Supreme Court. The Kurds in particular demanded that there should be a veto within 
it in order to protect their interests and avoid majority tyranny. Arif Tayfor said, “there were 
two main controversial points. First, we demanded the veto and second, the Shiites 
demanded it as well for the Shiites’ Scholar. We agreed that it should not only be Scholars 
who can exercise that right, because there are secular groups, and they should have it as 
well.”638 Moreover, the Shiites did not agree on the Kurds having the veto because they 
wanted to make decisions by majority, not through consensus.639 The main barrier to issuing 
the law related to the requirement of the two-thirds majority. If the Shiites could issue that 
law by simple majority, then they would not have to consider the demands of the other 
parties. However, the two-thirds majority prevented the Shiites from obtaining this 
requirement. Thus, the two-thirds majority indirectly worked to give a veto to minority 
communities to protect their rights and to forbid majority communities from ignoring their 
rights. 
Another case, the declaration of high alert emergency in the country, required a super 
majority. When the so-called Islamic State (IS) controlled Mosul and the majority of Sunni 
areas in 2014, Maliki demanded the declaration of a state of emergency in the country. As he 
stated, “the council of Ministers has decided to declare a state of high alert and to mobilise 
all efforts to face up to existing challenges… and he asked Parliament to declare a state of 
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emergency and general mobilisation.”640 Constitutionally this requires two-thirds of the CoR 
to reach a decision and enact the law, with such a declaration based on the joint decision of 
the Prime Minister and President (according to Article 61, Section 9A). Maliki, however, 
requested it by himself, without having shared his proposal with the President. That demand 
happened just a few days before parliament ended its term. Maliki wanted to continue for a 
second term, and realised that a state of emergency would allow him – in charge of it – to 
extend his power. He therefore demanded a session in the parliament to discuss the issue 
and make a decision about whether to implement a state of emergency. After two days of 
Maliki’s demands, the Speaker of the CoR called for a session; however, the Sunnis and Kurds 
boycotted that session, which led to its postponement without any decision. This was because 
only 130 MPs attended the session, which was not two-thirds.641 If the Sunnis and the Kurds 
had supported Maliki’s proposal for declaring a state of emergency, he would have been able 
to continue to govern Iraq indefinitely, without a specific time proposed to cancel the 
emergency period. The only thing that did not allow Maliki’s proposal to be accepted was the 
two-thirds majority rule, because it was required for enacting the law regarding a state of 
emergency.  In this sense, super majority veto within the constitution is one way to protect a 
group’s right and to create a favourable atmosphere for maintaining their interests, and 
avoiding majority tyranny.  
During the second term of Maliki’s cabinet, mutual veto did not encourage movement 
towards a power-sharing arrangement. The only type of veto available in reality was the Super 
Majority veto, through two-thirds of members of the CoR. As we can see from the important 
case discussed earlier, it did partially work in practice. However, the Presidency veto did not 
exist during that period because constitutionally it related to the previous period from 2005 
to 2010.  Thus, Mutual veto was effective to a certain extent, and did not affect the whole 
process for achieving consociationalism.  
7.5 Creating a New Region 
Creating a new region in Iraq was one of the controversial issues between the Shiites and 
Sunnis during that period. Constitutionally, the formation of a new federal region in Iraq is 
very clear, but the problem was with the implementation of it. There were different views 
among politicians about the way to deal with that issue. What was new in terms of the Sunni 
and Shiite positions? Who tried to create a new region and who was against that attempt? 
What was the outcome? In this section, I will investigate those questions through each 
community’s position and their attempts towards creating a new region as a tool for reducing 
violent conflict. 
Although the Sunnis had been against federalism when the permanent constitution was being 
drafted, circumstances since then brought about a change in their position, and they 
demanded the creation of another region in their area. The main reason was that the Sunnis 
felt neglected by Maliki in the political process, and that he treated them as second-class 
citizens, rather than as members of a genuine partnership in the political process. That 
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situation was reflected in the Sunni provinces, where people thought that their interests were 
not being protected. The Sunnis therefore proposed establishing a region, starting with the 
Saladin governorate’s declaration for federalism in October 2011. 642  The Sunnis’ leader 
supported that demand, and they thought it would be a good way for making a safe place 
without domination by Maliki. Osama al Nojaefi, the former Speaker from the Sunni 
community, said, “the constitution explicitly provides articles for the right to form regions 
through article numbers 117, 118,119, 120 and 121… All should respect the constitution and 
nobody has a right to stop this right.”643 Al Hashemi also highlighted that right and said, 
“converting from governorates to federal regions explicitly exists in the permanent 
constitution and it should be implemented by the government providing conditions for it to 
succeed perfectly. However, the problem is: the people who wrote the constitution in 2005 
are against creating a new region.”644 In other words, the Sunnis had changed their position, 
and thought that the only solution for them was to create a new region. This indicated positive 
progress towards the implementation of the constitution in terms of building genuine 
federalism, but it faced strong opposition from the Shiites, which made it impossible.  
The Sunnis’ change of heart regarding federalism was due to several reasons. Ammar Wajih, 
the Sunnis’ leader, pointed out in his interview that “nowadays the Sunni Arabs want a region 
in order to establish a safe place for the Sunnis people.”645 The Sunnis had suffered under the 
authority of the Shiites and wanted to govern their provinces by themselves through a system 
of self-determination. As Saleem al Jubouri, the speaker of CoR, said, “that is the outcome of 
the reality: the central government centralised the power and the Shiites did not share the 
power with the Sunnis. That led to the Sunnis’ demand for the region and decentralization in 
order to obtain benefits from it.”646 The Sunnis knew that their role had been marginalised. 
Excluded by the Shiites, they complained about Maliki’s way of governing the country. Despite 
attempts to find a solution to protecting their rights by boycotting and demonstrating, 
nothing was effective.  Eventually, the situation led to an uprising in the Sunnis’ area.647  
The Sunnis’ demand for the region was based on governorates, not the whole Sunni area, 
which included three or four governorates. Ahmed A. al-Masari, the Sunnis’ leader and MP, 
said, “we need the unity of Iraq and if the aim of the creation of regions means self-
determination, the provinces system [region based on the governorates] will achieve that. 
Forming the three regions based on ethnic-religious lines may divide Iraq into three states: 
Shiite, Sunni and Kurd, but we want the unity of the country.”648 The Sunnis did not have one 
single, overarching view regarding the style of the region they demanded. The only thing they 
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wanted was to be independent from the Shiites’ authority. The problem was that the Shiites 
did not agree with creating any region at all, as they believed that this would separate the 
country. Ayad al-Samarrai pointed out, “when the Sunnis called for federalism the Shiites 
rejected it and they did not accept that proposal.”649  
Why were the Shiites against establishing a new region in Iraq?  What were their views about 
it? It is obvious that the Shiites and the Kurds strongly supported federalism. In addition, one 
of the Shiite political parties (ISCI) had suggested establishing a region for the Shiites in the 
South of Iraq in 2006. During the period 2010-2014, there were different views about forming 
a region for the Sunnis, separate from the Shiites. Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of ISCI, pointed 
out that “federalism is a constitutional right, and that principle should organise our plans, 
guaranteeing interests for all communities. And then it should consider the sensitivities, time 
conditions and constitutional procedure.”650 Although al-Hakim had previously backed his 
own party’s proposal for creating a region in the South, he did not support the establishment 
of a new region for the Sunnis. Souzan al-Saad, a former MP from the Fazial Shiite Party, said 
“that demanding threatens the unity of Iraq because it will divide Iraq into many parts and 
produce sectarian fights.”651 
Similarly, the Sadrist group was against any attempt towards forming a new region in Iraq. 
Hakim al Zamely, from the Sadrist bloc, said, “calling for establishing the Sunnis’ region at this 
time has high risks that could negatively affect other provinces and places demanding 
that.”652 In his interview, Hani, also from the Sadrist bloc, said, “Saeed al Sadr [the head of 
the Sadrist group] asserted that implementing federalism at present has a risk and would be 
cause for dividing Iraq because infrastructure has not been completed in the country to deal 
with their federal application. For that reason, Saeed al Sadr believes in delaying 
federalism.”653 This meant that the Sadrist group did not support federalism. The Sadrists 
believe that it will be a long time before conditions will be sufficiently stable to implement 
federalism.  
Finally, Maliki’s attitude was crucial, since he was the Prime Minister during that period for 
the second term. He said, “we will not allow the establishment of federalism in Iraqi provinces 
because it will be a cause for tearing the country apart.”654 However, there was no unity in 
Iraq in practice because the region of Kurdistan was also moving towards more independence, 
and because the Sunni provinces did not agree with being governed by the Shiite majority.  
Maliki asserted, “We do not reject the demand, but we say that the time is not appropriate 
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for it.”655 In his interview, he stated: “yes, after political stability and destroying IS, come and 
establish federal regions in the peaceful way. But forming them based on sectarianism is not 
good… Establishing federal regions based on the provinces could be fine, as Basra [the Shiites’ 
city] demanded.”656 Hence, there was no support for the Sunnis’ demand, and the entire 
Shiite community was against creating a region for the Sunnis, even if it was based on a single 
governorate.    
In light of the above discussion, it is obvious that some political parties did not allow the 
Sunnis to form another region. The Shiites thought that attempts to do this would threaten 
their own position of governing the whole country. This shows that there was an exchange in 
the Shiite and Sunni groups’ positions regarding establishing federation regions. The Shiites 
originally accepted federalism, but when they saw the authority that they monopolised in the 
political institutions, they changed their mind, and opposed federalism. Moreover, when the 
Sunnis saw that they were being neglected, they changed their minds, and worked towards 
establishing a region, in order to prevent their provinces from being controlled by Shiite 
authority. The Kurds, although they already had their own region, did not take any side in the 
debate for creating a new Sunni region. Hence, the establishment of a new region, an element 
of consociationalism, was not implemented during that period. The inability to create a new 
federal region – as an instrument for gathering communities and making power-sharing work 
– meant that further conflict arose.   
7.6 Conclusion 
As discussed above, it was obvious that the implementation of consociationalism faced more 
challenges. Some consociational principles were implemented, but those were not really 
significant because they did not lead towards consociational democracy. Proportional 
representation is reflected in the CoR and CoM, as each community obtained its ratio of seats 
and high-level positions. It was based on the permanent constitution and electoral law, and 
was a formal requirement for forming the CoR and an informal requirement for shaping the 
CoM. While proportional representation was fully implemented in the CoR, this was not the 
case with the CoM. 
Grand coalition government is another key element of consociationalism. In Iraq, it was the 
result of an informal agreement, based on the Erbil Agreement. While there was distribution 
of posts between communities for the purpose of forming a broad-based cabinet, this was 
not compatible with the values of grand coalition government and power-sharing 
arrangements. In reality, grand coalition government could not be implemented in Iraq, since 
one political party from the Shiite community was able to control the entire process, with no 
opportunity for sharing the power among other communities.  
There were two types of mutual veto, presidency veto and super majority veto. However, 
only the super majority veto was able to be implemented constitutionally. Despite being a 
formal requirement to prevent majority rule, it did not really work during that period because 
it was only partially implemented, and could not stop the tyranny of a powerful group.  
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Moreover, creating a new region, for which there were stipulations in the constitution, did 
not work in the period. Interestingly, however, attitudes towards federalism changed during 
this time, with the demand for the creation of a new Sunni region, which the Shiites refused. 
The Sunnis wanted to protect themselves from the Shiite domination, but despite having the 
constitution on their side, they could not get what they wanted. This means that the Shiites 
were a significant barrier to creating a region for the Sunnis.  
Since consociational elements were only partly reflected, the political process became more 
complicated, and crises arose among communities. We can see better results where 
consociational elements were formally required, and worse results where they were not. 
(Table 21 shows the implementation of it). This means there was lack of actual and true 
implementation of consociational elements that affected by politician’s performance that 
opposed the formal reflection of consociationalism.    
During Maliki’s second term, Iran’s role in Iraq increased and replaced the role of the US-led 
coalition. This happened during the negotiations to form the new cabinet, select a new Prime 
Minister, and establish how powerful ministries would be distributed. The rule of Iran was the 
result of the absence of the US-led coalition. Iran wanted to side-line the Sunni community 
and support the Shiites in controlling as many of the positions as possible. This caused more 
crises between the Sunnis and Shiites in the political process. 
Rating the implementation of consociational elements in Iraq from 2010-2014  
 Consociational 
elements  
Implement
ed  
Partially 
implement
ed 
Not 
implement
ed  
Notes  
1 Grand coalition  
  
√ While there was distribution of posts between 
communities for the purpose of forming a broad-based 
cabinet, this was not compatible with the values of 
power-sharing arrangements. In actuality, grand 
coalition government was not implemented because 
one political party, especially one man role, from the 
Shiite community controlled the entire process. 
2 Proportional 
Representation  
√ 
 
  While proportional representation was fully 
implemented in the CoR, this was not the case with the 
CoM. This means it is not fully implemented in the 
government. 
3 Mutual Veto  
  
√ It did not work well during that period because it could 
not stop the tyranny of a powerful group which is the 
Shiite majority. 
4 The creation of 
a new region   
  
√ There was demand for creating the new region, but 
despite having the constitution on their side, it did not 
occur because the Shiites were a significant barrier to 
creating a region for the Sunnis. 
Table 21: Rating the implementation of consociational elements (2010-2014)   
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8 Chapter 8 Conclusion  
8.1 Introduction  
The question that I have addressed in this thesis is whether Iraq was a consociational 
democracy in its formal institutions as well as in practice from 2003 to 2014. This is an 
important question because consociationalism (the elements of which include grand coalition, 
proportionality, mutual veto, and autonomy) is frequently practised as a way to resolve 
conflict within divided, post-war societies, such as Iraq after 2003, where it was promoted by 
a number of intervening states, particularly the US. This involved bearing in mind the role of 
the US-led coalition in the political development of Iraq during this period. Assessing whether 
consociationalism was actually practiced is of relevance to any assessment of the reasons for 
the continued violence and conflict in Iraq, and to evaluate the efficacy of consociationalism 
as a conflict-management tool. Textual analysis has been used as a method for the first part 
of the empirical chapter, which is about formal consociationalism in the constitution. It was 
crucial to map out the actual consociational elements in the constitution. The second part of 
this chapter examined the implementation of consociationalism. It traced the events that 
took place between 2003 and 2014. I have divided this into three main periods: from 2003 to 
2005, 2005 to 2010, and 2010 to 2014. Three main types of data have been used: written 
primary sources (the permanent constitution, meeting minutes, memoirs, and public 
documents), interviews, and secondary sources (journal articles and books).  
From this investigation, three general points can be concluded. Firstly, consociational 
elements were only partially reflected in the constitution. Proportionality and autonomy were 
fully reflected, but the mutual veto was only partially reflected. While a requirement for grand 
coalitions does not exist in the constitution, it was managed by agreement whenever required 
for forming a cabinet. (See Table 22) Two of the key features of consociationalism, 
proportionality and mutual veto, were formal requirements in the constitution, while the 
other two, grand coalition and autonomy, were not but were implicit in the document. 
Therefore, required elements had more chance to be implemented that the empirical 
investigation suggests.  
Secondly, what is written and implied in the constitution regarding consociationalism affected 
politicians’ implementation of it. The point I want to make here concerns the path 
dependency between the constitution and its implementation. Consociationalism was 
partially reflected in the constitution, and then partially implemented; however, there is a 
mismatch between institutional design on the one hand and the implementation of this 
design on the other. Despite the fact that the permanent constitution was compatible with 
consociationalism, consociationalism was at best partially practiced in reality. There were, 
then, different degrees of implementation of consociational constitutional provisions. 
Sometimes, what was in the constitution was not implemented, while on other occasions, 
politicians implemented consociational principles that were not in the constitution. (See Table 
22) Complicating this further, the individual behaviour and attitudes of the politicians 
involved limited the practice of the power-sharing arrangements that the constitution 
recommends. 
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 Finally, external actors, especially the US-led coalition, were crucial for the adoption of 
consociational elements in Iraq; Iraq was pushed in this direction in particular by the 
international presence, led by the US. When the US-led coalition was in power in the country, 
there was a better implementation of consociationalism. For instance, if you compare 2005-
10 with 2010-14, you can see an improved implementation of consociationalism in 2005-10. 
(See Table 22). Consequently, while the permanent constitution included consociationalism 
features, the implementation of it did not correspond perfectly.   
Rating the reflection and implementation of consociational elements from 2005 to 2014 
 Consociational 
elements 
Constitutional reflection Consociational implementation 
from 2005-10 
Consociational implementation 
from 2010-14 
1 Grand coalition  Not reflected Partially Implemented not Implemented 
2 Proportional 
Representation  
Reflected Implemented Implemented 
3 Mutual Veto  Partially reflected Partially Implemented Not Implemented 
4 The creation of 
a new region  
Reflected Not Implemented Not Implemented 
Table 22: Rating the reflection and implementation of consociationalism (2005-2014) 
In addition, Table 22 corresponds with the focus on construction between formal reflection 
and the implementation of consociational elements I highlighted in the introduction and 
research question. The table demonstrates that there was partial consociational democracy 
in Iraq from 2005 to 2010, and it also shows that the practice of consociationalism declined 
between 2010 and 2014. The main explanation for this is that the political leaders’ actions 
moved away from the actual practice of consociational elements to single community rule, 
especially by one political party, that is Malik’s party. For that reason, the issue was not 
related to consociationalism because it was promoted in many cases, and was not part of a 
partial reflection of consociational elements because, according to consociational scholars, 
the Iraqi constitution is a consociational document. Consequently, the issue is more securely 
related to the way that consociational elements operated in practice and the effectiveness of 
external actions, in particular the US-led coalition.  
The current chapter develops these findings in more detail, and is consequently divided into 
three main sections. The first focuses on the key findings regarding how consociationalism is 
formally reflected in the Iraqi political system after 2003. The second part examines the 
significant outcomes of the implementation of consociationalism. Third, the role of the US-
led coalition in the political development, particularly in terms of consociationalism, will be 
outlined. Finally, I will make recommendations for further research in this field. 
8.2 Reflection of Consociationalism in the constitution   
Path dependency can be noted in the reflection of consociationalism in the constitution. 
There was path dependency throughout the period even before the permanent constitution, 
when the US-led coalition imposed the system of broad based institutions. After the invasion 
in 2003, the US-led coalition established the foundations for a power-sharing arrangement 
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through the IGC and the first Cabinet, which lasted from 1 September 2003 to June 2004. 657 
These two institutions were established through a broad-based government style and 
involved representatives from each community in its proportion. Out of the 25 posts, the 
Shiites obtained 13 posts, the Sunnis 5 posts, the Kurds 5 posts, the Christians 1 post, and the 
Turkoman 1 post. Thus, political institutions set up even before the drafting of the 
constitution in 2003 shaped the later constitutional framework, which included a degree of 
proportional representation. 
 Similarly, this system of power sharing was carried out and formalised in the TAL, which was 
characterised by provisions for federalism, grand coalition, proportionality and a mutual veto. 
Therefore, consociationalism was fully formally reflected and embedded in the TAL. This is 
addressed in more detail in chapter 5. A combination of direct appointment at the beginning 
of the invasion and the implementation of the electoral process later on, which formed 
political institutions across ethno-religious groups and produced the TAL, enabled power 
sharing principles to be consistently practised throughout the period. 
Moreover, the constitution itself, when drafted, included firm provisions for federalism and 
mutual veto, but only limited provisions for proportional representation (limiting it to 
Parliament, not the bureaucracy and executive positions), and for grand coalition government 
and power sharing.  As argued in chapter 4, this study found that certain elements of 
consociationalism are formally reflected in the Iraqi constitution, but that not all of them are 
explicit. Formally, proportionality occurs in a few constitutional articles, such as, 9(A) Armed 
forces, and 49 (the first section), which details the composition of the CoR.658 In addition, 
provisions for proportional representation are found across a wider range of legislations and 
informal agreements, such as the Electoral Law and the Erbil Agreement.659 The latter, which 
took place in 2010, advocated the appointment of certain individuals to high-level positions. 
These instances of proportionality, both formal and informal, are compatible with the theory 
of consociationalism because it takes different forms, democratic or authoritarian, formal or 
informal, and liberal or corporate in different divided places.660     
Another consociational element is grand coalition. This research highlighted, however, that 
there are no provisions for grand coalition government in the constitution and other 
legislation. It is only apparent in Article 138 (2) of the constitution, which deals with electing 
the Presidency, and prescribes that it should consist of three people from the three key 
communities for a specific period from 2005 to 2010. However, for the government we can 
see grand coalition in informal agreements (e.g. the Erbil Agreement) among significant 
political leaders. Therefore, formally, there is no chance for a single community to govern Iraq 
without getting support from other significant communities to form the cabinet. There are 
                                                     
657 BBC, 1st September 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3199561.stm and see Middle East 
newspaper (in Arabic) 2003, Issue 9044,2nd September 2003.    
 
658 Iraq, “Permanent Constitution.” 
659 “Erbil Agreement, 2010, 
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IQ_101107_IraqErbilAgreement%20%28English%29.
pdf.” 
660 McEvoy, Joanne and O’Leary, Brendan, Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places. P.27 
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many existing constitutional provisions requiring collaboration among communities, which 
aim to make it impossible for a single community to dominate, even if it has absolute majority 
in the CoR.  Hence, grand coalition in Iraq is mostly managed on an informal basis.  
The third consociational element that is formally reflected in the constitution is mutual veto.  
There are two types of veto provisions. The first, the Presidency veto, is placed in Article 138, 
sections 1 and 4, which state that “the Presidency Council shall issue its decisions 
unanimously.”661 Between 2005 and 2010, the Presidency Council consisted of three key 
communities, each one having the formal right to use the veto. The second, the super majority 
veto, is covered at 12 points in the constitution. All of them require a two-thirds majority of 
seats in the CoR to issue a law, or two-thirds of voters in three or four provinces to approve a 
constitutional amendment or to create a new federal region. Each of the key communities 
can use this right to stop a particular process by rejecting or withdrawing its members from 
the CoR. However, these vetoes are actually not very strong, especially after 2010, when the 
formal presidency veto was abandoned.662 Thus, the super majority veto was the only veto to 
remain in the permanent constitution. The obligation to uphold the mutual veto gives more 
power to minority groups being neglected in the political process. 
Finally, federalism is particularly well-represented in the permanent constitution, and acts as 
a foundation for the political system after 2003. Federalism is covered by several articles.  In 
particular, political autonomy, which is the core of federalism in Iraq, is conspicuous. Creating 
a new federal region is a crucial point, because it encompasses all three forms of federalism: 
cultural, economic, and political autonomy. Article 117, section 2 emphasises this point, 
observing that “this Constitution shall affirm new regions established in accordance with its 
provisions.”663 In addition to giving governorates the right to create a region, the permanent 
constitution also “leaves the decision about what the number of regions and their boundaries 
should be to the governorates.” 664  That process should be put to vote through a local 
referendum. As Article 119 states, “one or more governorates shall have the right to organize 
a region based on a request to be voted on in a referendum.”665 This study finds that the issue 
with creating a new region in Iraq is that it is only optional, rather than an obligation. This 
means that according to the provisions of the constitution, the government is not obliged to 
take responsibility for carrying out the entire process.  
While consociationalism was the most logical and applicable system for Iraq, support for 
consociational institutions was mixed among all communities. There were some powerful 
voices both from Iraqis themselves and the international community, which was pushing for 
a broadly consociational system. However, support for these institutions among Iraq’s 
political parties was mixed.  The main reason for this was that some political parties did not 
feel that consociationalism would allow them to obtain what they wanted. This led to it only 
                                                     
661 Iraq, “Permanent Constitution.” 
662 Ibid. Article 138, Section 1 
663 Ibid. 
664 Bogaards, Matthijs, “Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Three Problems, Four Misconceptions, Some Suggestions.” 
P.16 
665 Iraq, “Permanent Constitution.” 
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being partially reflected in the permanent constitution. However, its adoption was more well-
received than other alternatives, such as majority rule. 
The argument I shall make here is that one cannot simply examine the permanent 
constitution and then its implementation. What happened at each stage of the process 
influenced the next. One cannot understand the constitution without looking at the work 
undertaken early in the occupation and at the TAL, nor can one understand the 
implementation of consociationalism without regarding the constitution. This does not mean 
that consociational elements translate directly from one stage to the next, but certain 
elements are carried through.  
In retrospect, policy-makers should have considered two points, which were not in fact taken 
into account. First, they should have made all consociational elements a requirement in the 
constitution. Second, failing that, they could have put greater emphasis on the existing 
consociational elements. This would have been better for Iraq. My opinion is that there was 
no intense interest among the key communities for all consociational elements to be 
represented in the constitution. While all parties were in favour of power sharing, there were 
reservations from each community, particularly the Shiites, who were not particularly 
interested in power sharing until they were sure that they would obtain what they wanted. 
The explanation for this is related to the different communities’ thoughts about the political 
system. The Shiites were not entirely supportive of the consociational elements, while the 
Sunnis were completely against them. The only fully supportive community was the Kurds.   
8.3 Implementation of consociational elements 
The implementation of consociational characteristics was the core of this investigation, in line 
with the aims of the study. My research highlighted that the implementation of 
consociationalism differed from the constitutional provisions, in the way that they operated. 
That is to say that some political institutions effectively adopted a number of consociational 
features, while other consociational provisions in the constitution were only partially 
implemented. In the following sub-sections, the research findings in relation to the four 
individual characteristics of consociationalism are summed up.   
8.3.1 Proportional representation 
Proportionality was represented in various ways from 2003 to 2005 and from 2005 to 2014. 
During 2003 to 2005, proportionality was an outcome of the appointment of the distribution 
of posts among key communities, and the passing of the electoral law, mainly drafted by the 
US-led coalition. Under the US-led coalition’s appointments, the Shiites obtained absolute 
majority in all positions, starting with the IGC, and ending with the Transitional Government 
(TG) in May 2005, in which the Shiites’ political parties dominated across all posts. The Kurds 
received 20% of posts in the IGC, but in the TG they obtained more than this ratio because 
the Sunnis boycotted the political process. The Sunnis formally had the right to obtain 20%, 
but they did not participate in the TNS and the TG, which led to an increase in the ratio of 
Shiites and Kurds in the TNS and TG. In addition, the Turkomen and Christian communities, as 
minorities, obtained 3% to 4% of posts. Thus, this study noted that it was the US-led coalition’s 
method for proportionality through direct appointment that established the foundation for 
each community to obtain its due proportion in the political institutions. This kind of formula 
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came from the US occupation, and no-one really challenged it. Rather, it carried through with 
very few amendments, and was very difficult to change. This is an example of path 
dependency by the US-led coalition. 
From 2005 to 2014, the ratio of each community in parliament, the Shiites, the Sunnis, and 
the Kurds, had slightly fluctuated. According to the election results, the Sunnis’ community 
received just 1.8% of votes and seats in the January 2005 election, which increased to 20.5% 
of votes and 21.45 seats in the December 2005 election. The main reason for the large gap 
was because in the January 2005 election they boycotted the process. They could keep their 
proportionality in the March 2010 election because the Secular list joined the Sunnis’ group 
under the Iraqi National Movement list, which got 30% of votes and 31% of seats. The Kurds’ 
community lost their ratio because in the January 2005 election, they received 25.7% of votes 
and 27.2% of seats, but in the December 2005 election, they got 22.96% of votes and 21.09% 
of seats. In the March 2010 election, their proportion slightly increased to 22.1% of votes, but 
the number of their seats decreased to 17.5%. They could not keep their proportionality 
because of amendments to the electoral law, which negatively affected their proportional 
representation in the CoR. The proportionality of the Shiites was an exceptional case, because 
in the January 2005 election, they received 48.2% votes and 50.9% of seats, but in the 
December 2005 election, they obtained 42.38% of votes and 47.28% of seats. Moreover, in 
the 2010 elections, they obtained 42.4% votes and 48.9% of seats. This study found that only 
the Shiites’ community received more than their due proportion over that period, resulting in 
their over-representation.666 
This meant that while proportionality was practised broadly during this period, each 
community’s share of the vote fluctuated. It did, however, translate into a relatively 
proportional number of representatives in each election. The January 2005 election was less 
representatives because the Sunnis’ community was absent and they did not participate in 
that election.667 Furthermore, the March 2010 election was less proportional because there 
was a wide gap between percentage of votes and percentage of seats. Notably, the Shiites 
obtained more seats by 6.5%, and the Kurds lost 4.6% of seats.668 Thus, the December 2005 
election result was broadly proportional. Thus, while the number of allocated seats diverged 
from the vote share, it did not do so dramatically, or in a way that changed the outcomes. 
Thus, the elections were broadly proportional.  
Consequently, there was ample opportunity to practise proportional representation during 
the period under the occupation. Each community had received its ratio in the parliament, 
despite the number of votes fluctuating at some points. Proportionality was implemented 
largely because it was a formal requirement for the election process and the formation of 
political institutions. The lack of implementation of proportionality, especially in the January 
2005 election and the TG in 2005, was not related to the formal requirements. Rather, it was 
related to the attitude of the Sunnis’ community towards the political process, and their 
boycotting of the election. An important point that arose during this study is that 
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proportionality played a significant role in the political development of Iraq, and was crucial 
for forming the cabinet, because it showed each community’s weight in an exact number, and 
generated election results that made coalition government across the communities a 
necessity for a parliamentary majority. From that point of view, it is an essential element of 
consociationalism, not a secondary element, as Lijphart pointed out.669 Rather, I argue that in 
the Iraqi context, it is a primary concern, and the empirical chapters 5, 6, and 7 demonstrate 
this clearly.  
8.3.2 Grand coalition  
Immediately after the invasion, as a first step towards rebuilding formal political institutions, 
the CPA established the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) on 13 July 2003.670 Its structure was 
very similar to grand coalition government because it was a broad-based institution. 
Successive political institutions continued in this tradition, with the Iraqi Interim Government 
(IIG) also based on grand coalition. This was in accordance with the TAL.671 It had formed 
without neglecting or excluding any key communities. This study pointed out, as noted in 
chapter 5, that the main reason for this was the influence of the US-led coalition forces, since 
they were aware that this kind of government does not allow a single community to 
monopolise the power. The second key motivation for forming a broad-based cabinet was the 
provision of the TAL, because there were several places in it that required unanimous 
agreement between ethno-religious groups. Thus, the external actors and the TAL helped to 
implement grand coalition government. However, while the TAL stated that the government 
should be formed broadly, the Transitional Government (TG) was not a broad-based 
government, because the Sunnis boycotted the political process. This meant that while 
formally grand coalition was requirement for forming the government, the TG had in reality 
formed with a few Sunni ministers, which did not meet the requirements for grand coalition.  
Following that stage, particularly when grand coalition was not a formal requirement for 
forming the cabinet, the implementation of grand coalition took different forms. After the 
approval of the permanent constitution in 2005, up to 2014, two cabinet governments had 
formed. All political parties demanded the formation of a grand coalition government under 
the name of NUG and GNPG. While negotiations took a long time, five and nine months 
respectively, they resulted in an agreement designed to form a government based on power-
sharing methods. It was clear that the government structure, in terms of distribution of high-
level positions, was a grand coalition government, and was based on consensus among the 
three main communities. However, in reality its implementation and performance was 
incompatible with consociationalism.  
Grand coalition government is not reflected in the permanent constitution. Instead, majority 
government is stipulated in Article 76 Sections 1 and 4, which require the largest bloc and 
absolute majority in the CoR to form and approve the cabinet.672 It was only after much 
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pressure and hard negotiations that NUG and GNPG were formed. It was not in the interests 
of the community that had the majority of the population and the majority of seats in the CoR 
to institute power-sharing among all communities. The behaviour of Maliki’s government and 
the political parties associated with him indicate that they were attempting to undermine 
power sharing and consociationalism, which gradually led to authoritarian policies instead of 
power-sharing arrangements.  This means that the implementation of grand coalition did not 
lead to power-sharing in practice, nor did it create the conditions for a fair decision-making 
process, which are the usual distinguishing features of a grand coalition government in a 
deeply-divided society.    
As a result, the implementation of grand coalition government under the occupation was 
better than it was under the permanent constitution and informal agreement. This is because 
after the occupation ended, it was only partially implemented, and so did not contribute to 
bringing down the level of ethno-religious violence. The way in which politicians operated the 
NUG and GNPG in reality meant that they could never implement genuine grand coalition. 
The main reason that grand coalition is not reflected in the constitution is because it was not 
a requirement, and only arranged by informal agreement. If grand coalition had been formally 
enshrined in the constitution, it could have been better implemented, and prevented any 
political leader, political party, or community from neglecting that kind of principle.     
8.3.3 Mutual veto  
During the period 2003-2014, we can identify two kinds of mutual veto, the veto of presidency 
members, and the super majority requirement which creates a de-facto veto. As noted, after 
2010 the constitution no longer foresaw the presidency veto.673 Between 2006 and 2010, 
each community’s representative in the presidency council had made use of the veto 
opportunity. This study pointed out that each community had used the veto to protect its 
rights. It was a formal requirement that did not allow any community to be outvoted on that 
occasion. As addressed in chapter 6, the presidency veto had worked when President Talabani, 
and Vice-Presidents Adil Abdul Mahdi and Tariq Ai-Hashemi, used it. That kind of veto was 
formally reflected in the permanent constitution, and that helped with its implementation 
during the transitional period. Moreover, the super majority veto had partially worked, 
especially in the case of establishing the Federation Council, because the Kurds used the veto 
since they did not agree with that kind of proposal.674 Thus, both types of mutual veto were 
implemented, but at different levels and occasions, which in practice prevented the neglect 
of minority communities’ views, and avoided one-man rule.   
For the period of the second term of Maliki’s cabinet, the implementation of mutual veto was 
not as strong as in the transitional period. Only the super majority veto remained, through a 
two-thirds majority, on different occasions, which was highlighted in Chapter 7. It did not 
work very well and did not make practical sense because the rights of minorities were not 
protected. As I concluded, mutual veto was effective only to a certain extent in contributing 
to a consociational system, because it did not prevent the dominance of Maliki and the Shiite 
parties associated with him over the whole political process. The lack of formal provisions for 
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mutual veto directly affected the implementation of it over this period, especially during 
2010-2014. That is why this study highlighted that in practice the veto worked better during 
2006 to 2010 than in the period between 2010-2014, which faced lack of veto provisions.    
8.3.4 Creating a new region  
Creating a new federal region in Iraq was a controversial point between communities, 
especially between the Shiites and the Sunnis. The reason is that the devolution of the power 
between regions and the central government was a matter to be dealt with among political 
parties. When the Shiites and Sunnis demanded the creation of a new region, the greatest 
concern of each community was to exert their own power far from the central government. 
As argued in chapter 6, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) proposed a plan for 
establishing a new federal region for the Shiites in the south of Iraq in 2006. That was 
according to the initiative declared by Abdul Al-Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of ISCI.675 It had been 
refused by some key political parties from the Shiites’ community and the entire Sunni Arab 
community. They claimed that the new federal region would lead to the dissolution of the 
country and its division into small states, which they saw as unacceptable, thinking that it 
would lead to an increase in conflict violence between communities. This study pointed out 
that the Iraqi people were not ready for creating the new federal region, even though 
provisions for this are formally enshrined in the permanent constitution.  
However, during the second term of Maliki’s government from 2010 to 2014, the situation 
experienced a total about-face in terms of creating the new federal region. This was because 
the Sunnis, who were against the ISCI’s proposal for creating the region for the Shiites in the 
south, demanded the creation of a region for the Sunnis. The Sunnis wanted to protect their 
rights through creating a new federal region, governed by the Sunnis themselves, to curtail 
the Shiite dominated government’s authority. This attempt started from a proposal from one 
of the Sunnis’ provinces, Salahaddin province, in October 2011. 676  The Shiites strongly 
opposed the Sunnis’ bid, and they did not allow them to create what they wanted.  They 
thought that attempts to do this would threaten their own position of governing the whole 
country.  
This meant that at different times both Sunni and Shiite parties proposed and supported the 
creation of new regions, and at other times opposed it. Basically, the closer they were to 
power, the more likely they were to oppose a new region. The primary motivating factor was 
the desire to obtain majority posts and powerful positions, through which they thought they 
could control the whole country. Moreover, when the Sunnis were side-lined by the majority 
of the Shiites, they changed their thinking, and demanded a new federal region. Thus, I argue 
that the behaviour of politicians was and continues to be the real barrier to creating a new 
federal region, because in the pursuit of their own interests, they neglected key provisions of 
federalism, and did not allow it to be implemented at all.     
As a result, creating a new federal region, either for the Shiites or for the Sunnis, did not work 
in the period from 2005 to 2014. Moreover, there were disagreements between the central 
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government and the Kurdistan regional government regarding authority for the Kurdish 
region as an existing federal region. The problem revolves around provisions for the 
administration, control, and management of resources, such as oil and gas, etc.  This study 
argued that the Shiites’ and Sunnis’ attitudes towards federalism changed during this time, 
with the demand for the creation of a new federal region for the Shiites, which the Sunnis 
refused, and later on, the Sunnis own equivalent demand, which was refused by the Shiites. 
Each of them wanted to assure a place for themselves. Another important finding is that the 
provisions for federalism in the constitution are only optional. They are not a compulsory 
requirement in the political system. 
8.4 The role of the US-led coalition (external actors)  
As noted in this study, throughout the whole period of political development, the role of the 
US-led coalition was crucial. At the beginning of the invasion, they had a strong influence on 
rebuilding the political system. It was obvious that they wanted power to be shared between 
significant communities, and they tried to ensure this by drawing up an equation based on 
the three main communities’ participation. They acted as the foundation for forming political 
institutions, starting with the IGC and ending with the second period of Maliki’s government. 
The role of the US-led coalition is reflected in the TAL, which formally included consociational 
elements. In addition, their role in drafting the constitution extended to giving the Iraqi 
people more chances to contribute to writing their own constitution.  The US-led coalition 
had a real role during negotiations for forming the cabinets in 2006 and 2010, and they 
affected the direction of appointing the Prime Minister and other posts between 
communities.677 
At the start of the occupation, from 2003 to 2005, the US-led coalition determined how 
political development would progress. During that period, it came up with a new political 
system wherein the Shiites would obtain absolute majority, the Sunnis 20%, and the Kurds 
20%, which was reflected practically across institutions. This demonstrates that they wanted 
power sharing instead of one-man rule. This study pointed out that during that period, the 
US-led coalition established the foundations for a power sharing arrangement. Therefore, 
consociational elements were formally reflected in the TAL, in the legislations which formed 
the Iraqi Interim political institutions, and in the January 2005 election, which was run under 
their provisions.   
In the transitional period from 2005-2010, the US-led coalition made a plan to withdraw its 
troops from Iraq by the end of 2010. The Iraqi people would then be granted more 
opportunity to drive their political process. Iraq remained, however, under the US-led 
coalition’s troops, because the Iraqi army was still not ready to take responsibility for the issue 
of security in Iraq. This meant that the US-led coalition still had the power to affect the 
direction of Iraq’s political development. It could influence the direction of the political 
process, especially during the negotiations for forming the cabinet, and discussions 
concerning who should take positions such as that of Prime Minister. The point was that the 
US-led coalition tried to encourage the Sunnis to participate in the political process, and to 
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take posts in the political institutions. Alongside this, they struck a balance between ethno-
religious groups to avoid the domination of one community, especially the Shiites, because of 
their absolute majority in the government.678 On the other hand, since the Shiites knew that 
the US-led coalition still had a large role on account of its troops, they realised that they could 
not attack other communities, especially the Sunnis, or neglect them in the cabinet.   
However, when the US-led coalition withdrew its troops at the beginning of the second term 
of Maliki’s government in 2011, the situation immediately changed, and the Prime Minister 
began to target the Sunnis leaders, starting with Tariq al-Hashimi in December 2011. 
Moreover, the entire system, which was formulated to be a power-sharing system, was 
attacked by the Prime Minster, who advocated ignoring the consensus in favour of a ‘majority 
rules’ system.679 This means that the absence of the US-led coalition negatively affected the 
political process, and led to an increase in the level of conflict violence. That was why the 
2005-2010 period was better than 2010-2014 in terms of the positive influence of the US. 
That is, the US-led coalition had a positive role in bringing all ethno-religious groups together 
without letting any group neglect another or attack them in the political process.     
Thus, you can see that when the role of the US-led coalition was strong, the implementation 
of consociational elements, especially the gathering of all communities together to share 
power, was much better. In addition, when the US-led coalition stepped down, Iraq’s political 
development was negatively affected, leaving a government with little aptitude for dealing 
with minority communities. This study pointed out that the role of the US-led coalition was 
crucial for implementing consociational elements in Iraq. When the US’s power declined, 
consociationalism crumbled. It opened the gates to external influences and the rise of Iranian 
power. In addition, consociationalism could not thrive while domestic support for it was so 
shallow, as highlighted earlier.  
In his study, Lijphart did not realise the extent of the role of external actors in cases of 
consociationalism, but McGarry and O’Leary realised that the role of external actors is, in fact, 
very important “in the promotion and operation of consociational settlements.” 680  They 
made their case from an examination of Northern Ireland’s 1998 Good Friday Agreement. 
This study reinforces their findings, because I argue that the external actor will affect the 
direction of the implementation of consociational elements, and promote agreement among 
communities to reach a consensus. The only difference is that the US-led coalition played its 
role as an occupying country.  
However, as argued in chapters 5 and 6, there were different agendas for external actors, 
both the US-led coalition and Iran. The US-led coalition was crucial for bringing all 
communities together to participate in the political process, without letting one single 
community neglect other community. On the other hand, it was in the interests of Iran, whose 
influence increased after the US-led coalition withdrew its troops in 2011, to neglect minority 
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communities, particularly the Sunnis, and to push the Shiites forward to dominate the entire 
country. Therefore, while the role of the external actor is important, it is important to 
understand its agenda, and whether it advocates power sharing or tyranny by single group.    
8.5 Conclusion  
As I have demonstrated, my contribution consists of three points. One of my contributions is 
empirical, because I examined how in the particular case consociationalism was partially 
implemented between 2003 and 2014. This has been demonstrated by unique empirical work, 
that is interviews with key Iraqi senior leaders from that period, with access to meeting 
minutes and memoirs and which disagrees that the literature addressing the Iraqi case is fully 
consociational, such as Lijphart etc.  The second contribution of this thesis is adding to the 
wider literature on consociationalism in Iraq and as a conflict resolution tool or a conflict 
management tool, and in particular, to power sharing literature. I highlighted how, through 
political negotiations and political ambitions, individuals can abuse the system. Part of the 
research analysis is studying the question of the role of consociationalism as a conflict 
resolution tool (especially when the US and UN thought it would work as a tool for conflict 
resolution). The empirical analysis highlights how it has not operated in that way in Iraq, 
because of the way it has been implemented. This raises questions about its utility as a conflict 
resolution tool, and opens up new avenues for future enquiry and research. The main point 
of my research is that the case of Iraq can tell us that consociationalism that is compatible 
with the Iraqi constitution was not implemented correctly and there is a mismatch between 
formal reflection and practice. The ongoing conflict between communities is increased by 
Maliki’s victimisation of his political opponents set a precedent for instability, where 
individuals could abuse the system, allowing for a wider gap between the communities, and 
contributing to the rise of IS. 
The third contribution is the impact of the US-led coalition: the Iraqi case demonstrates that 
the role of the US was crucial for adopting and implementing consociational elements. The 
US pushed to shape formal political institutions through the lens of consociational elements. 
When the US was in power, the direction of the political process headed towards ensuring 
that there would be consensus among key communities and that the political institutions 
should be broad-based. The political process of 2005-10 promoted that direction.  However, 
when the role of the US declined, some internal actors and Iran were presented with the 
opportunity to abuse the consociational systems already in place, as the political 
development between 2010 and 2014 was improving it. 
If not in its entirety, can consociationalism be partially implemented as a conflict resolution 
tool? In the case of Iraq, it could not. The outcome of partial implementation of 
consociationalism from 2003 to 2014 resulted in the neglect of minority communities. It did 
not lead to a decrease in conflict violence in Iraq, nor did it bring stability, peace, or 
sustainability. Moreover, IS could flourish, and the gap between the Kurds and the Shiites 
became wider, with high levels of distrust between communities.        
This led to a widening gap between communities. In 2014, the country faced threat from IS, 
which mostly overtook the Sunnis’ area. The Sunnis asserted that they required their own 
federal region after the recapture of their area.  Most Kurdish political parties have decided 
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to go to referendum regarding the issue of independence on 25 September 2017.681 Masoud 
Barzani pointed out that the main reason for the Sunnis’ and Kurds’ demands is fourteen years 
of regime collapse.  As he said, “Baghdad has failed to implement key provisions of that 
constitution, and we have good reason to believe that it never will.”682 This shows that the 
real reason for the widespread failure to implement the constitution is the behaviour of the 
politicians. Barzani states that “failure of the political system is also responsible for the drastic 
deterioration of relations between Sunnis and Shiites that led to the rise of the Islamic 
State.”683 While the referendum was held on 25 September, it did not lead to the Kurdish 
independence and not go as planned. Thus, the lack of implementation of consociationalism 
caused instability and distrust among all communities.    
This study contributes to the field of the practice of consociationalism as a conflict resolution 
tool in Iraq by using sources which have not previously been used before for this kind of 
empirical work, and by covering the time period from 2003 to 2014. In future, it might be 
worth continuing to investigate the possibility of a solution for Iraq, which is now basically 
divided into three different parts. Therefore, there are several areas of study in conflict 
reduction that remain to be investigated. Is consociationalism still an applicable solution for 
reducing conflict violence in Iraq or are formal divisions and partition required?   
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 Name  Position  Ethnicity Date  Place  Note  
1 Abdulrahman 
S.Kareem  
Former 
Minster 2003-
2004   
Kurd  10.7.2014  Erbil   
2 Ammar Wajih  The Senior 
leader of Iraqi 
Islamic Party 
IIS  
Sunni  12.7.2014  Erbil   
3 Ali Baper  The head of 
the Kurdistan 
Islamic Group 
KIG 
Kurd  15.7.2014 Erbil  Former 
member 
of CoR 
2010-
2014 
4 Fakhradden 
Qader  
The Secretary 
of Kurdistan 
Parliament 
Kurd  16.7.2014 Erbil   
5 Yousif 
Mohammed  
The Speaker 
of Kurdistan 
Parliament  
Kurd  16.7.2014 Erbil   
6 Jaffar Hagi  The Deputy 
Speaker of 
Kurdistan 
Parliament 
Kurd  16.7.2014 Erbil   
7 Mahmood 
Hamad Amin  
Former 
Member of 
Iraqi 
Parliament 
2005-2010 
Kurd  22.7.2014 Halabja   
8 Bayan Tofiq  Former 
Minister 2014-
2016  
Kurd  26.7.2014  Sulaimany Former 
member 
of The 
INC 
9 Yaseen Hasan  Former Iraqi 
Minister  
2010-2011  
Kurd  26.7.2014 Sulaimany  
10 Aram Shikh 
Mohammed  
 The Deputy 
Speaker of 
Iraqi 
Parliament  
Kurd  26.7.2014 Sulaimany  
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11 Alaa Makki  Former 
Member of 
Iraqi 
Parliament 
2006-2014 
Sunni  3.8.2014  Erbil   
12 Hussein 
Balisani  
Former 
Member of 
Iraqi 
Parliament 
and Member 
of constitution 
committee 
2004-2010  
Kurd  4.8.2014 Erbil   
13 Ahmad 
Abdulwahab 
Majid  
Former 
Member of 
Iraqi 
Parliament 
and Member 
of constitution 
committee 
2004- 2005 
Kurd  5.8.2014 Erbil   
14 Mohamad Faraj  Former leader 
of Kurdistan 
Islamic Union 
KIU 2013-
2016 
Kurd  5.8.2014 Erbil   
15 Jamal Al-
Gailani  
Former 
Member of 
CoR 
Sunni  6.8.2014 Erbil   
16 Mohammed 
Senamoki  
Former 
Member of 
CoR 2004-
2005 
Kurd  12.8.2014  Erbil   
17 Barham Salih  Former Prime 
Minister of 
KRG  
Kurd  20.8.2014 Erbil   
18 Saieb Al-Gailani The leader 
form the 
Sunnis 
community  
Sunni  23.8.2014 Erbil   
19 Qader Saeed  Member of 
CoR  
Kurd  2.9.2014  Erbil   
20 Qubad 
J.Talabani  
The Deputy 
Prime 
Minister KRG  
Kurd  11.9.2014  Erbil   
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21 Arif Tayfor  Former 
Deputy 
Speaker of 
CoR 2004-
2010 
Kurd  12.9.2014 Erbil   
22 Akram M.H. Al-
hakim  
Member of 
CDC and 
former 
Minister of 
CoM 2006-
2010 
Shiite  2.10.2015  By Email   
23 Salahaddin 
Muhammad  
Former 
member of 
IGC 2003-
2004 
Kurd  5.10.2015  Sulaimany  
24 Mohsen Abdel 
Hamid 
Former 
member of 
IGC and 
president, 
February 2004 
Sunni, Kurd  7.10.2015  Erbil   
25 Mahmoud 
Othman  
Former 
member of 
CoR and IGC  
Kurd  8.10.2015  Erbil   
26 Rowsch 
Shaways  
Former 
Deputy Prime 
Minister 2015  
Kurd  10.10.2015 Erbil   
27 Yonadam Y. 
Kanna  
Member of 
CoR 
Assyrian  15.10.2015  Baghdad   
28 Alia N. G  Member of 
CoR 
Shiite   15.10.2015  Baghdad   
29 Hisham Al-
Suhail  
Member of 
CoR 
Shiite  15.10.2015  Baghdad   
30 Humam 
Hamoudi  
Head of The 
CDC and 
Deputy 
Speaker of 
CoR 
Shiite  15.10.2015  Baghdad   
31 Ayad Al-
Samarrai  
Former 
speaker of 
CoR 2010  
Sunni  16.10.2015  Baghdad   
32 Ahmad A. Al-
Masari  
Member of 
CoR 
Sunni   18.10.2015  Baghdad   
33 Saleem Al-Jburi  Speaker of 
CoR 
Sunni   18.10.2015  Baghdad   
34 Hanan Al-
Fatlawi  
Member of 
CoR 
Shiite  18.10.2015  Baghdad   
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35 Hani Mousa  Member of 
CoR 
Shiite  18.10.2015  Baghdad   
36 Dara M. A. 
Saeed 
Former 
Minister KRG  
Kurd  3.3.2016  By Facebook   
37 Nouri al-Maliki Former Prime 
Minister 2006-
2014  
Shiite  17.10.2015  Baghdad   
Total:  37 interviews (21 Kurdish, 7 Shiite, 8 Sunni, and One is Christian)  
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